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Abstract of the Dissertation

Operations Management under Financial Frictions
by
Fasheng Xu
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Panos Kouvelis, Chair
Professor Fuqiang Zhang, Co-Chair

The main purpose of this dissertation is to study the emerging operations issues under
financial frictions, in the contexts of supply chain finance and crowdfunding platform;
and to identify the implications for individuals and businesses.
In Chapter 1, “A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring”, we develop a supply chain theory of factoring (recourse and non-recourse) and reverse factoring
showing when these post-shipment financing schemes should be adopted and who really
benefits from the adoption. Factoring is a financial arrangement where the supplier sells
accounts receivable to the factor against a premium, and receives cash for immediate
working capital needs. Reverse factoring takes advantage of the credit rating discrepancy between small supplier and large retailer, and enables supplier’s factoring at the
retailer’s rate. Given the supplier’s credit rating and the trade credit term, recourse
factoring is preferred when the supplier’s cash investment return rate is relatively high;
non-recourse factoring is preferred within certain medium range; otherwise, factoring
should not be adopted. Both factoring schemes, if adopted, benefit both the supplier and
the retailer, and thus the overall supply chain. Further, we find that reverse factoring
may not be always preferred by suppliers among other short-term financing options (bank
loans, recourse and non-recourse factoring). Retailers should only offer reverse factoring
to suppliers with low, but above a threshold, to medium cash investment return rates.
The optimally designed reverse factoring program can always increase the retailer’s profit,
x

but it may leave the supplier indifferent to his current financing option when followed by
aggressive payment extension. Interestingly, our results suggest that it is often preferable
for the retailer to extend reverse factoring to certain suppliers without any request for
payment extension, and leverage the supplier’s willingness to carry extra inventory that
increases the overall supply chain efficiency.
In Chapter 2, “Crowdfunding under Social Learning and Network Externalities”, we
investigate how the presence of both social learning and network externalities affects the
strategic interaction between a crowdfunding firm and forward-looking consumers. In
rewards-based crowdfunding, a firm (campaigner) pre-sells a new product and solicits
financial contributions from the crowd (consumers) to cover production costs. When a
crowdfunding product with uncertain quality is first introduced, consumers may choose
to strategically delay their purchase in anticipation of product quality reviews. Our research yields three main insights. First, we find that in the presence of social learning and
strong network externalities, an upward-sloping demand curve may arise. This so-called
Veblen effect occurs due to the interaction between social learning and strong network
externalities. Second, we show that network externalities have important implications
for the optimal crowdfunding reward choice. In particular, under strong network externalities, the optimal reward will induce all consumers to either adopt the product early
or adopt the product late; whereas under weak network externalities, the consumers will
possibly adopt the products in different periods. Third, we characterize the optimal reward strategy under financial constraints and quantify its impact on the optimal reward
choice and the induced purchase pattern from consumers. These insights provide useful
guidance on how firms can exploit the benefits of crowdfunding.
In Chapter 3, “Crowdfunding vs. Bank Financing: Effects of Market Uncertainty and
Word-of-Mouth Communication”, we investigate a firm’s optimal funding choice when
launching an innovative product to the market with both market uncertainty and wordof-mouth (WoM) communication. Bank financing is a traditional source of capital for
small businesses, whereas crowdfunding has recently emerged as an alternative fundraising solution to support innovative ideas and entrepreneurial ventures. Conceivably,
crowdfunding could potentially replace some of the conventional roles of bank financing,
but puzzles linger over when crowdfunding is a better funding choice. We characterize
the firm’s optimal pricing strategies under the two funding choices (i.e., bank financing

xi

and crowdfunding), compare their performances, and investigate the corresponding implications on social welfare. Among other results, we find that the firm’s optimal funding
choice and pricing strategy depend critically on the market uncertainty, the WoM, and
the initial investment requirement. More specifically, the firm would adopt intertemporal pricing under crowdfunding, where the exact format is determined by the WoM and
market uncertainty; under bank financing, however, the firm should always charge a fixed
price invariant to those parameters. Moreover, market uncertainty has a non-monotonic
effect on the optimal funding choice: Bank financing is preferred only when the market
uncertainty is within an intermediate range. The impact of initial investment requirement
on the choice of funding schemes shares qualitatively a similar trend. Finally, contrary to
the conventional wisdom, we find that more active social interactions in crowdfunding,
although beneficial to the firm, may hurt consumers and even reduce social welfare.

xii

1. A Supply Chain Theory of Factoring and Reverse Factoring

1.1

Introduction
1

Trade credit, as a common industry practice, is the credit extended by a firm’s

suppliers when the supplier sells the firm goods or services on account. Instead of paying
for the goods and services with cash immediately, the firm pays its suppliers with a time
lag which creates the equivalent of a loan (i.e., trade credit) from the suppliers to the
firm. Since most downstream firms demand 30 to 90 days to pay after goods are delivered,
those small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) suppliers will find it difficult to finance
their production cycle or miss other attractive investment opportunities. A potential
approach to free up cash flow locked in their accounts receivable positions is factoring.
Factoring is a type of short-term financing in which suppliers sell their accounts receivable
at a discount and receive immediate cash from the factor (typically a bank or a financial
service firm). In recent years, the use of factoring has increased dramatically on a global
scale as an effective, and relatively low-risk and low-cost, way of expanding access to
working capital finance. Since 1996, the global factoring industry has been growing at
a relatively fast pace, increasing on average nearly 9% per annum, and the total volume
amounts to EUR 2,376 billion in 2016 [2].
Factoring can be done on a recourse basis, especially when it is difficult to assess the
default risk of the underlying accounts, meaning that the factor has a claim (i.e., recourse)
against its client (the borrower) for any account payment deficiency. The alternative is
non-recourse factoring, where the factor not only assumes title to the accounts, but also
assumes most of the default risk because the factor does not have recourse against the
supplier if the accounts default. Hence, non-recourse factoring removes the receivables
from the supplier’s books (off-balance sheet), and thus formally separates the accounts receivable from borrowers’ other assets in the event of bankruptcy. That said, non-recourse
1

This paper is based on the author’s early work [1] jointly with Panos Kouvelis.

1

factoring is classified as a sale of receivables, whereas recourse factoring is classified as
borrowing, since the eventual receivables recoup is a potential liability to the supplier.
The difference between recourse and non-recourse factoring raise a natural question for
the cash-constrained supplier: which is a better choice?
It is worth noting that financial constraints of SME suppliers are strengthened by
common cash-management practices of retailers (buyers) in the supply chain. Retailers
try to collect their account receivables as quick as possible while postponing payments to
suppliers. This is not only true for companies experiencing worrisome cash flow problems,
like small start-up companies with limited access to credit, but also for big, robust companies who are imposing new schedules on suppliers as a business strategy. For example,
during the heart of the recession in January 2009, beverage giant Anheuser-Busch InBev
extended its payment terms from 30 days to 120 days with less than a month’s notice,
giving suppliers no time to prepare. Around the same time, global beverage giant Diageo
went from 30 days to 60 days payment, with no offsetting compensation for its suppliers
[3].
However, the above cash-to-cash cycle optimization of large buyers by extending payment terms on SME suppliers leads to a suboptimal solution from a supply chain perspective. The highest inventory financing burden is borne by the weakest shoulders, thus
increasing overall finance costs in the value chain with serious implications for its smooth
performance (deterioration of relationships, price increases, lower service/quality, continuity issues, bankruptcy, etc). [4] and [5] document that extending trade credit with
unfavorable payment terms is especially costly for financially constrained firms, who must
curtail investments and take on liquidity risk in order to do so. [5] empirically demonstrate that slow payment terms for matched pairs of large customers and small suppliers
result in significant underinvestment by the suppliers.
Concerned about the rising financing costs for SME suppliers, retailers are stepping
up to help alleviate suppliers’ cash flow stress. In many cases retailers employ the new
financing scheme of reverse factoring (also often referred as supply chain finance program 2 ). Under this new scheme, the retailer essentially acts as an underwriter of the
suppliers’ accounts receivable risk, and works with a third-party bank to ensure the lend2

Although the terms SCF and reverse factoring are often used interchangeably, especially by practitioners,
the definition of SCF provided by Global Supply Chain Finance Forum in 2016 positions it as a general
concept that encompasses reverse factoring and many other financial supply chain solutions.

2

ing of money to their suppliers with a relatively lower interest rate. A great example of
such a practice is the one used by Jingdong, China’s second-largest e-commerce company.
Starting in October 2013, Jingdong has cooperated with banks to streamline procedures
for its suppliers to get loans. A Jingdong supplier could ask the company to verify its
accounts receivable and use this to borrow from a cooperating bank much more quickly
and at a lower rate than usual. Such supply chain finance program is particularly attractive to SMEs in emerging markets, as they can borrow based on their buyer’s superior
credit rating.
Procter & Gamble’s decision in April 2013 to extend its payment terms for all suppliers
by 30 days was complemented by the firm’s reverse factoring program helping suppliers
finance their increased working capital requirements. Using a similar approach, Unilever
has been able to achieve a $2 billion working capital reduction in a three-year time
span [6]. Similarly, Philips uses reverse factoring to obtain preferred-buyer status with
its suppliers and reduce the risk of disruption in times of shortage. Reverse factoring
programs have also been initiated in response to disruptions in the financial markets. For
example, WalMart’s “Supplier Alliance Program”, was offered to more than a thousand
of its apparel suppliers, many of which SMEs, in the aftermath of the 2009 Chapter 11
bankruptcy filing by CIT Group Inc., an established commercial lender [7].
Reverse factoring is often presented as a “win-win approach” for both the supplier
and the buyer [6, 8]. The supplier can finance its working capital needs using the creditworthiness and commitments from the retailer, thus resulting in lower financing costs.
They also have the option to improve their cash flow through early payment, should they
choose to execute it. The retailer is able to use its credit rating to infuse cash efficiencies into the supply chain, and often leverages such programs for extended payments and
cash-to-cash cycle optimization. However, in most cases the reality is nuanced, with large
buyers aggressively using reverse factoring to extend the payment terms to suppliers, with
the benefits of the reverse factoring program questionable under such terms for suppliers
[9, 10]. Our study investigates the performance implications of reverse factoring for all
players in the supply chain and the chain’s overall efficiency.
In this paper, we study a pull-structure supply chain with a cash-constrained SME
supplier and a large credit-worthy retailer. The newsvendor-like supplier has a single opportunity to produce and stock inventory to satisfy future uncertain retail demand, with

3

the wholesale price determined by the retailer. Within this setting, we model different financing alternatives, and we investigate the optimal structures for each financing scheme.
We also compare those financing schemes both from a supplier and a supply chain perspective. Our main goal is to shed light on how different financing alternatives impact
the strategic interactions within the supply chain, and how they should be designed to
create value for firms in the supply chain. Our work contributes to the literature in the
following three ways.
First, we develop a pull-structure supply chain model in the presence of liquidity constraints and financing frictions to advance our understanding of how short term financing
schemes (factoring and reverse factoring) interface with operational decisions in the chain
(wholesale price, production quantity, and payment extension). However, extant literature has mostly relied on push-structure supply chains (i.e., financing the newsvendor-like
retailers) to model the role of trade credit on supply chain decisions. Our emphasis on
understanding retailer (buyer) motivated financing programs necessitates the use of pullstructure supply chain modeling.
Second, we explicitly model the role of factoring schemes within supply chains, and
are able to explain the differing implications of factoring structures, recourse vs. nonrecourse, in supply chain efficiency and benefits for each firms in the chain. This allows
us to provide conditions under which recourse vs. non-recourse factoring are preferred by
capital constrained suppliers. In doing so, we explicitly model “seniority rights” of banks
in collecting their loans with priority over factored accounts in the case of bankruptcy, a
financing friction that is necessary to explain the advantages of non-recourse factoring.
From the perspective of the liquidity constrained supplier, the trade-offs in choosing
factoring schemes are twofold: the advanced cash amount for accounts receivable (favors
recourse factoring with the supplier receiving higher cash advance as he remains liable
for the accounts receivable risk) and the incurred financing cost during factoring (favors
non-recourse factoring as it avoids the financing friction of bank seniority). We show that
non-recourse factoring is a preferred option for suppliers with low (but above a threshold)to-moderate investment opportunities for the cash received in advance. However, for
suppliers with reasonable credit ratings (above a threshold) and rather high investment
return rates, the increased liquidity benefits of recourse factoring exceed any financing
cost concerns.
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Finally, our work offers a clear supply chain argument, which explicitly recognizes the
strategic interactions of the buyer and the supplier in the chain, in explaining the extent
of reverse factoring adoption versus other short term financing schemes (bank financing,
recourse/non-recourse factoring) of inventories (accounts receivable) in the chain. Reverse
factoring has often been argued as an effort by the credit-worthy buyers to compensate
smaller capital constrained suppliers for an aggressive lengthening of payment terms. Our
work shows that reverse factoring is adopted by suppliers that have non-recourse factoring
as a preferable short term financing option. However, reverse factoring might not be
preferable for suppliers with low investment return rates, or for suppliers of moderateto-high credit ratings and rather high investment return rates. In the latter case, the
liquidity benefit of reverse factoring might be overcome by the increased financing costs
of an extended payment term. For this latter case, an optimally designed reverse factoring
scheme is less aggressive in extending payment terms for the retailer, if at all, and fully
capitalizes on the supplier’s willingness to assume higher inventory risk due to the lower
financing costs afforded by reverse factoring. Our work is the first to fully model the
strategic choice of suppliers among all available short-term financing options in response
to a proposed reverse factoring program by the buyer, and as a result points out that
reverse factoring may not be always adopted by suppliers. We also show that buyers
(retailers) may not want to extend these programs to certain suppliers.
Recourse
Factoring
Bank
Financing

Factoring
Comparison

Reverse
Factoring

Non-Recourse
Factoring

Figure 1.1.: The Structural Outline of the Main Models

The rest of the paper is organized as follows (The structural outline of main models
in this paper is given in Figure 1.1). Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section
3 lays out the model framework, the assumptions, the notations, and the benchmark
equilibrium solution for the pure bank financing case. In section 4, we investigate the
strategic interactions between four parties (retailer, supplier, bank and factor) under recourse and non-recourse factoring, and characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium for these
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factoring schemes. Then, in section 5 we study the optimal design of the reverse factoring
contract accounting for other available short-term financing options. We characterize the
conditions under which suppliers will adopt the reverse factoring programs, and retailers
will offer such programs. We place emphasis on understanding when successful reverse
factoring adoptions are complemented by payment term extensions. We conclude with
summary remarks, managerial insights, and model extensions. All proofs are given in the
appendix.

1.2

Literature Review
There are three primary streams of research our work is related to: short-term fi-

nancing in supply chains (in particular, pure bank financing and trade credit), operations
management under financial frictions, and the study of factoring and reverse factoring.
Among the first to bring capital constraints and financing issues into operations management, [11] discuss asset-based financing in an inventory context, and investigate the
situation that a retailer borrows from a profit-maximizing bank who controls both the
loan interest rate and credit limit. In the context of a push supply chain, i.e., selling to the
newsvendor, [12] study a Stackelberg game without liquidity constraints, with the supplier offering a wholesale price contract to a retailer facing uncertain demand, and then
the retailer placing a single order prior to the selling season. The subsequent “financing
the newsvendor” literature builds upon this model by adding liquidity constraints and
exploring the effectiveness of various financing schemes to alleviate them. [13] suggest
that the strategic supplier prefers to offer cheap trade credit to better price the wholesale
price contract and have the retailer order larger order quantities for the same price. Optimally designed trade credit leads to higher order quantities and enhances supply chain
efficiency. [14] shows that the inventory decisions of a retailer with multi-items are distorted by debt financing, and the distortion can be mitigated by trade credits with terms
contingent on the retailer’s order. When risk in a trade relationship originates from the
buyer, [15] study how a firm’s own riskiness impacts its sourcing diversification strategy.
We refer the reader to [16] for a comprehensive discussion of recent contributions and
future directions in this area.
Under bankruptcy related frictions, [17] examine how a firm’s financial distress and
the legal environment of bankruptcy reorganization can alter product market competition
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and supplier-buyer relationships. [18] present an exhaustive analysis of newsvendor like
decisions under liquidity constraints, bankruptcy risks and bankruptcy costs. Further,
[19] discuss contract design and supply chain coordination issues under working capital
constraints and bankruptcy costs. In some cases, coordination is possible via contracts
that appropriately reallocate working capital among firms, but not possible in other
cases. [20] study the dynamics of purchase order financing under market frictions of
the supplier’s credit limit and informational transparency, and show how the financial
characteristics of the supplier influence the operational decisions and profits of both firms.
Taking a different perspective, we study the financing schemes of factoring and reverse
factoring in the pull supply chain setting, and incorporate two types of financial frictions:
credit rating discrepancy between supplier and retailer, and the “seniority rights” of banks
in collecting their loans with priority over factors in the case of bankruptcy. This latter
friction is instrumental in explaining the advantage of non-recourse factoring.
In addition to the work referenced above, our research is related to the emerging
literature that deals with various facets of factoring and reverse factoring. Using a case
study approach, [21] describe the usual objectives and barriers to the adoption of reverse
factoring. Through system dynamics modeling, [22] identify the market factors (e.g.,
competition, interest rates, receivables volumes, etc.) determining the benefits of reverse
factoring, and find that such benefits are highly sensitive to market conditions. On
the empirical side, [23] provides an econometric analysis of the benefit of both factoring
and reverse factoring as a means of financing SMEs and emphasizes the importance of
economic development and growth. Early analytical works on factoring schemes focused
on the information asymmetry between the supplier (the seller of accounts receivable)
and the bank (or the factor) [7, 24, 25]. [24] examines the optimal factoring contract and
finds that the preference of recourse over non-recourse factoring depends on the credit
quality of the seller’s accounts receivable, the seller’s solvency, and the seller’s reputation.
[26] propose an analytical framework to optimize the payment extension term in reverse
factoring, and argue that the financial implications of payment extension need careful
assessment in stochastic settings.
[25] shows that from a supplier perspective reverse factoring is beneficial when the
spread in deadweight financing costs is high, nominal payment periods are long, the demand volatility is high, and the SME employs an aggressive working capital policy. [7]
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analytically study the impact of reverse factoring on SME suppliers in a stochastic multiperiod setting, and they find that reverse factoring considerably improves a supplier’s
operational performance while providing the potential to unlock more than 10 percent of
the supplier’s working capital. Adopting the Bass diffusion model, [27] find that initial
payment terms and procurement volume strongly affect the optimal timing of reverse factoring introduction and optimal payment term extensions. [28] analyze a model with the
buyer specifying both wholesale price and order quantity and employing reverse factoring
to reduce financing costs for its suppliers. They find empirically that these financing
practices generate higher profits for both the supplier and the retailer by inducing higher
stocking levels.
Our work explicitly models reverse factoring as one of the short-term financing choices
(bank loans, recourse/non-recourse factoring) of the supplier in a strategic interaction
game with the buyer. So, optimally designed reverse factoring programs have to balance
financing cost advantage of the supplier via use of differential credit ratings (buyer’s
superior rating over the supplier’s) with the penalizing extended payment terms. Using
a pull-structure supply chain, we offer a clear supply chain rationale of the advantages
of reverse factoring programs when adopted: non-recourse structure reduces importance
of “seniority rights” of banks at the collection time of accounts receivable in low demand
conditions; suppliers lower financing costs by dealing with factors/banks that use the
buyer’s superior credit rating in assessing financing terms; and finally potential benefits
of extended payment terms for the buyer. In the presence of these trade-offs, our work is
the first to provide a comprehensive treatment of a supply chain equilibrium model on the
supplier’s and retailer’s choices on wholesale price, production quantity, and short-term
financing scheme, fully accounting for the ensued financing and operational costs.

1.3

Modeling Framework
Building upon the classic buying-from-the-newsvendor model, i.e., pull supply chain

setting [29], we study a two-firm supply chain where a large downstream retailer determines the wholesale price and then the SME supplier decides how much inventory to
produce and stock at the retailer’s location, and owns that inventory prior to sales. As
mentioned in [29], often encountered situations represented by a pull-structure supply
chain are: Vendor Managed Inventory with consignment contract (the supplier decides
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how much inventory to stock at the retailer and owns that inventory), or drop shipping
(the supplier holds the inventory and ships directly to consumers, even though customer
orders are placed through the retailer’s online channel). Pull supply chain structure makes
the supplier fully responsible for the inventory risk, and the uncertainty nature of the
supplier’s accounts receivable intensifies the interplay between operational and financial
decisions in the supply chain.
The SME supplier is capital constrained (i.e., the supplier’s initial capital may be
insufficient to produce what is needed in support of the retail demand) and in need of
short-term financing, which is provided by a third-party bank (or a factor). To fully
understand and illustrate the benefits of different short-term financing schemes, we first
analyze the benchmark case of pure bank financing. We then model and analyze the
equilibrium outcomes under recourse factoring, non-recourse factoring and reverse factoring, and investigate the structural differences, equilibrium solutions and supply chain
consequences. For all cases, the bank offers a fairly priced loan for relevant risks. Failure
of the supplier’s loan repayment leads to bankruptcy. For the rest of the paper, we will
refer the retailer as she, the supplier as he, and the band and factor as it.

1.3.1

Notations and Assumptions

The decision variables are the retailer’s wholesale price w, the supplier’s production
quantity q and the bank’s/factor’s interest rate r. Exogenous parameters are rf , the riskfree interest rate for unit time period (normalized to 0 without loss of generality); p, the
retail price; c, the unit production cost for supplier at time 0; t1 , the supplier’s production
lead-time and t2 , the retailer’s deferral payment period (also referred to as payment term
or trade credit term). Let tc = t1 + t2 be the total cash conversion cycle (also referred to
as cash-to-cash cycle). The timing of events (both operations and finance) is outlined in
Figure 1.2. (Note: AR and AP are abbreviations for “accounts receivable” and “accounts
payable”, respectively.)
To capture the timing effect of the contract terms, we adopt in our study the continuous compounding for all interest related calculation. Because the salvage value of unsold
items and goodwill loss for unmet demand do not change the nature of the problem,
without loss of generality, they are normalized to zero in our model. The supplier’s and
retailer’s expected profits are denoted by πi and Πi , with i ∈ {B, F, S, R} representing
9
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Figure 1.2.: General Timing of Events

pure bank financing, recourse factoring, non-recourse factoring, and reverse factoring, respectively. Hereafter, for a generic decision variable V, we will use Vi , to denote the best
response given the Stackelberg leader’s (retailer’s) decision under financing alternative
i, and use Vi∗ to denote the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. Let ∨ (∧) denote the
maximizing (minimizing) operator, i.e., x ∨ y = max(x, y) and x ∧ y = min(x, y). 1{·}
is used to represent the indicator function and (x)+ = max(x, 0). Monotonic relations
(increasing, decreasing) are used in the weak sense unless otherwise stated.
We assume, for ease of exposition, that the uncertain product market demand D is
realized at a single time tc , the end-of-the-sales season. Let demand D be a non-negative
random variable with p.d.f. f (·), c.d.f. F (·), and complementary c.d.f. F̄ (·) = 1 − F (·).
We make the following assumptions about demand distribution F throughout the paper:
(i) it has a finite mean µ and a continuous p.d.f., with f (ξ) > 0 in [0, Ξ] (Ξ ≤ +∞); (ii)
its failure rate function z(ξ) = f (ξ)/F̄ (ξ) is strictly increasing in ξ, i.e., (strictly) IFR.
Our other modeling assumptions are summarized in Table 1.1.

1.3.2

Cash Investment Return

The supplier has access to a new investment opportunity at time t1 , with a deterministic investment output function Is (x, t) = xeαs t if x amount of cash is invested for a time
period of t. If the supplier receives cash x immediately after delivery at time t1 , he can
invest it with a return Is (x, t2 ) at time tc , where t2 is retailer’s deferral payment period,
i.e., open account payment term. We refer to αs as the supplier’s investment return rate
(per unit time) and t the investment horizon. This new investment opportunity captures
the supplier’s need of unlocking the cash flow trapped in the trade credit obligation (accounts receivable), and it is used a modeling artifice to reflect the working capital needs
10

Table 1.1: A Summary of Modeling Assumptions

(A1)

The bank, factor, retailer, and supplier are all risk-neutral.

(A2)

All parameters and the pull supply chain structure are common knowledge.

(A3)

The capital market has no taxes and bankruptcy costs. The factor and the bank
competitively price risk with a premium based upon the borrower’s credit rating.

(A4)

The bank and factor face no bankruptcy risk, but the supplier may claim bankruptcy,
depending on whether his cash inflow (sales revenue and investment output) can
cover the cash outflow (loan obligations to the bank and factor) at time tc .

(A5)

The bank is senior to the factor under recourse factoring, i.e., the supplier first
repays the bank loan and then repays the factor after the bank loan has been paid
in full.

(A6)

Credit ratings are set by an independent rating agency prior to the analyzed supply
chain transaction, and the ratings are common knowledge to all three parties.

(A7)

The supplier has zero initial cash position and needs bank financing to start
production.

in support of other current or new business opportunities. Similarly, we can define the
retailer’s cash investment output function Ir (x, t) = xeαr t . Note here, the linearity of
investment output function with respect to x is mainly assumed for convenience of exposition, and our results hold for general concave increasing investment output functions
as widely adopted in finance literature [30].

1.3.3

Credit Rating and Interest Rate Premium

Our modeling of credit ratings and implications for supply chain firms follows [31]. A
firm’s credit rating represents a rating agency’s evaluation of a company’s overall creditworthiness. The evaluation describes rating agency’s opinion of the firm’s ability to pay
back the debt and the likelihood of default. In our study, credit rating is adopted to reflect default risks for the firm exogenous to the immediate supply chain transactions. We
capture such risk via a Bernoulli random default of a firm, with occurrence probability
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depending on the firm’s credit rating. That is, at time tc , we use two exogenous independent Bernoulli random variables, which are independent of the random demand, to
model the supplier’s and retailer’s potential default due to risk factors captured in credit
ratings, but outside their current supply chain transactions. The bank decides the bank
loan interest rates, rr and rs , charged for the retailer and supplier, respectively, for a unit
borrowing period. For j = r (retailer) and s (supplier), let Cj ≥ 0 be the borrower i’s
credit rating score. Since we focus on the supply chain with a large credit-worthy retailer
and a cash-constrained SME supplier, we assume the retailer credit rating is higher than
the supplier’s, i.e., Cr > Cs . We shall denote by ρ(Cj ) the default probability of a firm
with credit rating Cj , due to exogenous default events. We assume that ρ(·) is a general
decreasing function.
Bank loans are competitively priced, but with risk premium reflecting the firm’s credit
risk. Based on the short-term credit practices described in [32] and similar to the setting of [31], we assume that η(Cj ) ≥ 0 is the interest rate premium charged by the
bank/factor based on the borrower’s credit rating and η(·) is a general decreasing function, which corresponds to current credit rating practices [?, see, e.g.,]]tirole2010theory,
babich2012managing. We also assume such premium are the same across all banks due to
a transparent credit rating process and a fully competitive banking sector. For notational
convenience, we will simply denote ρ(Cj ) as ρj , and η(Cj ) as ηj .
Empirical research on small business finance confirms that the financing costs faced by
large retailers are significantly lower than what their suppliers can realize. For instance,
[33] estimate that marginal equity flotation costs for large firms start at 5.0%, while the
corresponding figure for small firms is 10.7%; bankruptcy costs amount respectively to
8.4% or 15.1% of capital. In a novel data set on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts, [34]
observe that most suppliers are much smaller and less well rated than their buyers, and
are unlikely to have access to cheaper financing.

1.3.4

Pure Bank Financing Benchmark

Now, we present the equilibrium result under pure bank financing when the supplier
has no access to other financing alternatives (i.e., cash advance opportunities with factoring and reverse factoring). Let us first consider the supplier’s borrowing activity at
time t = 0. Since both the supplier and the retailer may default with probability ρs and
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ρr due to the exogenous default risk, the supplier may claim bankruptcy in which case
the bank receives zero repayment for the short-term loan issued to the supplier. With
probability (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ), the bank has only demand risks associated with the current
supply chain transaction affecting the supplier’s ability to repay the loan. Due to the risk
premium, the bank expects a return of e[rf +ηs ]tc (i.e., eηs tc as rf = 0) through the loan
transaction with the SME supplier over a time period of tc . Then, the bank’s interest
rate rB for supplier is chosen so that he is indifferent to issuing the loan to the supplier
and earning a rate of return eηs tc ,
cqeηs tc = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )E[min(wD, cqerB tc )].

(1.1)

We refer to this equation as the “competitive credit pricing equation in pure bank financing.”
Let bB (q; w, Cs , Cr ) be the supplier’s bank financing bankruptcy threshold, representing
the minimal realized demand level under which the supplier is still able to repay the
loan obligation. Then, bB (q; w, Cs , Cr ) = cqerB tc /w, where the dependence of Cs and
Cr is contingent on equation (2.2). It is expositionally convenient to use bB (q; w, Cs , Cr )
instead of rB (q; w, Cs , Cr ), as the fundamental decision variables of the bank. Hereafter,
for notational convenience, we also denote bB (q; w, Cs , Cr ) and rB (q; w, Cs , Cr ) as bB (q)
Rq
and rB (q) or simply bB and rB for a given w. Let S(q) = E[min(D, q)] = 0 F̄ (ξ)dξ.
Then, equation (2.2) can be rewritten as
cB q = wE[min(D, bB )] = wS(bB ),
where cB =

ceηs tc
(1−ρs )(1−ρr )

(1.2)

is the supplier’s effective unit production cost under pure bank

financing. From the definition of bankruptcy threshold bB , we know the probability F (bB )
captures the the supplier’s bankruptcy risk. With the SME supplier the weak link in the
chain, we will further adopt F (bB ) as a measure for the supply chain default risk. Note
that the supply chain default risk defined here is separated from firms’ exogenous default
risk conditioned on credit ratings, and only captures the supply chain inherent risk due
to demand uncertainty.
Without exogenous default shock, the supplier’s expected revenue at time tc is wS(q).
To calculate the supplier’s expected cost, we note that if the realized demand at the
retailer side is less than or equal to the bankruptcy threshold bB , the supplier cannot repay
the loan obligation and has to declare bankruptcy. In this case, the supplier loses his
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sales revenue wξ. Hereafter, all sales revenue and cost are calculated with the equivalent
time tc value. However, if the realized demand is larger than bB , the supplier repays the
commercial loan, and his total cost is cqerB tc = wbB . In summary, the supplier’s expected
cost is E[min(wD, cqerB tc )] = E[min(wD, wbB )] = wS(bB ). Then, the supplier’s expected
profit is πB (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )w[S(q) − S(bB )], where 1 − ρs and 1 − ρr reflect the
supplier’s and the retailer’s exogenous default risk, respectively. Since wS(bB ) = cB q from
equation (1.2), the supplier’s expected profit can be simplified as
πB (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )(wS(q) − cB q).

(1.3)

Two points bear mentioning here. First, the supplier’s expected profit does not depend
on the bankruptcy threshold bB (equivalently, the bank’s interest rate rB ), but depends
on the credit ratings of both parties in the supply chain. This implies that the supplier’s
optimal production quantity is not influenced by his financial constraints (without loss
of generality, we assume zero initial cash position), but is affected by his financial status (credit ratings). When market frictions (credit rating and interest rate premium)
exist, the capital-constrained supplier’s operational decisions can not be decoupled from
financing decisions. Second, based on the supplier’s effective unit production cost cB ,
the supplier’s unit production cost now consists of two parts: the original production
cost and the financing cost. This can be directly reflected if we rewrite the effective unit
production cost as
ceηs tc
eηs tc − (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
cB =
=c+
c.
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
|
{z
}

(1.4)

unit financing cost

In other words, the effective unit production cost increases as the credit rating of either
the supplier or the retailer decreases, and increases in the supplier’s cash conversion cycle
tc . Meanwhile, the retailer’s profit function is
ΠB (w) = (1 − ρr )(p − w)S(qB (w)),

(1.5)

where qB (w) is the supplier’s optimal production quantity given a wholesale price w under
pure bank financing. The equilibrium outcome is similar to the case of traditional pull
supply chain [29], with the adjustment of the supplier’s effective unit production cost cB .
Therefore, the optimal production quantity qB and wholesale price wB can be formally
summarized in the next proposition. Henceforth, for notational convenience, we denote
j(q) = S(q)/F̄ (q).
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Proposition 1.3.1 There exists a unique equilibrium (wB∗ , qB∗ ) under pure bank financing:
(i) (wB∗ , qB∗ ) can be derived from the equation system: pF̄ (q) = cB [1 + z(q)j(q)] and
w = cB /F̄ (q);
(ii) In equilibrium, as the credit rating of either party increases or the payment term t2
decreases, the wholesale price wB∗ decreases, while the production quantity qB∗ and
both profits increase.

1.4

Factoring
Factoring is a short-term financing scheme for suppliers with the supplier’s accounts

receivable serving as the traded asset for immediate cash or serving as a loan collateral.
The factor will typically advance less than 100% of the face value of the receivable even
though it takes ownership of the entire receivable. The remaining balance is paid to the
seller when the receivables are received, less interest and related service fees. For example,
most factors offer sellers financing up to 70% of the value of an account receivable and
pay the remaining 30% – less interest and service fees – when payment is received from
the retailer. The difference between the advance amount and the invoice amount serves
as a reserve held by the factor. If and when the invoice is paid in full, the reserve amount
is remitted by the factor to its client.
Factoring can be done either on a “non-recourse” or “recourse” basis. If the receivable
is sold without recourse, then the supplier is not liable for any delinquency in the payment
of the underlying receivable (retailer’s payment). If the receivable is sold with recourse,
then the supplier may be accountable for all of the uncollected amount. As the value of
the supplier’s accounts receivable is uncertain due to the demand risk, the factor limits
the cash advance amount to the supplier to better control it. In this section, we will
provide quantitative examination of the structures of optimal factoring contracts under
both recourse and non-recourse factorings, and investigate the corresponding equilibrium
outcomes and their implications for supply chain performance.
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1.4.1

Timing of Events under Factoring

The chronology of events, notations, and decision structure are summarized as follows,
where we use case (a) and (b) to represent recourse factoring and non-recourse factoring,
respectively.
(1) At time 0, the retailer proposes the wholesale price w. Then, the supplier responds
with the production quantity q, and requests the bank loan cq, with the interest rate
based on the supplier’s own credit rating Cs and the maturity date at time tc .
(2) At time t1 , the supplier delivers the products to the retailer and records accounts
receivable from the retailer, which are payable at time tc with face value wq. Then,
the supplier either
Case (a) : factors the accounts receivable and receives immediate cash LF ; or
Case (b) : directly sells the accounts receivable to the factor and obtains immediate
cash LS .
For both cases, the received cash is used to invest for a period of t2 with a deterministic
investment output Is (Li , t2 ) = Li eαs t2 ;
(3) At time tc , the retailer pays the supplier wξ for sold items. Then,
Case (a) : the supplier repays the bank first and then the factor, and may claim
bankruptcy if the realized sales plus the investment output is less than
the total loan obligation;
Case (b) : the factor directly collects payment from the retailer, with the supplier
having no liabilities if the collected repayment can’t cover the supplier’s
cash advance amount.
We would like to note that in the case of recourse factoring, the supplier is simultaneously liable at time tc to both the bank, for the original loan for production purposes,
and the factor, for the advanced cash for the factored receivables. As is common in the
finance literature [32], the bank has “seniority” during the collection process, or in other
words, collects ahead of the factor. Therefore, it is to be expected that the factor charges
a higher interest rate then the bank, under the assumption that all have access to the
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same supplier’s credit rating information. Hence, the supplier will use the received cash
from the factor at time t1 to invest in a profitable opportunity (modeled via the investment output function) rather than repay the bank loan. Furthermore, when the supplier
requests for bank financing to start production at time 0, the bank knows the supplier’s
factoring activities at time t1 , which together with the bank’s seniority rights, guarantees
the supplier’s full repayment of the bank loan regardless of the demand realization.

1.4.2

Recourse Factoring

At time 0, the bank offers a competitively priced bank loan under the supplier’s
credit rating, using the same pricing equation as in the bank financing case, i.e., cB q =
wS(bB ). Hence, we have the same bank financing bankruptcy threshold bB , and the
interest rate rB satisfies cqerB tc = wbB . Then, at time t1 the supplier may choose to factor
his accounts receivable, with the factor offering a cash advance (loan) LF = wS(q), which
is competitively priced under the supplier’s credit rating Cs and equal to the expected
value of the accounts receivable. Denote rF to be the interest rate charged by the factor.
When factoring is adopted, the supplier will invest the cash advance LF he receives
at time t1 in a new project, with an investment horizon t2 and a deterministic investment
output Is (LF , t2 ) = LF eαs t2 . Due to the recourse nature of the factoring, the supplier is
responsible for the uncollected amount at time tc . If the realized demand is too low, the
supplier may be liable for the loan obligations to the bank and the factor. The supplier’s
problem is to optimally choose the production quantity q to maximize the expected net
cash flow at time tc , by considering the bank’s loan interest, the factor’s interest for cash
advance, and the supplier’s own cash investment return.
Due to the bank’s senior collection rights relative to the factor, the bank’s loan is
guaranteed to be fully repaid as long as no exogenous default of the supplier. Hence,
the bank’s interest rate rB only prices in the exogenous default risk and satisfies (1 −
ρs )cqerB tc = cqeηs tc . Let bF be the supplier’s recourse factoring bankruptcy threshold,
then bF should satisfy wbF + LF eαs t2 = LF erF t2 + cqerB tc , where LF = wS(q). Taking
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into consideration the bank’s interest rate decision rB , the recourse factoring bankruptcy
threshold can be further derived as3
bF =

cqeηs tc
LF (erF t2 − eαs t2 ) + cqerB tc
= (erF t2 − eαs t2 )S(q) +
.
w
w(1 − ρs )

(1.6)

This equation builds up the connection between the recourse factoring bankruptcy
threshold bF and the factor’s interest rate for the supplier’s cash advance rF .
Lemma 1 For a given bF and the pull contract (w, q), the factor’s expected total repayment Ω(bF ; w, q) from the supplier under recourse factoring is as follows:
Ω(bF ; w, q) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(bF ) + (1 − ρs )wS(q)eαs t2 − cqeηs tc .

(1.7)

A risk-neutral factor will offer a fairly priced interest rate rF to the supplier, which
will imply a bankruptcy threshold bF so that the factor is indifferent between providing
the recourse factoring service to the supplier and earning the interest rate with premium
eηs t2 adjusted according to the supplier’s credit rating. Hence, the competitive credit
pricing equation for the factor is as follows:
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(bF ) + (1 − ρs )wS(q)eαs t2 − cqeηs tc = wS(q)eηs t2 .

(1.8)

Without exogenous default shock, the supplier’s expected cash inflow (sales revenue
plus cash investment output, if any) at time tc is wS(q) + LF eαs t2 = wS(q) + wS(q)eαs t2
as the cash advance at time t1 is LF = wS(q) under recourse factoring. To calculate
the supplier’s expected cash outflow (repayment of loan obligations), we note that if the
realized demand is less than or equal to the recourse factoring bankruptcy threshold bF ,
the supplier cannot fully repay the loan obligation and has to declare bankruptcy. In
this case, the supplier loses his sales revenue wξ plus the investment output LF eαs t2 =
wS(q)eαs t2 . However, if the realized demand is larger than bF , the supplier repays the
loan from the bank at time 0 and the one from the factor at time t1 , and his total cost is
cqerB tc + wS(q)erF t2 . In summary, the supplier’s expected cash outflow is
E[min(wD + wS(q)eαs t2 , cqerB tc + wS(q)erF t2 )] = wS(q)eαs t2 + wS(bF ).

(1.9)

Therefore, the supplier’s expected profit can be written as πF (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 −
ρr )w[S(q)−S(bF )], where (1−ρs )(1−ρr ) reflects the supplier’s and the retailer’s exogenous
3

When αs is extremely high, bF will become zero as demand is non-negative, i.e., no bankruptcy risk for
the supplier. A complementary discussion of this special case is given in Appendix C.
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default risk. Since S(bF ) can be derived from the competitive credit pricing equation
(3.4), we further have


πF (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 wS(q) − cqeηs tc .

(1.10)

Based on the structure of supplier’s profit function, we can write out the effective unit
production cost under recourse factoring as
cF =

ceηs tc
.
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2

(1.11)

In other words, the effective unit production cost cF incorporates both the original production cost c and the associated financing cost of recourse factoring for the supplier,
and effectively determines the supplier’s best response of production quantity for a given
wholesale price.
We are now ready to analyze the optimal wholesale price proposed by the retailer. The
retailer’s profit function under recourse factoring is ΠF (w) = (1 − ρr )(p − w)S(qF ). The
equilibrium outcome (wF∗ , qF∗ ) under recourse factoring is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.4.1 Recourse factoring is adopted by the supplier if and only if (iff ) αs >
∗
∗
ᾱF = ᾱF (Cs , t2 ) := ηs −t−1
2 ln(1−ρs ), and the equilibrium (wF , qF ) can be uniquely derived

from: pF̄ (q) = cF [1 + z(q)j(q)], w = cF /F̄ (q). Moreover, wF∗ < wB∗ , qF∗ > qB∗ , πF∗ > πB∗ ,
and Π∗F > Π∗B .
Several remarks are in order. First, the Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained by solving
a similar system of equations as in pure bank financing (as shown in Proposition 1.3.1),
but with a different effective unit production cost cF as defined in equation (2.6). Second,
by definition we know ᾱF = ηs − t−1
2 ln(1 − ρs ) > ηs , as 0 < 1 − ρs < 1. This indicates that
recourse factoring is not feasible for those suppliers with αs < ηs , which makes intuitive
sense. If the outside investment return is lower than the interest rate charged by the
bank, there is no value for the supplier to obtain cash at t1 for investment reasons. Lastly,
recourse factoring is only adopted if the supplier is better off (πF∗ > πB∗ ). Proposition
3 further points out that once recourse factoring is adopted, the retailer’s profit also
increases (Π∗F > Π∗B ). Interestingly, when recourse factoring is adopted in equilibrium,
the retailer offers a lower wholesale price (wF∗ < wB∗ ), while the supplier responds with
a higher production quantity (qF∗ > qB∗ ), as the effective unit production cost reduces
through the cash advance benefit of recourse factoring.
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Corollary 1 The threshold ᾱF decreases in the supplier’s credit rating Cs and the payment term t2 .
The threshold ᾱF depends on both the supplier’s credit rating Cs (through ρs and
ηs ) and the payment term t2 . As presented in the corollary 1, ᾱF decreases in Cs and t2 .
That said, recourse factoring is preferred by suppliers with relatively high credit ratings,
or relative long payment terms, as illustrated in Figure 1.3. Moreover, as the trade credit
payment term t2 decreases, the threshold ᾱF will dramatically increase (approaches infinity as t2 goes to zero). Our findings agree with industry practices that recourse factoring
is typically adopted by suppliers with relatively long trade credit payment terms4 .
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Figure 1.3.: When to Choose Recourse Factoring (Red Region)

1.4.3

Non-Recourse Factoring

In a non-recourse factoring contract, the factor can only collect payment from the
retailer, but cannot consider the supplier liable for any uncollected accounts receivable
amount. In pull-structure supply chains, such underpayment of the accounts receivable
may happen for low demand realization since the retailer only pays for sold items. Therefore, in non-recourse factoring, the supplier’s bank loan has a borrowing period of t1 , and
the supplier ends its obligation with the factor before the demand risk is resolved. Under
4

2014 Supply Chain Finance Payable and Receivable Solutions Guide, The Global Business Intelligence.

20

the assumption of a fully competitive factoring environment, the supplier’s cash advance
obtained from selling the accounts receivable to the factor is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Under non-recourse factoring, the supplier’s cash advance at time t1 through
selling accounts receivable is LS = e−ηs t2 (1 − ρr )wS(q).
Recall that the supplier’s cash advance in recourse factoring is LF = wS(q), which is
larger than LS here since e−ηs t2 (1−ρr ) < 1. The advance rate in non-recourse factoring is
lower because the factor bears more risk and has to price in the risk by a deeper discount
(lower advance rate).
Under non-recourse factoring, the competitively priced bank loan under credit rating
should satisfy cqeηs tc = (1 − ρs )cqerB tc . Note that the bank’s initial loan to the supplier
does not depend on the demand uncertainty. The bank is informed about the supplier’s
factoring activity at time t1 , which guarantees the full repayment of the bank loan. The
supplier will have LS amount of cash available (as given in Lemma 2) for investment at
time t1 , with a investment output LS eαs t2 for the investment period of t2 . Hence, the
supplier’s expected profit at time tc can be derived as
πS (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(LS eαs t2 − cqerB tc ) = e(αs −ηs )t2 (1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )wS(q) − cqeηs tc . (1.12)
Similar as in preceding cases, we shall derive (see proof of Proposition 3.4.2 for details)
the effective unit production cost under non-recourse factoring as
cS =

ceηs tc +(ηs −αs )t2
.
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )

(1.13)

Hence, for a given wholesale price w, the supplier’s problem is to choose the optimal
production quantity qS that maximizes πS (q; w). Given the supplier’s best response, the
retailer’s profit function is ΠS (w) = (1 − ρr )(p − w)S(qS ). We formally derive, in the next
proposition, the Stackelberg equilibrium (wS∗ , qS∗ ) under non-recourse factoring.
Proposition 1.4.2 Non-recourse factoring is adopted by the supplier iff αs > ηs = η(Cs ),
and the equilibrium (wS∗ , qS∗ ) can be uniquely derived from: pF̄ (q) = cS [1 + z(q)j(q)],
w = cS /F̄ (q). Moreover, wS∗ < wB∗ , qS∗ > qB∗ , πS∗ > πB∗ , and Π∗S > Π∗B .
Similar to the case of recourse factoring, and as illustrated in Figure 1.4, non-recourse
factoring is adopted when the supplier’s investment return rate is higher than a threshold
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ηs that depends on his credit rating Cr (as ηs = η(Cs ) is a decreasing function of Cs ).
However, different from recourse factoring, the threshold doesn’t depend on the payment
term t2 , as the supplier is not liable after t1 . Similar to recourse factoring, the equilibrium
wholesale price is lower and the production quantity is higher relative to pure bank
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Figure 1.4.: When to Choose Non-Recourse Factoring (Yellow Region)

Non-recourse factoring has two important financial roles. First, it completely eliminates the supplier’s bankruptcy risk due to the demand risk (also called, bankruptcy
remoteness). [23] also points out non-recourse factoring may be particularly useful in
countries with weak contract enforcement, inefficient bankruptcy systems, and imperfect
records of upholding seniority claims, because receivables factored without recourse are
not part of the estate of a bankrupt supplier. Second, similar to recourse factoring, nonrecourse factoring helps the supplier free up cash flow at an earlier stage and seize profits
through investments (liquidity benefit). It benefits the supplier when his credit rating or
investment return rate are relatively high.

1.4.4

Factoring Comparisons and Implications

We now compare the equilibrium outcomes under two factoring schemes when both
are available to the supplier, and summarize the conditions under which one is preferred
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over the other one. We start by summarizing the supplier’s expected profit under pure
bank financing, recourse factoring and non-recourse factoring as follows:
πi (q; w) = λi wS(q) − cqeηs tc ,

i ∈ {B, F, S},

where the coefficients λi of the expected revenue part are given



(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),



λi = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 ,




(1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )e(αs −ηs )t2 ,

(1.14)

as


i = B



i=F .




i = S

In general, the supplier’s expected profit under different financing schemes depends
on the key parameter λi , which further relates to the credit ratings of both the supplier
and the retailer, supplier’s investment return rate αs and payment term t2 . We further
show (in Lemma 12 in appendix) that the supplier’s preference over the three different
financing schemes becomes a simple comparison of the coefficient λi . We characterize, in
the next proposition, how the equilibrium outcome depends on the supplier’s investment
return for a given credit rating.
Proposition 1.4.3 Let ᾱS be a threshold for supplier’s investment return rate αs ,
 ηs t2

1
e
− (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
ᾱS = ᾱS (Cs , Cr , t2 ) := ln
.
(1.15)
t2
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηs t2 ]
When both factoring schemes are available to the supplier:
(i) Non-recourse factoring is adopted iff ηs < αs ≤ ᾱS ;
(ii) Recourse factoring is adopted iff αs > ᾱS .
Figure 1.5 illustrates the supplier’s choice among the three financing options we have
discussed so far under different regions along the dimensions of credit rating, investment
return rate, and trade credit payment term. The left panel is plotted based on the
supplier’s investment return rate αs and credit rating Cs . The dotted line indicates the
region separation between pure bank financing and recourse factoring when non-recourse
option is not available. For a given credit rating and payment term, the supplier should
choose non-recourse factoring when the investment return rate is in a medium range
(regions 2 & 3). When the investment return rate is relatively low (region 1), pure bank
financing is the preferred option. Recourse factoring is preferred when the supplier has
23

Non-Recourse

Recourse

80

3.0

70

2.5

60

1

2

3

Trade Credit Payment Term t2

Supplier's Credit Rating Cs

Non-Recourse

4

50
40
30
20

Recourse

2.0
1.5

1

2

3

4

1.0
0.5
0.0

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

0.0

2.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

Supplier's Investment Return Rate α s

Supplier's Investment Return Rate α s

Figure 1.5.: Supplier’s Choice among Pure Bank Financing, Recourse and Non-Recourse
Factoring

a rather high investment return rate for reasonable (above a threshold) credit ratings
(region 4).
The result conveys the intuition of the trade-offs between the benefits of recourse
factoring and non-recourse factoring. The key advantage of non-recourse is the lower
financing cost, since it can avoid the friction of seniority rights (the bank is senior in
collection rights, and thus the factor will charge a higher interest rate) present in recourse factoring. One the other hand, recourse factoring has the advantage of the higher
advance rate and the associated liquidity benefit, since the demand risk of the accounts
receivable is not directly sold to the factor. For suppliers with reasonable credit ratings
and high investment return rates, the liquidity benefit of recourse factoring dominates
the benefit of lower financing cost in non-recourse factoring. Our findings agree with
the empirical evidence in [24], showing that as a supplier’s probability of bankruptcy
increases (i.e., supplier’s credit rating decreases in our model), his propensity to recourse
factoring decreases.
The right panel presents a similar comparison from the lens of trade credit payment
term t2 and investment return rate αs for a given credit rating. (The dotted line has the
same interpretation as for the left panel.) An important observation is that when the
investment return rate is not too low (region 2-4) and for reasonable credit ratings, an
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increase in payment term may switch the supplier’s preference from non-recourse factoring
to recourse factoring. A general observation is that non-recourse factoring is adopted for a
wider parameter region, especially for SME suppliers whose credit rating and investment
return rate are rather moderate. But recourse factoring may still be preferred in a narrow
parameter region, and mostly for suppliers with rather high credit ratings and investment
return rates. Our results are supported to some extent by empirical findings that in
developed countries factoring is more frequently done on a non-recourse basis. In Italy,
for example, 69% of all factoring is done on a non-recourse basis [35]. Similarly, a study
of publicly traded firms in the US found that 73% of firms factored their receivables on a
non-recourse basis, but higher quality suppliers were more likely to factor with recourse
[24]. In Figure 2.5, we plotted the factoring volume data overtime as reported by Factor
Chain International (FCI)5 . The volume growth pattern for recourse and non-recourse
factoring also supports the higher popularity of non-recourse factoring globally.
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Now, we turn our attention to the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes
and analyze how the changes in the both parties’ credit ratings and the supplier’s cash
investment return rate affect the optimal wholesale price and production quantity, as well
as different parties’ profits.
5

Factor Chain International (FCI) is the main global network for factoring with more than 400 member
companies engaged in factoring activities in over 90 countries.
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Proposition 1.4.4 When either factoring scheme is adopted, as the credit rating of either party Cj or the supplier’s investment return rate αs increases, the optimal wholesale
price wi∗ decreases, while the optimal production quantity qi∗ and both parties’ profits increase.
The increase of credit rating reduces the supplier’s financing cost, and the increase
of investment return rate increases the liquidity benefit of cash advance in factoring,
subsequently reducing the effective unit production cost of the supplier. Hence, in the
Stackelberg game, the retailer reduces the wholesale price in anticipation of the supplier’s
best response of increasing production quantity. Essentially, better short-term financing
scheme in the supply chain will mitigate to some extent the double-marginalization problem in supply chains, and end up benefiting both firms.

1.5

Reverse Factoring
Reverse factoring programs allow high-risk suppliers to lower the financing costs of

their accounts receivable. Typically, these programs have the suppliers factor their accounts receivable at the buyer’s higher credit rating. Under reverse factoring, suppliers’
accounts receivable are factored on a non-recourse basis. Often in practice, in return for
offering the reverse factoring program, the buyer asks for an extension to the payment delay to the supplier. Denote this payment extension, beyond the original (prior to reverse
factoring) trade credit terms, as τ ≥ 0.
It is often argued that the associated benefits of higher days payable outstanding
(DPO) is the motivation for large retailers to initiate the reverse factoring program.
While the availability of an alternative form of low-cost financing makes reverse factoring
attractive to SMEs, the assessment of the trade-offs between lower cost of financing and
payment-term extension requires careful analysis that accounts for strategic interactions
of the supply chain players and considers both operational and financing decisions.
The chronology of events, notations, and decision structure are as follows:
(1) At time 0, the retailer offers the reverse factoring program to the supplier with a
payment extension τ , and then the supplier decides whether to join the program
or not. If yes, similar production and borrowing decision protocol is followed as in
factoring.
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(2) At time t1 and tc , activities and decision protocol are similar as in non-recourse
factoring, with the only difference that the interest rate charged by the factor is now
based on the retailer’s credit rating Cr .
(3) At time tc + τ , the retailer directly pays the factor wξ, and the supplier is not liable
to the factor even if the collected amount from the retailer can’t cover the supplier’s
cash advance.

1.5.1

Supplier’s Cash Advance and Production Quantity

Under reverse factoring, the factor’s expected repayment from the supplier’s accounts
receivable is (1 − ρr )wS(q) after a time period of t2 + τ , where τ is the retailer’s payment
extension under reverse factoring. Suppose the supplier’s cash advance at time t1 is LR ,
then the factor competitively prices it, but with the risk premium ηr , adjusted according
to the retailer’s credit rating Cr . Then, under competitive credit pricing, the factor offers
cash advance LR to the supplier as summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 Under reverse factoring, the supplier’s cash advance through selling accounts
receivable to the factor is LR = e−ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρr )wS(q).
We proceed by solving for the supplier’s optimal production decision q, given the
retailer’s wholesale price w and payment extension τ . Since the supplier will cash out
at time t1 by selling the accounts receivable to the factor, bank’s interest rate rB is then
determined through cqeηs tc = (1 − ρs )cqerB tc . Hence, the supplier’s expected profit at
time tc can be derived as
πR (q; w, τ ) = (1 − ρs )(LR eαs t2 − cqerB tc ) = eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(q) − cqeηs tc .
Hence, for a given wholesale price w and trade credit extension τ , the supplier’s problem
is to choose optimal production quantity q to maximize πR (q; w, τ ). And the supplier’s
optimal production quantity under reverse factoring is summarized in the following proposition.
Lemma 4 Given the retailer’s offer of reverse factoring with payment extension τ , the
supplier’s optimal production quantity qR satisfies
wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ) :=

ceηs tc +ηr (t2 +τ )−αs t2
.
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
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(1.16)

Comparing to the effective unit production cost under pure bank financing cB =
ceηs tc
,
(1−ρs )(1−ρr )

the effective unit production cost under reverse factoring cR (τ ) also depends

on the retailer’s interest rate premium ηr (i.e., retailer’s credit rating Cr ) and payment
extension τ . It’s not clear which one is smaller. Note that when ηr (t2 + τ ) − αs t2 = 0,
i.e., τ =

αs −ηr
t2 ,
ηr

the supplier’s effective unit production cost is the same as in the

pure bank financing, i.e., cR (τ ) = cB . Hence, as long as αs > ηr , the retailer can still
extend payment terms (i.e., τ > 0) and the supplier may still prefer reverse factoring to
pure bank financing. However, the supplier may have already adopted or have access to
factoring schemes (recourse or non-recourse). The retailer has to take into consideration
the supplier’s choice among all available short-term financing schemes in structuring the
right reverse factoring program the supplier may be willing to adopt.

1.5.2

Optimal Payment Extension in Reverse Factoring

Under the assumption of symmetric information, the retailer is aware of the supplier’s
response qR (w, τ ) when deciding on the wholesale price w and payment extension τ to
maximize her expected profit. With wholesale price w and payment extension τ , the
retailer’s profit function becomes
ΠR (w, τ ) = (1 − ρr )(p − e−αr τ w)S(qR ),

(1.17)

where qR is the supplier’s optimal production quantity under reverse factoring as shown
Lemma 22. Note that in this case, the payment extension τ generates cash flow benefits of
delayed payment. Thus, when the retailer offers a wholesale price w but with a payment
delay τ , the effective wholesale price becomes eαr τ w.
Suppose the supplier has access to bank financing, and also recourse and non-recourse
factoring as post-shipment financing alternatives and has been adopting the optimal one
among them. Based on Proposition 1.4.3, the existing equilibrium before introducing the
reverse factoring program can be summarized as follows:


∗
∗




(wB , qB ) in Pure Bank Financing,
if αs ≤ ηs






∗
∗
(wS , qS ) in Non-Recourse Factoring, if ηs < αs ≤ ᾱS .









 (w∗ , q ∗ ) in Recourse Factoring,
if
α
>
ᾱ
s
S
F F
Now, the retailer initiates the reverse factoring program where the retailer proposes
a new extended payment term and enables the supplier to sell accounts receivable at a
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better (interest) rate backed by the retailer’s better credit rating. We assume the retailer
offers the reverse factoring program without adjusting the existing equilibrium wholesale
price with the supplier6 . Hence, the key problem for the retailer is whether to offer the
reverse factoring for a specific supplier, and if to offer it, with what payment extension.
This problem can be formalized as follows:

max ΠR (τ ) = max (1 − ρr )(p − e−αr τ w)S(qR ) ,
τ ≥0

τ ≥0

s.t.

wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ),
∗
πR
≥ max{πB∗ , πF∗ , πS∗ }.

(1.18)
(IC)
(IR)

For easy of exposition, we define a function Ξ[0,z] (x) as the projection of x onto the
line segment [0, z]. That is, Ξ[0,z] (x) = z, if x > z; Ξ[0,z] (x) = 0, if x < z; otherwise
Ξ[0,z] (x) = x. Let ᾱR be a new threshold of αs and ψ(αs ) be a new function of αs , which
are defined as
 ηs t2

1
e
− (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
ᾱR := ln
,
t2
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηr t2 ]


1
eαs t2
eηs t2
ψ(αs ) :=
ln 1 +
−
.
ηr
1 − ρr (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )

(1.19)
(1.20)

We now summarize the retailer’s reverse factoring strategy in the next proposition.
Proposition 1.5.1 The retailer’s optimal reverse factoring strategy is as follows:
(i) If αs ≤ ηr , then reverse factoring is dominated by pure bank financing (wB∗ , qB∗ );
(ii) If αs ≥ ᾱR , then reverse factoring is dominated by recourse factoring (wF∗ , qF∗ );
(iii) If ηr < αs < ᾱR , then reverse factoring should be offered with the payment extension
τR∗ = Ξ[0,τs ] (τ0∗ ), where τ0∗ is solved from {ws (αr j(q)z(q) + ηr ) = pηr eαr τ , ws F̄ (q) =
cR (τ )}, and


∗



(wB , (αs /ηr − 1)t2 ),
if ηr < αs ≤ ηs 






(ws , τs ) = (wS∗ , (ηs /ηr − 1)t2 ),
.
if ηs < αs ≤ ᾱS







(w∗ , (αs /ηr − 1)t2 − ψ(αs )), if ᾱS < αs < ᾱR 

F
6

(1.21)

This assumption reflects the typical industry practice of reverse factoring program and helps deliver
clean insights. An extension is provided in Appendix C where the retailer could adjust both payment
term and wholesale price.
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To better understand this proposition, it is helpful to first go over some key notations.
τs in (2.10) represents the retailer’s maximal payment extension due to the supplier’s IR
constraint. τ0∗ is the optimal payment extension for the retailer’s maximization problem
in (1.18) without the non-negativity constraint τ ≥ 0. ws is the equilibrium wholesale
price in the existing best financing scheme as summarized in Proposition 1.4.3.
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Figure 1.7.: When to Offer Reverse Factoring (Yellow Region)

Proposition 3.6.1, and an illustrative Figure 2.4 of a relevant numerical example, offer
insights on reverse factoring. First, parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3.6.1 specify the
conditions under which reverse factoring should not be offered as it is dominated by
the existing best financing scheme (either pure bank financing or recourse factoring).
The yellow region in Figure 2.4 reflects the parameter regions where reverse factoring is
preferable to suppliers. The dotted lines, starting from the left, refer to the threshold
separating pure bank financing and non-recourse factoring, and the one separating nonrecourse and recourse factoring. As reverse factoring is a form of non-recourse factoring,
it will Pareto dominate traditional non-recourse factoring through its reliance on the
superior buyer’s credit rating. It is both implied in Proposition 3.6.1 and also can be
seen in Figure 2.4. The yellow region in the middle represents the parameter region
where reverse factoring should be offered. It is straightforward to see that the yellow
region in Figure 2.4 expands the one in Figure 1.5 (the boundaries are illustrated as the
two dashed lines in Figure 2.4). In other words, reverse factoring not only dominates
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non-recourse factoring, but also limits the preferred regions for pure bank financing and
recourse factoring.
Part (iii) of Proposition 3.6.1 fully characterizes the retailer’s optimal choice of payment extension for a specific supplier profile. Notice that the reverse factoring program
is contingent on the existing financing schemes adopted by the supplier. The payment
term extension in reverse factoring differs by regions, reflecting the comparison to the
alternative financing scheme of special appeal to the supplier in the parameter region.
The formula of the optimal payment extension τR∗ = Ξ[0,τs ] (τ0∗ ) indicates that the retailer
should not extend payment when τ0∗ ≤ 0 (more discussion in the next proposition), and
that there exists a maximal payment extension τs in each region. This maximal payment extension τs represents the retailer’s aggressiveness in payment terms. Intuitively,
one expects the retailer to be more aggressive as the supplier’s investment return rate
increases. Interestingly, we find, however, the retailer’s aggressiveness is not monotonic
in the supplier’s investment return rate, as presented in equation (2.10). Proposition
3.6.2 further summarizes several implications regarding to the retailer’s optimal payment
extension choice.
Proposition 1.5.2 When reverse factoring is adopted, i.e., ηr < αs < ᾱR :
(i) There exists a threshold αrτ , such that the retailer should not extend payment term
if αr ≤ αrτ .
(ii) The retailer’s profit always increases, but the supplier’s may remain unchanged when
τ0∗ ≥ τs .
Part (i) of Proposition 3.6.2 states that, as expected, it is not optimal to extend the
payment term in reverse factoring when the retailer’s own investment return is relatively
low. It offers a clear threshold for the retailer’s rate to be below, with detailed derivation
of the threshold αrτ in the proof of Proposition 3.6.2. Optimally designed reverse factoring
program, once adopted, can always improve the retailer’s profit but do not necessarily
require an increase in the payment term. Part (ii) of Proposition 3.6.2 suggests that
when reverse factoring is adopted, it is always a “win” option for the large retailer, but
may not be a “win-win” solution as typically claimed by industry practitioners since the
supplier’s profit may remain unchanged.
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We now summarize the benefits of reverse factoring compared to the best among
other three financing schemes (pure bank financing, recourse factoring and non-recourse
factoring) in Table 1.2. Case 1 represents the scenarios in Proposition 3.6.1 (i) and (ii)
(i.e., αs ≤ ηr , or αs ≥ ᾱR ), where reverse factoring is dominated by either pure bank
financing or recourse factoring (the gray and red regions, respectively, in Figure 2.4).
Case 2 represents the case where the optimal payment extension reaches the maximum
τs , and thus the supplier’s production quantity and profit remain unchanged. In this
case, even though the retailer’s profit increases, the supplier’s profit is the same as when
reverse factoring was not offered. Case 3 is the win-win situation where the retailer is
not aggressive on payment extension, leaving some profit gain to the supplier after the
adoption of reverse factoring.
Table 1.2: The Benefits of Reverse Factoring (Compared to the Best of Other Schemes)
Case 1: No-Win

Case 2: Retailer-Win

Case 3: Win-Win

(αs ≤ ηr or αs ≥ ᾱR )

(τ0∗ ≥ τs )

(τ0∗ < τs )

∗
Wholesale Price wR

=

=

=

∗
Production Quantity qR

↓

=

↑

∗
Supplier’s Profit πR

↓

=

↑

Retailer’s Profit Π∗R

↓

↑

↑

Three Cases

1.6

Conclusion
We consider a pull-structure supply chain with a large retailer and an SME supplier:

A newsvendor-like supplier has a single opportunity to produce and stock inventory to
satisfy future uncertain demand at the retailer’s side, with the wholesale price determined
by the retailer. The SME supplier is in need of short-term bank financing for the preseason production activity. The bank offers a competitively priced loan for relevant
risks but with interest rate premium based on the supplier’s credit rating. Failure of
loan repayment leads to supplier’s bankruptcy. The strategic interaction between the
supplier and the retailer are modeled and analyzed under a Stackelberg game setting, with
the retailer proposing the wholesale price and the supplier deciding on the production
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quantity. We first derive the unique equilibrium in pure bank financing of the pull supply
chain as our benchmark, which has similar structure to the traditional pull contract but
with the bank financing cost added into the supplier’s effective unit production cost.
Factoring (recourse or non-recourse) is often used by suppliers as post-shipment financing scheme to obtain advanced cash in selling their accounts receivables from retailers
and using it to finance their immediate working capital needs or other available investment opportunities. We carefully model, analyze and compare the equilibria of different
factoring schemes. Our results show that the benefit of recourse and non-recourse factoring depends on three important financial parameters of the supplier: credit rating, cash
investment return rate, and payment delay offered to the retailer. For a given supplier’s
credit rating, the recourse factoring is adopted only when the supplier has rather high
investment return rate; while the non-recourse factoring is adopted when the investment
return rate is within certain intermediate (low, but above a threshold, to moderate) range.
For a given supplier’s investment return rate, in the moderate-to-high level, suppliers that
extend longer payment terms favor recourse factoring. The choice between recourse and
non-recourse factorings is driven by the trade-off between the higher cash advance in
recourse factoring and the lower financing cost in non-recourse factoring.
By engaging suppliers in reverse factoring programs, retailers work with banks or
factors to help finance the suppliers’ accounts receivable on the retailer’s orders through
a non-recourse way of factoring, but with the factor calculating financing costs using
the superior credit ratings of the retailers. We find that reverse factoring might not be
always adopted by suppliers when other short-term financing options are available. Retailers should offer such programs only to suppliers with low, but above a threshold, to
medium cash investment returns and relatively low credit ratings. Suppliers with high
credit ratings and investment return rates will opt for traditional recourse factoring. We
also fully characterize the optimal payment extension strategy in reverse factoring programs. We find that such programs do increase the retailer’s profit (due to the retailer’s
superior credit rating and potential payment extension), but may leave the supplier’s
profit indifferent to other financing options (due to the retailer’s aggressive payment extension). Interestingly, it may be preferable for the retailer not to extend the payment
term in reverse factoring, and the retailer can still leverage the supplier’s willingness to
bear higher inventory risk and benefit from the increased supply chain efficiency. This
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contradicts with conventional wisdom in the supply chain finance industry that a longer
payment term is always better for the downstream buyer and is often regarded as the
driving force for the implementation of reverse factoring programs.
Most of current supply chain finance research revolves around post-shipment approved
invoice financing. But, purchase order financing, where the under-capitalized supplier has
to finance raw material procurement and intermediate components or work-in-process,
is an important application area deserving further research. Big banks such as Bank
of America and Wells Fargo, large Fintech players such as GT Nexus, a cloud supply
chain platform, are heavily involved in advancing pre-shipment financing practices. We
consider it a promising future research direction for quantitative modeling of supply chain
finance practices.

34

2. Crowdfunding under Social Learning and Network
Externalities

2.1

Introduction
1

Crowdfunding is the practice of funding a project or venture by raising many small

amounts of money from a large number of people, typically via the Internet. Crowdfunding may be used for a variety of purposes, from disaster relief to citizen journalism
to artists seeking support from fans to political campaigns. In this paper, we focus on
rewards-based crowdfunding, where production-based firms pre-sell a product to launch a
business without incurring debt or sacrificing equity/shares 2 . In such an environment,
a firm solicits financial contributions from the crowd, mostly in the form of pre-buying a
product. And these funds could then be used to cover production costs.
Rewards-based crowdfunding is the most prolific form of crowdfunding currently taking place in the U.S. The rising popularity of crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter and
Indiegogo has promoted crowdfunding as a modern fund-raising solution. It has changed
the face of investing, giving startups a chance to prove product-market-fit without the
massive costs of going into mass production. Crowdfunding has gone beyond simply being a tool specifically utilized by small businesses and independent entities to get a given
project off the ground. Even larger businesses are now turning to crowdfunding as a way
to obtain funds to develop new products.
Quality uncertainty is an inevitable issue for crowdfunding firms when they first introduce an innovative product under development (often just a prototype of a complex
product such as an electronic vehicle or a smart watch) to the market. A common feature of crowdfunding is that over time, consumers learn more about the product and
gain a better sense of its value, through channels such as professional product reviews
1

This chapter is based on the author’s early work [36] jointly with Fuqiang Zhang.
In contrast, another primary type of crowdfunding is equity-crowdfunding in which the backer receives
shares of a company, usually in its early stages, in exchange for the money pledged.

2
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from websites and magazines, the reviews of fellow consumers (e.g., from online retailers
such as Amazon), and the experiences of friends and family who may have purchased the
same product. Hence, consumers may recognize that future learning will occur and may
choose to delay a purchase until they have more information about a product’s value.
In this paper, we consider a two-sided learning model where both sides of the market,
the firm and the consumer population, exhibit learning behavior: They both learn the
true quality of a new product through consumer reviews. Hence, strategic consumers
make their decisions on both whether and when to purchase the product based on their
anticipation of product quality and their own personal preference.
Another feature of crowdfunding products is that they often exhibit positive network
externalities. An externality occurs in any situation in which the welfare of an individual
is affected by the actions of other individuals, without a mutually agreed-upon compensation [37]. For example, the value of a social networking site to a person depends on the
total number of people who use the site. When other people join the site, they increase
the welfare even though there is no explicit compensation involved. As concrete examples
of such goods, consider online games (e.g., League of Legends, Pokémon Go, etc.) and social networking communities (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.). Network externalities may
come from multiple sources, such as learning/herding [38, 39] and social influence/peer
effects [40,41]. Specifically for the crowdfunding setting, recent research has documented
empirical evidence for network externalities [42]. Hence in this paper, we incorporate
the positive network externalities into our model to better reflect the consumer’s decision
framework. The focus of this research is to investigate the impact of different levels of
overall strength of externalities on consumers’ purchasing behaviors and its interaction
with the social learning feature.
In the spirit of these characteristics, we develop a two-period model (crowdfunding
stage and retail stage) that captures three salient features – network externalities, social
learning, and financial constraints – as a unified framework to study the strategic interactions between the firm and consumer population. Crowdfunding is a cornucopia of
important research questions, of which we mainly consider three in this paper: (i) What
is the impact of network externalities on the purchasing game dynamics in the “crowd”
with strategic consumer behaviors? (ii) What is the firm’s optimal crowdfunding reward
choice in the presence of social learning and network externalities? (iii) What is the
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impact of the firm’s financial constraints? Our analysis of these research questions yields
three main sets of insights, which we summarize below.
First, we find that an upward-sloping demand curve (documented as the Veblen effect) may arise where a higher price induces more demand in crowdfunding. The existing literature has principally focused on either social-related benefits, or consumers’
uniqueness-seeking feature (i.e., negative externalities, snobs) to explain the Veblen effect. In contrast, we model the consumers as forward-looking social learners, and provide
a novel explanation for the Veblen effect: It may arise due to the presence of both social
learning and strong positive network externalities, even in the absence of uniquenessseeking consumers. The intuition is that the forward-looking consumers may strategically lower the purchasing threshold to lock in a higher social utility from more demand
as the crowdfunding price increases. Due to the strong network externalities, the social
utility increase from lowering the purchasing threshold will compensate the decrease in
personal preference value and the increase in crowdfunding price, eventually leading to a
new equilibrium in the firm-consumer game.
Second, we show that network externalities have significant structural implications for
the optimal crowdfunding reward choice: Under weak network externalities, the crowdfunding sales induced by optimal reward can be any fraction of the population; by contrast, in the presence of strong network externalities, only very high or very low reward
should be offered to induce either adoption inertia (none-purchasing) or adoption frenzy
(all-purchasing) in the crowdfunding stage. Such equilibrium purchasing patterns can
be explained by the trade-off between two countervailing forces: the immediate network
benefit and the potential learning benefit. When there are weak network externalities, the
two benefits are close to each other, so the optimal strategy is to take advantage of both
benefits, resulting in any dispersed adoption. However, as the network externalities become very strong, one benefit tends to dominate the other. When the immediate network
benefit is dominant, the optimal reward strategy is to induce adoption frenzy; otherwise,
adoption inertia is preferred to take advantage of the potential learning benefit.
Third, we characterize the optimal rewarding strategy when facing financial constraints (a fundraising target to meet in the crowdfunding stage) and quantify the impact
of the fundraising target on optimal reward choice and the induced purchasing pattern in
consumer population. Comparing to the situation without financial constraints, the opti-
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mal reward choice can be either higher or lower under each network externalities scenario,
depending on the product’s cost structure and the prior uncertainty in quality. Furthermore, we observe that as the fundraising target increases, the optimal reward should
increase under weak network externalities but decrease under strong network externalities. However, the equilibrium purchasing fraction in the crowdfunding stage always
increases. This result offers insights into how financially constrained firms should exploit
the “funding” role of crowdfunding.

2.2

Literature Review
This paper is related to four streams of research in the literature: strategic consumer

behavior, advance selling, social operations management, and crowdfunding.
There has been a growing body of literature that explores the role of strategic customer
behavior in various operations settings [43–48]. This stream of research explicitly captures
the strategic response of customers to a seller’s pricing and inventory policies; however,
none of the studies in this stream considers a unified framework that incorporates quality
uncertainty, social learning, and network externalities. As a result, both the model setting
and insights are quite different in our paper.
Crowdfunding is similar to advance selling because both encourage customers to place
orders before the product is released. A major benefit of advance selling is to help firms
plan for inventory by using early demand information [49–51]. Another reason for firms
to adopt advance selling is to exploit consumers’ uncertainty about their valuations.
[52] demonstrate that selling to consumers who have uncertain consumption utility can
substantially increase the firm’s profit. [53] find that capacity rationing in advance selling
can be an effective device to signal quality. Crowdfunding differs from advancing selling
because products are typically at a much earlier stage, and thus social learning about
product characteristics plays an important role. In addition, network externalities and
financial constraints are often present in crowdfunding, but are rarely considered in the
advance selling literature.
Apart from the aforementioned papers, our work contributes to the emerging literature
on social operations management, which studies how firms’ operational decisions can
influence the formation of collective consumer behaviors under social interactions. For
example, [54] and [55] examine the impact of firms’ pricing policy on consumer purchasing
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decisions when consumers can learn from from early adopters’ product reviews. [56] study
a monopolist firm’s product quality strategy under review-based social learning. Our
paper considers two social interactions (social learning and network externalities) and
investigates their interaction with firm’s crowdfunding strategy.
Besides social learning, our paper is also related to the literature on network goods and
network externalities. Models that incorporate network externalities find their origins in
the works of [57] and [58]. Many papers have examined important strategic issues involving the network effects, such as pricing [59, 60], advertising strategy [61], and product
line design [62]. Recently, [63] study the operations and marketing policies under social
influence in a stream of consumers who arrive sequentially. [64] investigate the influence
of sales information revelation on a firm’s profitability under market size uncertainty.
However, these studies do not consider social learning and fundraising and are therefore
different from our paper.
Crowdfunding has received increasing attention from researchers in recent years. [65]
study how the crowdfunding mechanism affects a firm’s product and pricing decisions in
a two-period game. [66] explore how private quality information impacts rewards-based
crowdfunding. Focusing on the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, [67] argues that
the optimal crowdfunding mechanism should implement deferred payments to project
creators. [68] provide a dynamic model of crowdfunding and [69] propose several contingent stimulus policies to mitigate the “cascade effect” on backers’ pledging. [70] show
that crowdfunding alters interactions between the entrepreneur and the traditional financing sources (banks and VCs), and may either benefit or hurt entrepreneurs. Our
study focuses on the role of social learning and network externalities in crowdfunding
reward strategy when facing strategic consumers.

2.3

Model Framework
In this section, we introduce the model framework in three steps. First we describe the

firm’s characteristics and the consumers’ utility components; then we introduce the twosided Bayesian learning framework; finally, we present the consumers’ expected utility
functions.

39

2.3.1

The Firm and the Crowd

We consider a crowdfunding campaign where a firm markets a new product of unknown quality to a potential population of heterogeneous consumers. There are two
selling periods: the crowdfunding stage (period 1) and the retail stage (period 2). Hereafter, we use subscripts 1 and 2 to denote these two periods, respectively. We assume both
the consumers and the firm are rational Bayesian decision makers who aim to maximize
their expected utilities. The product is released at the beginning of period 2, but the firm
may accept pre-orders in period 1. The firm charges two different prices for the product,
crowdfunding price p1 and retail price p2 (p1 ≤ p2 ), in the two different stages. We assume the retail price p2 is exogenously determined due to competitive market3 . Then, the
firm’s problem is to determine the crowdfunding price, or equivalently, the crowdfunding
reward rp = p2 − p1 . The firm behaves as a Stackelberg leader by announcing the pricing
scheme {p1 , p2 } at the beginning of the crowdfunding stage. The marginal production
cost is c (p2 ≥ p1 ≥ c > 0).
The total potential market size is fixed and denoted by M . Due to uncertain social
learning on product quality, the actual demand (a portion of market size M ) is random.
Each customer purchases at most one unit of the product. The sequence of events is as
follows. At the beginning of the crowdfunding stage, all consumers arrive and make their
purchasing-or-waiting decisions depending on their own utilities. Then in the retail stage,
the consumers waiting from period 1 (if any) make their purchasing-or-leaving decision
based on the social learning outcome. The social learning could be based on the product reviews generated by those consumers who already purchased in the crowdfunding
stage. Finally, any consumers remaining in the market purchase a unit provided that
the expected utility from doing so is non-negative. Figure 3.1 summarizes the timing of
events.
3

For strategic consumers, purchase behaviors are mainly driven by the intertemporal price difference.
Hence, we assume the retail price is exogenous and focus on the impact of reward choice on consumers’
strategic purchase behaviors. This assumption helps maintain analytical tractability and deliver clean
insights. We relax this assumption by endogenizing the decision of retail price p2 and our main insights
remain valid (see Appendix B for details).
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Figure 2.1.: Timing of Events

Each consumer’s utility for purchasing the new product is v+q+s(ρ), which comprises
three components as explained below [55, 64]:
(1) Preference Value v: This reflects a customer’s idiosyncratic preference over the
product’s observable attributes (e.g., brand, exterior design). It is known to the consumer
ex ante, but the value could be different among consumers. For simplicity, we assume
v is distributed according to the uniform distribution U [0, 1]. Relaxing the uniform
assumption will not affect the qualitative results.
(2) Quality Perception q: The component q represents the utility derived from unobservable attributes before purchase (e.g., product usability) and can be referred to as
the product’s quality. The value of q is unknown ex ante but will be realized once the
product is experienced by the consumer. We use Q to denote the random quality in both
periods (i.e., q is the realization of Q). Although the exact value of Q is unobservable, its
distribution is the subject of social learning for both the firm and consumers. We assume
that the distribution of ex post quality perception is Normal, Q ∼ N (µq , σq2 ), where µq
is the product’s true quality and σq captures the heterogeneity in post-purchase quality
perception or illustrates the noise in product reviews. To simplify analysis, we follow the
literature to assume that the probability of a negative quality perception is negligible.
The firm and consumers share a common prior belief over µq . This belief is modeled by a
Normal prior µq ∼ N (µ0 , σ02 ), where we set µ0 = 0 without loss of generality4 . The social
learning process of µq will be explained in more detail later.
4

When µ0 6= 0 (e.g., a positive prior mean), we can always normalize this term to zero by adjusting the
price components (retail price and crowdfunding price) accordingly.
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(3) Social Utility s(ρ): s(ρ) represents the network effect on consumer’s utility, where
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of consumers who have purchased the product. For clarity of
analysis, we assume the social utility has a linear functional format: s(ρ) = kρ, k ≥ 0.
The coefficient k may be called the network effect intensity, which represents the increase
in consumers’ willing-to-pay when the whole population joins the consumption network.
Three remarks are worth mentioning regarding this social utility function. First, by the
social utility function, we specifically consider the global positive network externalities.
Second, since the market size M is fixed, this function is equivalent to the one that
replaces the population fraction ρ with the network size ρM (see [71] and [72]). Third, it
is also equivalent to the general linear function s(ρ) = a + kρM adopted by [73], because
the fixed intercept can be accounted as the corresponding shift in the price components.
Now, we categorize the network structures into three different scenarios depending on the
network effect intensity parameter.
Definition 2.3.1 (Structure of Network Externalities) We define the following three
scenarios based on the network effect intensity k: (i) weak network externalities (WN)
for 0 < k < 1; (ii) boundary scenario (BS) for k = 1; (iii) strong network externalities
(SN) for k > 1.

Similar categorization of network externalities based on product types has been discussed in the literature (see, e.g., [63] for similar argument). For some crowdfunding
products, consumers would assign more weight to their intrinsic preferences (i.e., k < 1),
whereas for others, social utility plays a crucial role and can even dominate their weight
on personal preference (i.e., k > 1). It will be shown later that the equilibrium consumer
behavior varies significantly across the three scenarios.
Finally, we make the following assumption to facilitate model analysis. When writing
a quality review, the consumers report their quality perceptions rather than the net utility.
Alternatively, one may argue that the reviews should reflect the net utility experienced by
consumers, which depends on all three utility components as well as the price [74, 75]. In
such alternative model, the reviews could be biased because, for example, the consumers
with higher preference values are more likely to purchase early and submit a positive
review. Nevertheless, this model can be shown to be equivalent to ours if the consumers
are rational in the sense that they are able to “debias” or “correct” the reviews to only
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report quality perceptions. Therefore, for simplicity, we assume that the reviews are
already debiased [54, 55].

2.3.2

Bayesian Social Learning

All customers who purchase the product in the first period report their experienced
product quality through product reviews (e.g., via an online review platform). In the
second period, the firm and consumers observe the reviews of the first-period buyers
and update their belief over the product’s true quality from µ0 to µ1 using Bayes’ rule.
Given the purchasing fraction ρ1 in the first period and the average quality review q̄r , the
posterior of true quality is normally distributed, µq |q̄r ∼ N (µ1 , σ12 ), with
µ1 =
where the ratio γ =

σ02
σq2

ρ1 M γ
q̄r ,
ρ1 M γ + 1

σ12 =

σ02
,
ρ1 M γ + 1

(2.1)

measures the degree of ex ante quality uncertainty relative to the

uncertainty in individual product reviews. We refer to γ as the learning effectiveness,
since a larger γ means that the social learning process is more effective in shaping the
quality perceptions of future buyers.
Now consider a customer’s decision to purchase or not during the crowdfunding stage.
Suppose the consumer forms a rational belief over her second-period expected quality
e = µ1 , which is the expected posterior mean of the true quality µq
perception E1Q (Q)
e to denote the consumer’s belief of ex post quality perception). Since
(hereafter, we use Q
in the second period, consumers still cannot observe the true quality due to review noises,
this posterior expected quality µ1 will be critical in the consumer’s purchase decision.
The ex ante rational belief of µ1 is defined as its prior predictive distribution. It is also
referred to in the literature as the ex ante distribution of the ex post mean belief, or the
preposterior distribution [55].
Lemma 5 Given the purchasing fraction ρ1 in the crowdfunding stage, the rational bee can be represented by the
lief over the second-period expected quality perception E1Q (Q)
following distribution:
e
E1Q (Q)



ρ1 M γ
= µ1 ∼ N 0,
σ2
ρ1 M γ + 1 0


(2.2)

The proofs of all lemmas and propositions are presented in Appendix A. Expressions
in (2.1) represent the Bayesian updating process about the true quality perception after
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reviews are observed, and Lemma 5 further shows the consumer’s rational belief over
the posterior mean. These results demonstrate the uncertainty structure related to the
decision of strategic waiting and help to calculate the expected value of the “waiting”
action. However, the consumer’s expected value of purchasing in period 1 depends on
the rational belief of the post-purchase true quality perception during the second period,
and the consumer’s ex ante expectation of post-purchase quality perception is zero (see
Lemma 14 in Appendix A). The expected quality perception in the crowdfunding stage
is zero, and this result will be used to derive the consumer’s first-period expected utility
later on. We denote the p.d.f. of the Normal distribution in (2.2) as f (µ1 |ρ1 ), and denote
the associated c.d.f. and c.c.d.f. as F (µ1 |ρ1 ) and F̄ (µ1 |ρ1 ), respectively.

2.3.3

Consumer Expected Utility

Based on the above learning framework, we can examine consumers’ utility function
componentwise. The social utility is given by s(ρ) = kρ, where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of
total consumers who purchase in the two periods. We denote by ρ̃ the consumer’s ex ante
belief of this total purchasing fraction. Then, it can be decomposed as ρ̃ = ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 , where
ρ̃j is the belief of the purchasing fraction in period j. Note that the expected social utility
can be calculated as the social utility under the expected purchasing fraction due to the
linear structure of the function s(ρ). In this regard, we shall focus on how consumers
form expectation of the total purchasing fraction ρ̃.
In addition, it is worth noting that there is an internal connection between ρ̃1 and
ρ̃2 , as how many consumers choose to purchase in period 2 depends on both how many
have purchased in period 1 and the quality learning through reviews. Fewer consumers
purchasing in period 2 could be a result of either more consumers purchasing in period
1, or a lower posterior quality expectation. We clarify this interrelation by denoting ρ̃2
as ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ), a function of second-period expected quality perception µ1 , conditional on
the belief of first-period purchasing fraction ρ̃1 . Detailed functional form of ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 )
will be introduced later in Proposition 2.4.1 when we characterize the equilibrium for the
P-L game. Hence, the consumer’s expected social utility can be written as E0Q [s(ρ̃)|ρ̃1 ] =
E0Q [k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))] = k ρ̃1 + kE0Q [ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 )], where the expectation E0Q is taken over the
quality uncertainty (uncertainty in µ1 stemming from both reviews and post-purchase
quality perceptions) based on the prior predictive distribution in Lemma 5.
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The driver of a consumer’s expected social utility in period 1 is two-fold: the belief
of first-period purchasing fraction ρ̃1 , which only depends on the first-period decision,
and the belief of second-period purchasing fraction ρ̃2 , which relies on the realization of
reviewed quality information q̄r at the beginning of period 2. If a consumer chooses to
wait, her net utility becomes [v + µ1 + k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 )) − p2 ]+ and waiting comes with
the option of leaving with zero utility if the posterior quality is too low. For notational
convenience, hereafter we simply use ρi to denote ρ̃i . A consumer’s expected net utility
from purchasing the product in the crowdfunding stage and from waiting in the market
until the retail stage can be summarized as follows:
u1 (v, ρ1 ) = v + E0Q [k(ρ1 + ρ2 (µ1 |ρ1 ))] − p1 ,

u2 (v, ρ1 ) = E0Q [v + µ1 + k(ρ1 + ρ2 (µ1 |ρ1 )) − p2 ]+ .

(2.3)
(2.4)

We use the following notations in the rest of the paper. Let φ (Φ) denote the standard
Normal probability density function (cumulative distribution function). Let ∨ (∧) denote
the maximizing (minimizing) operator, i.e., x ∨ y = max(x, y) and x ∧ y = min(x, y). 1{·}
is used to represent the indicator function and (x)+ = max(x, 0). Monotonic relations
(increasing, decreasing) are used in the weak sense unless otherwise stated.

2.4

Game Analysis
In this section, we use the fulfilled expectations equilibrium (FEE) concept to charac-

terize the game outcome. For easy reference, we denote the purchasing game in periods 1
and 2 as P-W game (Purchasing-Waiting) and P-L game (Purchasing-Leaving), respectively. The fulfilled expectations equilibrium concept was proposed by [57], and since
then has been widely adopted in the literature involving network externalities [62]. It is
also called self-fulfilling expectations equilibrium [37] or rational expectations equilibrium
[76–78].

Definition 2.4.1 (Fulfilled Expectations Equilibrium) A fulfilled expectations equilibrium (FEE) is defined as follows: The consumers form a common belief that the fraction
of population using the product is z, and if each consumer makes her purchasing decision
based on this expectation, then the consumer fraction who actually purchases is z.
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Consider any crowdfunding price p1 and the retail price p2 . The consumers need to
decide whether to purchase in the first period. Specifically, a consumer with a preference
value v compares between the expected surplus gained from immediate purchase and the
expected surplus associated with waiting. It can be shown that for any crowdfunding price
offered by the firm and any purchasing behavior of the other consumers in the market, it
is optimal for an individual consumer to adopt a threshold policy in both periods (see the
appendix for the proof). Namely, the consumer will purchase a unit if v ≥ θ1 ; otherwise,
the consumer will wait for the retail stage (and purchase if v ≥ θ2 ). Note here, θ1 can be
obtained at the beginning of period 1 (details will be in P-W game analysis), while θ2 is
only known after the quality reviews are revealed in period 2.

2.4.1

Analysis of P-L Game

We first analyze the P-L game among the consumers in period 2. Given the threshold
policy θ1 in the P-W game (i.e., the purchasing fraction ρ1 = 1 − θ1 ) and the average
rating of quality reviews q̄r , a customer first forms the expectation of threshold policy θ2
adopted by the newly arrived population in period 2, and purchases the product iff
v+

(1 − θ1 )M γ
q̄r + k[(1 − θ1 ) + (θ1 − θ2 )+ ] − p2 ≥ 0,
(1 − θ1 )M γ + 1

(2.5)

where (θ1 − θ2 )+ is the belief of the purchase fraction from the first-period waiting consumers. Now define an outcome function G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) as follows:


(1 − θ1 )M γ
+
G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) = Ξ[0,1] p2 −
q̄r − k[(1 − θ1 ) + (θ1 − x) ] ,
(1 − θ1 )M γ + 1

(2.6)

where Ξ[0,1] {y} is the projection of y onto the line segment [0, 1]. That is, Ξ[0,1] {y} = 1, if
y > 1; Ξ[0,1] {y} = 0, if y < 1; otherwise Ξ[0,1] {y} = y. Under the FEE paradigm, if every
consumer expects a threshold policy x adopted in period 2, then the threshold policy
becomes G[0,1] (x; θ1 ). Thus, the FEE in the P-L game is essentially the fixed point of the
outcome function. For a given θ1 , the outcome function G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) can be depicted as
in Figure C.1.
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Figure 2.2.: Structure of Outcome Function G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) with q̄r1 > q̄r2 > q̄r3

A few observations are worth highlighting. First, for a given threshold policy θ1
adopted in period 1, all the remaining consumers in the P-L game must have valuations
v < θ1 since the fraction of consumers with higher preference values have already purchased and left the market. Thus, none of the consumers buys in period 2 if θ2 ≥ θ1 ,
i.e., (θ1 − θ2 )+ = 0 (as in the shadowed region in the figure). We may view the threshold
policy as θ2 = θ1 when θ2 ≥ θ1 . Second, there exists at least one feasible fixed point for
the outcome function G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) for any network effect intensity k and quality review q̄r
(see the dots in the figure). Third, when k < 1, there exists exactly one fixed point, or a
unique FEE. However, when k ≥ 1, there may be multiple fixed points for the outcome
function, which means we need equilibrium refinement. Fourth, the threshold policy under the P-L game FEE depends on the average quality review q̄r . When the realized
quality reviews are relatively low, there is no purchase in period 2. When the realized
quality reviews are relatively high, there exists an FEE and its property depends on the
strength of network externalities.
When there are multiple FEEs under k ≥ 1, we focus on the smallest one (θ2 = 0),
which we call preferred FEE. There are two reasons for this equilibrium refinement. First,
a smaller FEE θ2 leads to more purchases by consumers, and thus more surplus for the
customers (more social utility), and higher profit for the firm. So, it is a Pareto dominant outcome. Second, the smallest equilibrium point under strong network externalities
corresponds to the stable equilibrium, according to the network analysis literature [79].
Therefore, we will focus on the smallest FEE as the unique equilibrium in the P-L game
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in period 2, the form of which depends on the network effect intensity k. We define a
new function
P(θ1 , q̄r ) = p2 −

(1 − θ1 )M γ
q̄r ,
(1 − θ1 )M γ + 1

(2.7)

which represents the consumer’s effective retail price after subtracting the posterior expected quality perception. Hereafter, we use superscript w, b, and s to indicate the three
scenarios: WN, BS, and SN, respectively. Now, we characterize the unique FEE in the
P-L game.
Proposition 2.4.1 Given the threshold policy θ1 adopted in period 1 and the realized
average quality review q̄r , there exists a unique FEE in the P-L game that can be characterized as follows:

(P(θ1 , q̄r ) − k)+

θ1 ∧
,
1−k
θ2i∗ =

θ 1{P(θ , q̄ ) − k ≤ 0},
1

1

r



i=w 

.

(2.8)


i = b, s

Based on the FEE threshold θ2i∗ in the P-L game, we obtain the purchasing patterns
under different network structures shown in Figure 2.3, where µ1 =

(1−θ1 )M γ
q̄
(1−θ1 )M γ+1 r

is the

posterior expected quality after observing the average review q̄r . There are two thresholds
z(θ1 ) and z(0), where the function z(θ1 ) is given by z(θ1 ) = (k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k. The left
plot shows the scenario of weak network externalities (0 < k < 1). When µ1 ≤ z(θ1 ),
there is θ2w∗ = θ1 , which means none of the waiting consumers will buy due to the low
quality review. When µ1 ≥ z(0), the quality review is relatively high, and all waiting
consumers will buy with θ2w∗ = 0. As in the medium range of posterior quality, there is
a positive fraction of consumers who will buy in the second period (i.e., 0 < θ2w∗ < θ1 ).
Since θ2w∗ is decreasing in µ1 within this range, it means more consumers will purchase
as the quality review improves.
However, when the network externalities are relatively strong (k ≥ 1), there are only
two extreme cases that would happen (middle and right plots). In one case, none of
the waiting consumers will buy if the average quality review is lower than a threshold.
In the other case, all remaining consumers will buy due to the relatively high quality
review. The boundary scenario (BS) can be viewed as the limit of the strong network
externalities scenario (SN) and does not add new insights. Hence, the subsequent analysis
will focus on the WN and SN scenarios. More detailed analysis of the BS case is relegated
to Appendix C.
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Figure 2.3.: FEE Characterization in the P-L Game

2.4.2

Analysis of P-W Game

Based on the outcome of the P-L game in period 2, now we consider the P-W game in
period 1. For any crowdfunding reward rp (or crowdfunding price p1 ) offered by the firm,
the consumers need to decide whether to purchase in period 1 or to wait until period
2. Specifically, a consumer compares the expected surplus gained from immediate purchase and the expected surplus associated with waiting. However, the expected surplus
associated with waiting depends on both the purchasing policy adopted in period 1 and
the realization of posterior expected quality. As the posterior expected quality is ex ante
uncertain (depending on the realization of quality reviews), the consumers in the P-W
game need to form rational beliefs over the equilibrium outcome in the second-period P-L
game, conditioned on their beliefs of the purchasing policy θ1 adopted in period 1. Then,
the first-period consumers’ conditional expectation of the total social utility E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ]
can be derived based on those rational beliefs. Since the FEE in the P-L game depends
on the network externalities, we will separate the discussion of the P-W game into the
two scenarios (WN, SN) accordingly.
First, consider the weak network externalities scenario (WN) with k < 1. From
Proposition 2.4.1, we know when the posterior expected quality is low (i.e., µ1 ≤ z(θ1 )),
none of the waiting consumers will buy and hence the total social utility becomes k(1−θ1 ).
When the posterior expected quality is high (i.e., µ1 ≥ z(0)), all waiting consumers will
buy and the total social utility is k. In the medium range, i.e., z(θ1 ) ≤ µ1 ≤ z(0), θ2 is
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1 −k
determined through the equation k(1 − θ2 ) + θ2 = p2 − µ1 . Thus, we have θ2 = p2 −µ
1−k

1 −k
. Therefore, the consumer’s
and the total social utility is k(1 − θ2 ) = k 1 − p2 −µ
1−k

expected total social utility conditional on the belief of threshold policy θ1 in period 1
can be calculated as follows:

E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ] = k(1 − θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1
|
{z
}
social utility under low quality

Z

z(0)

+
z(θ1 )

|

+


k F̄ z(0)|1 − θ1
|
{z
}

social utility under high quality



p2 − µ1 − k
k 1−
f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 ,
1−k
{z
}

(2.9)

social utility under medium quality

where f (·|1 − θ1 ) and F (·|1 − θ1 ) are the p.d.f. and c.d.f. of the second-period expected

(1−θ1 )M γ
σ2 .
quality perception µ1 . Based on Lemma 5, we know µ1 ∼ N 0, (1−θ
1 )M γ+1 0
Consider the case when θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1), i.e., excluding the extreme cases where either
all consumers purchase or no consumer purchases in the first period. Detailed discussion
about the boundary cases will be presented later. By the definition of FEE, the threshold
policy θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1) in the P-W game in period 1 can be solved through the following FEE
equation:
θ1 +E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ]−p1

Z

+∞

=
z(θ1 )





(p2 − µ1 − k)+
µ1 +θ1 +k 1−
−p2 f (µ1 |1−θ1 )dµ1 . (2.10)
1−k


The above condition demonstrates how the firm’s pricing scheme {p1 , p2 } affects the consumers’ rational expectation of the threshold policy in period 1, and thus the purchasing
behavior in the P-W game. Plugging equation (2.9) into equation (2.10), after simplification we have


Z

+∞

θ1 + k(1 − θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 − p1 =

(µ1 + θ1 − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 .

(2.11)

z(θ1 )

Now, define the potential regret function Hw (θ1 ) under weak network externalities as
Z +∞

Hw (θ1 ) =
µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + z(θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 .
(2.12)
z(θ1 )

Then, the FEE equation (2.11) is equivalent to Hw (θ1 ) = p2 −p1 = rp . We call Hw (θ1 ) the
potential regret function since it essentially represents the consumer’s potential regret of
early purchasing if she waits to see the realized product quality and makes the purchase

50

decision afterwards. Hence, the crowdfunding reward is offered to induce consumers’
purchases in the crowdfunding stage. It is more intuitive if we rewrite the function as
Z z(θ1 )

p2 − [θ1 + k(1 − θ1 ) + µ1 ] f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1
(2.13)
Hw (θ1 ) =
|
{z
}
−∞
net disutility under buy-mistake

Z

z(θ1 )

=
−∞



p2 − k(1 − θ1 ) −θ1 − µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 .
|
{z
}

(2.14)

hedonic price

The first equality shows the consumers’ potential regret function, which essentially is the
expected net disutility under the wrong purchase decision. In the second equality, we refer
to p2 − k(1 − θ1 ) as the hedonic retail price (following [57]), i.e., the retail price adjusted
for the benefit of network externalities. Note that the hedonic retail price depends on
both the network effect intensity k and the equilibrium threshold θ1 , and it will in turn
determine the equilibrium threshold θ1 as shown in the potential regret function. The
consumers will strategically make use of this important feature to form the FEE in the
crowdfunding stage.
Note that this potential regret function plays a key role in understanding the purchasing dynamics in the P-W game in the crowdfunding period. Similarly, we can define the
potential regret function for the scenarios of strong network externalities (SN). Hereafter,
q
(1−θ )M γσ 2
(1−θ1 )M γσ02
2
we use σ (θ1 ) = (1−θ1 )M γ+1 , and σ(θ1 ) = (1−θ11)M γ+10 to denote the variance and standard deviation of µ1 . We summarize the preliminary technical results about the potential
regret functions in the next lemma.
Lemma 6 The FEE equations can be summarized as Hi (θ1 ) = rp , where


σ(θ1 )φ[z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 )], i = w
Hi (θ1 ) =
.
σ(θ )φ[z(0)/σ(θ )] + z(θ )Φ[z(0)/σ(θ )],

i
=
s
1
1
1
1

(2.15)

As stated in Lemma 6 and illustrated in Figure 2.4, the potential regret functions
under different network externalities exhibit different structural properties, and induce
different equilibrium patterns. From the left figure, we can identify the strictly decreasing
pattern for the potential regret function under WN, which is formally shown in Lemma
15. The monotonicity of the potential regret function ensures the uniqueness of the FEE
under WN. When the FEE equation has no solution, either Hw (θ1 ) > rp for ∀θ1 in which
case θ1 = 1 is the FEE, or Hw (θ1 ) < rp for ∀θ1 in which case θ1 = 0 is the FEE. The
existence of FEE can be guaranteed by including the boundary case where θ1 = 0, 1.
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Figure 2.4.: An illustration of the Potential Regret Function Hi (θ1 )

However, under SN (see the right plot in Figure 2.4), the potential regret function is
not monotonic in general, which results in multiple solutions to the FEE equation (i.e.,
multiple equilibria) for a given crowdfunding reward. So multiple FEEs may exist and
we apply similar equilibrium refinement as in the P-L game analysis, by focusing on the
smallest FEE.
The following proposition highlights some important implications of the P-W game
dynamics based on the structure of potential regret function Hi (θ1 ) and the FEE equation
Hi (θ1 ) = rp .
Proposition 2.4.2 (i) The crowdfunding market always exhibits adoption inertia under
zero crowdfunding reward. (Formally, Hi (θ) > 0, ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1), i ∈ {w, s}.)
(ii) Under WN, the crowdfunding market experiences adoption inertia if the crowdfunding
price is larger than or equal to 1. (Formally, when k < 1, Hw (1) ≥ (p2 − 1)+ .)
(iii) Under WN, for a given crowdfunding reward, more consumers choose to wait as
the network effect intensity decreases, market size increases, prior quality uncertainty
increases, or review noise decreases. (Formally, for a given rp , θ1w increases in M and
σ02 , while decreasing in k and σq2 .)
Part (i) indicates an important pricing structure in crowdfunding under any network
externalities structure, i.e., the crowdfunding price should always be lower than the retail
price. The consumers are tempted to exploit social learning of the uncertain quality,
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which entails deferring purchase. In fact, this tendency can be so overwhelming that
every consumer defers adoption when no reward is offered in crowdfunding. We call such
a market outcome adoption inertia. This well explains why we always need a reward in
crowdfunding. If there is no discount in the crowdfunding price, it is clearly a better
option for consumers to wait until more quality information is disclosed. Product quality
uncertainty in crowdfunding puts consumers in a risky position, and hence a reward is
needed to compensate for the potential regret of early purchase in the crowdfunding stage.
Part (ii) and (iii) focus on the WN case (as equilibrium is unique) and offer additional
insights about firms’ feasible pricing range and the impact of some key parameters.
Part (ii) reveals an interesting phenomenon: The crowdfunding price must be less than
1 in order to avoid adoption inertia in the crowdfunding market. When the retail price
is relatively low (p2 ≤ 1), this result is intuitive as part (i) has shown the crowdfunding
price must be less than the retail price to avoid adoption inertia. When the retail price is
relatively high (p2 > 1), the feasible crowdfunding price should be less than 1. To better
understand the rationale behind this result, we consider the consumer j with the highest
valuation vj = 1. Suppose the consumer j is the only consumer who adopts the product
early in crowdfunding (i.e., θ1 = 1). As one consumer’s review is negligible in the social
learning process (i.e., σ(1) = 0), the quality perception component remains unchanged
(zero) in period 2, and so does the consumer j’s purchase decision. The consumer j’s
expected net utility in period 1 becomes u1 (v, ρ1 ) = u1 (1, 0) = 1 − p1 , which indicates
the crowdfunding price should be less than 1.
Part (iii) provides a summary of how changes in network effect intensity, market
size, prior quality uncertainty, and review noise may affect the equilibrium purchasing
patterns. Since the network effect intensity has a direct impact on consumers’ utility, it
is straightforward to see fewer consumers purchase as the network externalities become
weaker. For the other three parameters, the intuition is that as the market size increases,
the prior quality uncertainty increases, or the review noise decreases, the potential value
of social learning increases, hence more consumers choose to wait.

2.5

Optimal Reward Choice
Optimizing the crowdfunding reward choice is a convoluted task for the firm owing

to the interaction between its pricing decisions, the adoption decisions of strategic con53

sumers, and the ex ante uncertain effects of the two-sided social learning process on
product quality perceptions. The firm’s pricing policy will affect consumers’ purchasing incentives, which, in turn, will affect sales at different stages and total profitability.
The analysis of this section centers around two main questions. The first pertains to
the optimal crowdfunding pricing policy: How should the firm adjust its crowdfunding
reward rp to accommodate the strategic purchasing behavior under different scenarios of
network externalities? The second question concerns the impact of several important parameters on the equilibrium outcomes: What are the impacts of production cost, quality
uncertainty, and social learning on the firm’s optimal reward choice and profitability?

2.5.1

Optimal Reward Choice under Perfect Learning

For transparent analysis and clean insights, the subsequent analysis will focus on perfect learning, which is equivalent to the following condition: M γ = M σ02 /σq2 → +∞. This
assumption holds when the potential market size M , or the relative ratio of prior quality
uncertainty σ0 over the review noises σq , is large enough. In crowdfunding practice, the
potential market is indeed very large; for example, there are millions of potential contributors on platforms like Kickstarter and Indiegogo. In addition, the quality uncertainty
of the product in crowdfunding is typically large since most crowdfunding products are
in an early development stage.
Hereafter, we denote by `(θ1 ) the threshold function,
`(θ1 ) =

z(θ1 )
(k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k
=
.
σ0
σ0

(2.16)

Then, `(0) = (p2 −k)/σ0 and `(1) = (p2 −1)/σ0 . The p.d.f. and c.d.f. of µ1 can be simply
denoted as f (·) and F (·), without dependence on θ1 . Based on the results in Lemma 6,
it is straightforward to derive the potential regret functions under perfect learning as
follows,
Hw (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )],

(2.17)

Hs (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(0)] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(0)].

(2.18)

By investigating the structural property of the potential regret functions, we are able to
characterize the impact of the crowdfunding price (i.e., the reward choice) on the crowd-
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funding demand (i.e., the equilibrium purchasing fraction in the crowdfunding stage), as
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.5.1 As the crowdfunding price increases, the crowdfunding demand decreases under WN, but increases under SN. (Formally, for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], Hw0 (θ1 ) < 0,
Hs0 (θ1 ) > 0.)
Under weak network externalities, a larger fraction of consumers will purchase in the
crowdfunding stage if a higher reward is offered. But under strong externalities, it turns
out that the crowdfunding demand increases as the crowdfunding reward decreases (i.e.,
as the crowdfunding price increases). This is an interesting finding because it means
demand increases as price goes up. The economics literature documents this effect as the
Veblen effect [80] and calls the product Veblen good. Veblen goods have upward-sloping
demand curves, which contradicts the law of demand. By incorporating social considerations into consumer preferences, the economics literature has proposed the nonfunctional
demand concept, i.e., the portion of demand not attributable to inherent quality. [80] formalizes bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects, the last of which implies that consumers will
pay a premium for products that convey higher status. [81] argues that the bandwagon
effects can explain the pricing strategies observed in restaurants, theater shows, and other
social events. [82] study the implications of snob and bandwagon effects on luxury goods
taxation, and [83] examines the emergence of fashion cycles. Although their contexts
differ, these papers share the idea that status seeking can induce a price premium for a
product, regardless of the quality; furthermore, these papers rationalize upward-sloping
demand curves under certain conditions. In our study, however, the consumers are fully
rational and utility maximizer. Hence, we provide new conditions and novel rationale for
the Veblen effect, without the presence of price premium induced by social status seeking.
A number of papers in marketing have analyzed the effect of conspicuous consumption
on consumer demand as well as its implications for firm pricing and product line decisions. In a market made up of consumers who desire uniqueness (i.e., snobs or negative
network externalities) and some others who desire conformism (i.e., followers or positive network externalities), [76] show that the demand from snobs might increase as the
price increases while the overall demand decreases with price. They demonstrate that
both snobs and followers must coexist for the existence of an upward-sloping demand
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curve. Focusing on a horizontally differentiated duopoly, [77] also show that in a market
composed of snobs and followers, demand among snobs could increase as the price of a
product increases. However, the demand among followers, as well as the total market
demand, would decrease as price rises. The intuition for this result is that snobs prefer a
higher-priced product if they expect the overall demand to be lower at the higher price,
and such an expectation will be rational only if the followers have a downward-sloping
demand curve. Therefore, in a market composed of either only snobs or only followers,
the demand curve must be downward sloping. More recently, [84] show that the joint
increase in price and demand for conspicuous goods may take place due to the change
in the underlying durability choice of the firm as long as some snobbish consumers are
present.
To summarize, the existing literature has principally focused on either social-related
benefits or consumer’s uniqueness-seeking feature (i.e., negative externalities, snobs) to
explain the Veblen effect. In contrast to this stream of research, we incorporate the
consumers as forward-looking social learners, and provide a novel explanation for the
Veblen effect: It may be caused by the presence of both social learning and strong positive network externalities, even in the absence of snobbish consumers. The intuition is
that forward-looking consumers strategically lower θ1 to lock a higher social utility from
crowdfunding sales in period 1 as the crowdfunding price increases. Due to the strong network externalities, the social utility increase from lowering the threshold θ1 compensates
for the decrease in the preference value v and the increase in crowdfunding price, eventually arriving at a new fulfilled expectations equilibrium point. From another perspective,
the function Hs (θ1 ) captures the potential regret for the consumer with preference value
θ1 , given the purchasing threshold in crowdfunding is also θ1 . It is more intuitive if we
rewrite FEE equation as follows:
Z z(0)

Hs (θ1 ) =
p2 + (k − 1)θ1 − k − µ1 ] f (µ1 )dµ1 = p2 − p1 .
|
{z
}
−∞

(2.19)

net disutility under buy-mistake

Due to strong network externalities (i.e., k > 1), the net disutility under the wrong
purchase decision increases in θ1 . Hence, as the crowdfunding price p1 increases, the consumer’s potential regret of purchasing in crowdfunding should decrease, which is attained
only by decreasing the equilibrium purchase threshold θ1 . Next we will further show that
the Veblen effect in the crowdfunding stage is driven by the interaction between the two
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important features: social learning and strong positive network externalities, and it does
not exist if either of the following two features is absent. Despite its importance, the role
of network externalities in the presence of social learning among strategic consumers has
not been well explored in the literature. The main objective of Proposition 2.5.2 is to
demonstrate how social learning and strong network externalities jointly give rise to the
interesting Veblen effect.
Proposition 2.5.2 The Veblen effect in the crowdfunding stage does not exist if either
of the following two features is absent: (i) social learning, (ii) strong positive network
externalities.
Before characterizing the optimal crowdfunding reward choice, we first derive the
Pareto choice sets based on the FEEs obtained earlier. There exists a Pareto set Rw
p
and Rsp for the crowdfunding reward choice under WN and SN, respectively, which can




s
be characterized as Rw
p = Hw (1), Hw (0) , and Rp = Hs (0), Hs (1) . Within these
Pareto choice sets, the one-to-one correspondence between θ1 and rp can be ensured and
characterized by the potential regret function. Suppose consumers’ threshold policy in
the P-W game is θ1 ; it is straightforward to see the crowdfunding sales is M (1 − θ1 ), and
hence profit in period 1 is (p1 − c)M (1 − θ1 ). But the firm’s profit in period 2 is not clear
as it depends on the uncertain quality learning process. The next lemma establishes the
expected sales in period 2 given the equilibrium threshold policy θ1 in period 1.
Lemma 7 Given the threshold policy θ1 adopted in the P-W game, the expected purchasing fraction in the P-L game has the following form:


θ1 Φ[−`(θ1 )] + χ(θ1 ), i = w
ρ2i (θ1 ) =
,
θ Φ[−`(0)],

i
=
s
1

(2.20)

where
o
o
p2 − k n
σ0 n
χ(θ1 ) =
Φ[`(θ1 )] − Φ[`(0)] +
φ[`(θ1 )] − φ[`(0)] .
1−k
1−k

(2.21)

Then, the firm’s expected total profit becomes Πi (p1 ) = M (p1 − c)(1 − θ1 ) + M (p2 −
c)ρ2i (θ1 ), i ∈ {w, s}. Since Hi (θ1 ) = p2 − p1 = rp in the P-W game equilibrium and there
is a one-to-one mapping between θ1 and rp for θ1 ∈ [0, 1] (based on Proposition 2.5.1 and
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Lemma 16), hereafter we can rewrite Πi (p1 ) as a function of θ1 and ignore the constant
M:
Πi (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[1 − θ1 + ρ2i (θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hi (θ1 ),
{z
}
|
{z
}
|
profit margin × expected total sales

i ∈ {w, s}.

(2.22)

cost of rewarding

The first part of the profit function represents the projected total profit from the total sales but with the retail price p2 , and the second part reflects the profit loss from
crowdfunding reward. Then, the analysis will be targeted to obtain the optimal θ1 that
maximizes the profit function Πi (θ1 ). Once we have the optimal θ1 , the optimal reward rp
(and the optimal crowdfunding price p1 ) can be uniquely attained through the potential
regret function Hi (θ1 ).
In the WN case (i = w), the first-order derivative of the firm’s profit function becomes
Π0w (θ1 ) = Φ[`(θ1 )]B(θ1 ), where
B(θ1 ) = c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1 + σ0

φ[`(θ1 )]
.
Φ[`(θ1 )]

(2.23)

After careful investigation (in the proof of the next proposition), we find that B(θ1 ) is
strictly decreasing in θ1 , and thus the profit function Πw (θ1 ) is strictly quasi-concave in
θ1 , i.e., the firm’s profit function is unimodal on [0, 1] (see the left plot in Figure 2.5).
Hence, there exists a unique optimal threshold policy θ1w∗ . Denote θB as the solution (if
exists) to the first order condition B(θ1 ) = 0. Then, we can obtain the optimal θ1w∗ and
the corresponding optimal reward choice as presented in the next proposition. In the SN
case (i = s), we have the profit function Πs (θ1 ) = (p2 −c)[1−θ1 +ρ2s (θ1 )]−(1−θ1 )Hs (θ1 ).
Further analysis shows the firm’s profit function Πs (θ1 ) is strictly convex on [0, 1] (see
the right plot in Figure 2.5). Hence, we can conclude that the optimal θ1 must be on the
boundary of its domain, i.e., either 0 or 1. Also we only need to directly compare the
following two values, Πs (0) and Πs (1).
Now, we summarize in the next proposition the firm’s optimal crowdfunding reward
choice under both weak and strong network externalities, and the induced equilibrium
threshold policy in the crowdfunding stage.
Proposition 2.5.3 The optimal crowdfunding reward is rpi∗ = Hi (θ1i∗ ), i ∈ {w, s}, where











0, if B(0) ≤ 0
0, if Πs (0) ≥ Πs (1)











w∗
s∗
θ1 = 1, if B(1) ≥ 0 , θ1 =
.
(2.24)
















θB , o.w.

1, o.w.
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Figure 2.5.: Firm’s Profit Function under WN (left) and SN (right)

Proposition 2.5.3 shows that network externalities have significant implications for the
optimal crowdfunding reward choice. Under weak network externalities, the crowdfunding sales induced by the optimal reward can be any fraction of the population; by contrast,
in the presence of strong network externalities, only extremely low and extremely high
reward should be offered to induce either adoption frenzy, where all consumers purchase
early although true quality is unknown, or adoption inertia, where all consumers defer
purchase to the retail stage (i.e., there is essentially no crowdfunding). The two extreme
patterns under SN in equilibrium are particularly interesting. One may intuit that it is
always optimal to charge the highest possible price, inducing adoption frenzy in crowdfunding by leveraging the Veblen effect. However, the proposition points out this is not
always an optimal strategy.
To elaborate the above result, we may explore in detail the underlying trade-off in
the firm’s rewarding decision. There two countervailing forces: the immediate network
benefit and the potential learning benefit. The immediate network benefit represents the
additional profit the firm can exploit immediately in the crowdfunding stage due to the
positive network externalities, where a higher network effect intensity gives the firm a
stronger leverage. The potential learning benefit captures the firm’s tendency to limit
the crowdfunding sales volume and expose itself to quality uncertainty. Driven by the
high retail price and positive network externalities, the benefit of a high quality review
would outweigh the loss associated with a low quality review. Note that the immediate
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network benefit is deterministic and increases in the network effect intensity k, while the
potential learning benefit is ex ante uncertain (as it depends on the realization of quality
reviews) and increases in k as well.
The equilibrium purchasing patterns in Proposition 2.5.3 can be explained by the
trade-off between these two benefits. When the network effect intensity is relatively small
(the WN case), the two benefits are close to each other; thus the optimal strategy is to
take advantage of both benefits, resulting in any dispersed adoption under weak network
externalities. However, as the network effect intensity becomes relatively large (the SN
case), one benefit tends to dominate the other. When the immediate network benefit is
dominant (e.g., the network effect intensity is high enough), the optimal reward strategy
is to induce adoption frenzy; otherwise, adoption inertia is preferred to take advantage
of the potential learning benefit (e.g., the prior quality uncertainty is high enough).
The following proposition characterizes the conditions under which the adoption inertia
strategy would be used by the firm.
Proposition 2.5.4 The firm should not launch the crowdfunding campaign when: (i) the
unit production cost is too high; (ii) the prior quality uncertainty is too high. (Formally,
i
for ∀i ∈ {w, s}, (i) ∃ cimax ≤ p2 s.t. θ1i∗ = 1 for c ≥ cimax ; (ii) ∃ σmax
> 0 s.t. θ1i∗ = 1 for
i
.)
σ0 ≥ σmax

When the potential learning benefit is the dominating one, the firm should not go
crowdfunding and wait to sell the product until the quality is perfectly revealed. That
means the firm is betting on the huge upside of quality uncertainty while forgoing the
moderate immediate network benefit. As pointed out by Proposition 2.5.4, such scenarios
arise when the unit production cost is too high (low immediate network benefit as pricing
flexibility is limited), or when the prior quality uncertainty is too high (high potential
learning benefit).

2.5.2

Effect of Social Learning

In this subsection, we examine the effect of social learning. For this purpose, we
introduce a benchmark case without learning. This situation may happen when there is no
product quality uncertainty (i.e., σ0 → 0), quality reviews are completely uninformative
(i.e., σq → +∞), or consumers have no access to quality review information (e.g., Moov
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runs a crowdfunding campaign on its own custom-built website, without offering any
review channel on the website).
Given the increasing pricing pattern, it is clear that consumers have no incentive
to wait without the opportunity for social learning. Therefore, in the absence of social
learning, consumers will either purchase in the crowdfunding stage or leave the market;
hence there are no sales in the retail stage (see Proposition B.0.2 in Appendix A). Then,
the firm’s profit function without social learning becomes Πni (p1 ) = (p1 − c)(1 − θ1 ),
i ∈ {w, s}. Here, we use the additional superscript n to denote the case without social
learning. Without social learning, there is no potential learning benefit for the firm.
Hence, the firm’s optimal strategy is to exploit the immediate network benefit in the
crowdfunding stage. In the next proposition, we characterize the unique equilibrium
outcome for the WN and SN cases.
Proposition 2.5.5 In the absence of social learning, the unique FEE θ1n∗ in the crowdn∗
can be
funding stage, the optimal crowdfunding price pn∗
1 , and the optimal profit Π

characterized as follows:



2
c
+
1
−
2k
c
+
1
(1
−
c)
1
+
c



∧ 1,
,
, if k <
< 1



2(1 − k)
2 4(1 − k)
2
θ1n∗ , p1n∗ , Πn∗ =
.



1
+
c


 0, k, k − c ,

if k ≥
2
Note that the pricing strategy under k ≥

1+c
2

(2.25)

simply sets the crowdfunding price p1in∗

equal to the network effect intensity k, which results in the adoption frenzy as θ1in∗ = 0.
Proposition 2.5.5 also suggests that the crowdfunding price under WN should satisfy
k ≤ pwn∗
=
1

1+c
2

≤ 1 in the absence of social learning. Moreover, the unit production cost

c must satisfy c < 1 under WN and c < k under SN; otherwise the firm cannot make a
positive profit.
Next, we compare the profits between the cases with and without social learning.
The majority of literature on strategic customer behavior finds social learning valuable
due to the fact that the beneficial informational effect of social learning outweighs the
detrimental behavioral effect [55]. One exception is [56], which shows that the presence
of social learning does not necessarily make the firm better off when the consumers are
highly strategic. The key driver of the result is the difference in consumers’ willingnessto-pay for the product’s quality attributes. We find that social learning can have a
negative impact on the firm’s profit, especially when the unit production cost is low and
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the network effect intensity is high. The key difference of our model is the consideration
of network externalities that introduce the interplay between social learning and network
externalities.

2.5.3

Effect of Network Externalities

As introduced in the previous sections, a larger network effect intensity k indicates
stronger network externalities. In this subsection, we investigate the impact of the network effect intensity k on the optimal reward choice, the crowdfunding sales, and the
firm’s optimal profit. Intuitively, as the network effect intensity increases, the firm’s optimal profit should increase as consumer’s gross utility increases. But what is unclear is
how the change of network effect intensity affects the firm’s reward choice, as well as the
resulting consumer purchasing pattern in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5.6 As the network effect intensity increases, the optimal reward decreases, the equilibrium purchasing fraction in the crowdfunding stage increases, and the
optimal profit increases. (Formally, as k increases, rpi∗ decreases, θ1i∗ decreases, and Π∗i
increases, i ∈ {w, s}.)
Proposition 2.5.6 confirms the benefit of higher network effect intensity, i.e., a stronger
network effect always improves the expected profit under both WN and SN cases. Another observation is that the change of network effect intensity alters all the equilibrium
outcomes in the same direction, regardless of the network externalities scenario. In general, as the network externalities become stronger, the optimal crowdfunding reward can
be reduced while still resulting in more consumers purchasing in the crowdfunding stage,
and thus a higher expected total profit over two periods.
Further investigation reveals additional insights regarding the role of network externalities, as shown in Figure 3.3. As in the left plot, it is interesting that the firm’s optimal
reward remains constant when the network effect intensity is relatively small. This insensitivity is good news for the firm because the optimal crowdfunding price is robust to
disturbance in the strength of network externalities. Within this region, the equilibrium
threshold policy θ1∗ strictly decreases, meaning more crowdfunding sales as network externalities become stronger. When k is larger than some threshold value (see the dash-dot
line in Figure 3.3), the crowdfunding market experiences adoption frenzy. Hence, as k
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Figure 2.6.: Impact of Network Effect Intensity on Equilibrium Outcome

further increases, the optimal reward decreases. In this case, the firm fully takes advantage of the increasing immediate network benefit and offers the lowest reward that can
induce adoption frenzy in the crowdfunding stage. The right plot shows the patterns for
equilibrium results under SN. We can see when k is not too high, the optimal strategy
is to offer the exact (high) reward (i.e., rps∗ = Hs (1)) so that all consumers choose to
wait. The intuition is to strategically forsake the immediate network benefit while fully
exploiting the dominating potential learning benefit. After the network effect intensity
exceeds some threshold value, the firm switches its strategy and offers the precise (low)
reward (i.e., rps∗ = Hs (0)) so that all consumers choose to purchase earlier, where the
firm’s strategy is to focus on the the dominating immediate network benefit.

2.6

Financial Constraints
In the previous analysis, it has been assumed that the firm is not subject to any finan-

cial constraints. In this section, we introduce the financial constraints and investigate how
they affect the firm’s crowdfunding strategy. Since crowdfunding originates as a funding
tool for startups who have budget constraints, our analysis can provide actionable insights for those financially constrained campaigners on how to fully exploit the “funding”
role of crowdfunding. Specifically, we consider the type of financial constraints as fixed
setup costs, where the variable production cost c is negligible and the funding raised is
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the only financial resource to support the high manufacturing setup cost S (we call it
fundraising target). The high fixed setup costs are salient for startup firms, which may
include the high expenditures in manufacturing equipments, raw materials and assembly
components, and research and development. Without loss of generality, we consider case
c = 0 for simplicity (see [66] for a similar setting and discussion).
Given the equilibrium θ1 in the P-W game, the amount of funding raised from the
campaign is p1 (1−θ1 )M = (p2 −rp )(1−θ1 )M = (p2 −Hi (θ1 ))(1−θ1 )M , i ∈ {w, s}. Then,
we can formulate the firm’s constrained optimization problem under case i as follows:
max Πi (θ1 ) = max p2 (1 − θ1 + ρ2i (θ1 )) − (1 − θ1 )Hi (θ1 ),

θ1 ∈[0,1]

θ1 ∈[0,1]

s.t.

(p2 − Hi (θ1 ))(1 − θ1 )M ≥ S.

(2.26)
(2.27)

Define the fundraising function to be Zi (θ1 ) = (p2 − Hi (θ1 ))(1 − θ1 ), which represents
the normalized fundraising from the campaign when consumers adopt θ1 as the threshold
policy in the P-W game. Then, the financial constraints (2.27) can be written as Zi (θ1 ) ≥
S/M . Now, denote the feasible set for θ1 under constraint (2.27) as ΘiF = {θ1 |Zi (θ1 ) ≥
S/M, θ1 ∈ [0, 1]}. Note that this feasible set may differ in structure since Hi (θ1 ) in
function Zi (θ1 ) differs under different network externalities.

2.6.1

Optimal Reward Choice under Financial Constraints

To study the impact of a funding target on the optimal reward choice, the key is to
understand how the fundraising amount depends on the crowdfunding reward, or equivalently the threshold policy θ1 adopted in the P-W game. Based on the decreasing pattern
of the potential regret function Hw (θ1 ), we know if the crowdfunding price increases (i.e.,
the reward decreases), then a smaller fraction of the consumer population will purchase
in the crowdfunding stage (i.e., the equilibrium threshold θ1 increases). However, it is
still not clear whether the fundraising amount, as a product of profit margin and sales
volume, increases or decreases. We start by analyzing the structure of the fundraising
function Zi (θ1 ) to understand the property of the feasible set ΘiF . We can show the
feasible set ΘiF is actually convex, as presented in the next lemma.
Lemma 8 (i) If Θw
6 ∅, there exists θlw and θuw such that 0 ≤ θlw ≤ θuw ≤ 1 and
F =
 w w
 s
s
s
s
s
Θw
F = θl , θu . (ii) If ΘF 6= ∅, there exists θu such that 0 ≤ θu ≤ 1 and ΘF = 0, θu .
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In Figure 2.7 (left: WN case; right: SN case), we plot the firm’s profit function Πi (θ1 )
(solid line), the fundraising function Zi (θ1 ) (dashed line) and the normalized fundraising
target S/M (dotted line). The shadowed region indicates the new feasible region for θ1
under financial constraints. Under the WN case, the fundraising function Zw (θ1 ) is also
strictly quasi-concave in θ1 . By the property of quasi-concave function, we know the
feasible set Θw
F is the upper contour set of function Zw (θ1 ), which is convex. Under the
SN case, we can show the fundraising function Zs (θ1 ) is a strictly convex with Zs (1) = 0.


Therefore, the resulting feasible set (if not empty) has the following form ΘsF = 0, θus .
Hence, the quasi-concavity of the profit function Πw (θ1 ) and the strict convexity of profit
function Πs (θ1 ) preserve over the convex interval ΘiF . Then, we can derive the optimal θ1ic∗
and rpic∗ for both the WN and SN cases (we use the additional superscript c to represent
the equilibrium outcomes under financial constraints). The next proposition summarizes
the optimal crowdfunding reward choice and the consequent purchasing threshold policy
in equilibrium.
Proposition 2.6.1 The optimal reward under financial constraints is rpic∗ = Hi (θ1ic∗ ),
where
θ1wc∗



w
w



θu , if B(θu ) ≥ 0





w
w
= θl , if B(θl ) ≤ 0 ,








θB , o.w.


θ1sc∗

=




0,




if Π(0) ≥





θs , o.w.
u
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2.6.2

Impact of Fundraising Target

We have shown the optimal crowdfunding reward under financial constraints has a
similar structure as in the base model. Next, we examine how the optimal crowdfunding
reward and the induced purchasing pattern change as the fundraising target increases
(i.e., more severe financial constraints).
Proposition 2.6.2 As the fundraising target increases, (i) the optimal reward would
increase (decrease) under the WN (SN) scenario; (ii) the equilibrium purchasing fraction
in the crowdfunding stage always increases. (Formally, as S increases, rpwc∗ increases,
rpsc∗ decreases, and θ1ic∗ decreases for ∀i ∈ {w, s}.)
Proposition 2.6.2 suggests that as the fundraising target increases, the firm should
always adjust the crowdfunding reward so that more consumers purchase in the crowdfunding stage. This is intuitive for the SN case, because more consumers purchase as
the price increases in the crowdfunding stage (due to the Veblen effect), which leads to
a higher fundraising amount. However, this finding is less obvious for the WN case since
the unit revenue and the sale volume move in opposite directions. Proposition 2.6.2 indicates that it is optimal to increase the crowdfunding reward (decrease the crowdfunding
price). This implies that the sales volume increase dominates the unit revenue decrease,
and thus a higher reward would yield a higher total revenue in the crowdfunding stage
for the firm.

2.7

Conclusion
In this paper, we study the reward choice decision for a crowdfunding campaign,

where a single firm sells a product with uncertain quality to heterogeneous consumers.
The selling horizon is divided into two stages: the crowdfunding stage and the retail
stage. The firm charges two different prices, crowdfunding price and retail price, where
the difference is the crowdfunding reward. The retail price is exogenous determined
due to competitive market, thus the firm’s key decision is the crowdfunding price, or
equivalently, the crowdfunding reward choice. Our model of consumer utility consists of
three components: a preference component, a quality component, and a social component.
Under this modeling framework, we first identify the consumers’ purchasing pattern as
a function of the crowdfunding reward. Under weak network externalities, a larger frac66

tion of the consumer population will purchase in the crowdfunding stage if a higher reward
is offered. But under strong externalities, interestingly, crowdfunding sales increase as
the crowdfunding reward decreases. That is, a higher price may lead to a higher demand,
which is called the Veblen effect. We provide a novel explanation of the Veblen effect
under the crowdfunding setting, where the underling driving force is a combination of the
social learning and strong positive network externalities. Next, we characterize the firm’s
unique optimal crowdfunding reward choice and the induced equilibrium outcome. We
find that network externalities have significant implications for the optimal crowdfunding
reward choice. In particular, under strong network externalities, the product adoption
behavior may exhibit either the inertia pattern (only late adoption) or the frenzy pattern
(only early adoption); whereas under weak network externalities, it exhibits the dispersed
pattern (both early and late adoptions). Lastly, we incorporate the financial constraints
into our model. Comparing to the situation without financial constraints, the optimal
reward choice can be either higher or lower under each network externalities scenario,
depending on the product’s cost structure and the prior uncertainty in quality. This
result offers insights into how financially constrained firms can exploit the “funding” role
of crowdfunding.
This research can be extended in several directions. For instance, the current model
focuses on a symmetric information structure between the firm and the consumers: Both
parties are equally informed about the product quality and hence share a common prior
belief about the true quality µq . In reality, however, the crowdfunding firm may have a
better sense of the product quality. A natural question is how should the firm exploit
this information advantage in crowdfunding. Another assumption in this paper is that all
consumers are fully rational. It might be more realistic to consider a mixed population,
where there are both strategic and myopic consumers. Finally, an alternative financing
option for the crowdfunding firm is to borrow from financial institutions like banks. The
optimal financing strategy for the firm when multiple options are available is still an open
question for future research.
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3. Crowdfunding vs. Bank Financing: Effects of Market
Uncertainty and Word-of-Mouth Communication

3.1

Introduction
1

Crowdfunding can be described as “the process of one party financing a project by

requesting and receiving small contributions from many parties in exchange for a form
of value to those parties” [86]. Crowdfunding is being widely adopted by a variety of
industries, such as venture capital (Crowdfunder), real estate (Fundrise), personal loans
(Lending Club), and nonprofits (Fundly Pro). In this paper, we focus on rewards-based
crowdfunding, where production-based firms pre-sell a product to launch a business without incurring debt or sacrificing equity/shares2 . In such an environment, a firm solicits
financial contributions from the crowd, mostly in the form of pre-buying a product. These
funds could then be used to cover production costs. Rewards-based crowdfunding is the
most prolific form of crowdfunding currently taking place in the U.S. The rising popularity of crowdfunding sites, such as Kickstarter and Indiegogo, has promoted crowdfunding
as a modern fund-raising solution. At present, crowdfunding has gone beyond simply
being a tool specifically utilized by small businesses and independent entities to get a
given project off the ground. Even larger businesses are now turning to crowdfunding as
a way to obtain funds to develop new products, and as a tool to market their products
[87].
Besides its important role of financing, rewards-based crowdfunding brings significant
operational benefits to firms. The all-or-nothing (AoN) funding mechanism3 helps firms
reduce future demand uncertainty and make better procurement and production deci1

This chapter is based on the author’s early work [85] jointly with Xiaomeng Guo, Guang Xiao, and
Fuqiang Zhang.
2
In contrast, another primary type of crowdfunding is equity crowdfunding in which the backers receive
shares of a company, usually in its early stages, in exchange for the money pledged.
3
In the all-or-nothing (AoN) model, the firm sets a funding target and gets nothing unless the target
is achieved. The most popular example of the AoN model is Kickstarter. In the keep-it-all model, the
raised funds are paid immediately to the project initiators, regardless of whether or not the project
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sions based on the advance demand information from crowdfunding. For new products,
the potential market size is usually hard to predict, yet matching supply with demand
is important, especially for capital-constrained firms. What crowdfunding does is to enable product-market-fit experimentation, which has historically been deprived of, in a
cost-effective and informative way. If the campaign goes well, not only does the firm
have the market validation for its product, it also has capital to fund manufacturing;
if it does not, they just spare themselves the pain of spending time and money on an
unattractive project. Hence, by crowdfunding the pledge of capital is available to firms
before committing to large-scale production, which allows them to do fund raising and
market testing simultaneously.
The benefits of rewards-based crowdfunding do not stop after a project is successfully funded. Ordinarily, crowdfunding sites help ventures get a number of natural visits
from genuine users, who are likewise essential for effective marketing, as they could further share product news with others. In fact, crowdfunding has become an important
“advertising” tool to help spread product/brand awareness, in particular through the
word-of-mouth (WoM) communication and recommendation4 . Typically, crowdfunding
platforms encourage and facilitate the use of online WoM through social networks and
social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram), to spread awareness about the crowdfunding
campaigns [89]. The popularity of social platforms have enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of communication, by providing a means to reach a large audience at a low cost.
Therefore, WoM is an integral component of the crowdfunding process, and its significant
impact has been empirically examined and validated by [90]. Through interviews with
entrepreneurs who have launched successful rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns, [91]
find the majority of the entrepreneurs considered “expand awareness” as a significant
benefit received. For example, a partner of Febtop Tech5 acknowledges how awareness of
the firm has increased as a result of the crowdfunding campaign: “There are many more
that know about us now after our campaign than before”.
reaches its funding goal. Indiegogo and RocketHub are two popular examples of this category. Here, we
focus on the more widely adopted AoN funding mechanism.
4
The influence of WoM is greatest when consumers are buying a product for the first time (typical case
in crowdfunding) or when products are relatively expensive [88].
5
Febtop Tech is campaigner on Indiegogo, who has successfully lunched a crowdfunding project, Optimus,
in 2017.

69

Before the introduction of crowdfunding, bank financing6 (i.e., bank/business loan) is
the traditional source of capital for small businesses. Typically, bank financing requires a
good personal and business credit rating, whereas there are no credit rating requirements
associated with crowdfunding campaigns. Even if firms qualify for a bank loan, the rate
of interest charged by banks may be high, which creates an additional burden on profitability. On the other hand, crowdfunding also bears disadvantages such as failure risk,
where the campaign may not reach the funding target under AoN funding mechanism. It
is conceivable that crowdfunding could potentially replace some of the conventional roles
of bank financing, but it is not clear when the crowdfunding model is a better funding
choice for firms.
According to survey data from the Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs7 , the primary
sources of initial financing for new businesses in the United States are: personal and
family savings (63.9%), business loans from banks (17.9%), and personal credit cards
(10.3%), whereas other funding sources are in relatively small scope, such as venture
capitalist investment (0.6%) [92]. Similar observation has also been reported in the 2017
year-end economic survey conducted by National Small Business Association. Among all
the feasible financing options for small business/start-up firms, various bank loans are
still the major choices whereas other innovative funding options, such as crowdfunding
and venture capitalist, also receives increasing adoption [93].8 Although compared to
traditional bank financing, crowdfunding, as an innovative funding source, may not be
prevalent, but it has drawn wide public attention and is disproportionately important for
business growth. As such, understanding the funding choice between crowdfunding and
bank financing is practically relevant and of great importance.
Motivated by the above practical observations, we are interested in investigating a
firm’s optimal choice between crowdfunding and traditional bank financing to fund its
innovative product with both WoM communication and market uncertainty. More specif6

In this paper, bank financing refers to any financing activities with the bank/financial institution,
including bank business loans, personal credit card financing, business line of credit, etc.
7
The Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs (ASE), conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, is the largest annual
survey of American entrepreneurs ever done, and exists thanks to a public-private partnership between
the Census Bureau, the Kauffman Foundation, and the Minority Business Development Agency. The
ASE samples approximately 290,000 employer businesses across all U.S. geographies and demographics,
and tells the story of the American entrepreneur.
8
The percentages of adoption for the surveyed firms are: large bank loan (15%), community bank loan
(14%), small business administration loan (4%), ventral capital/angel investors (3%), and crowdfunding
(1%).
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ically, we ask three main research questions in this paper: (i) What is the impact of WoM
communication and market uncertainty on the firm’s optimal pricing strategy under different funding schemes? (ii) When is crowdfunding a better choice for fund raising,
compared to traditional bank financing? (iii) How do different funding schemes affect
consumer surplus and social welfare? To answer these questions, we develop an analytical model in which the firm optimizes its operational decisions (pricing strategy, funding
target) while taking into account the financing role (i.e., raising funds to support product development and manufacturing) and the marketing role (i.e., the benefit from WoM
communication due to stalled market base in the crowdfunding stage). Our analysis
yields the following three main sets of insights.
First, we characterize the firm’s optimal pricing strategies under both crowdfunding
and bank financing. Specifically, for crowdfunding, the strategic/intertemporal pricing
strategy is optimal, which balances the immediate revenue loss from offering crowdfunding rewards to encourage more early adoption for WoM awareness expansion, and the
future profit gain from selling the product to the consumer population that would remain otherwise uninformed. In addition, we find that market uncertainty plays a critical
role in determining the optimal pricing strategy, and it is not always unfavorable for
firms to have a higher market uncertainty under crowdfunding due to the AoN funding
mechanism. In contrast, for bank financing, we adopt the risk-based credit pricing model
from the supply chain finance literature and find that the optimal pricing strategy and
the firm’s optimal profit remain fixed even as market uncertainty increases under bank
financing.
Second, we endogenize the firm’s optimal funding choice and compare the two funding schemes under various market environments, through the lens of both the market
uncertainty level and the initial investment requirement. Among other results, we show
that the choice between crowdfunding and bank financing is not monotonic in the market
uncertainty, with bank financing preferred within an intermediate range. Similar observation holds from the lens of initial investment requirement. The underlying intuition
is that with intermediate levels of market uncertainty and initial investment, the firm
would target only on high market realization and gives up the project under low market
realization due to the AoN funding mechanism. Such profit loss from market shrinkage
may outweigh the loss from adopting costly bank financing and, thus, leads to the inferior
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performance of crowdfunding. Moreover, when the initial investments are relatively high,
bank financing could also be adopted as crowdfunding is not feasible.
Third, we find that more active social interactions could hurt consumer surplus and
even reduce social welfare, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more informative
WoM should be beneficial. The intuition is that, although stronger WoM communication
helps inform more consumers in the retail market about the product, it also encourages the
firm to strategically increase the crowdfunding price, extracting more consumer surplus.
Moreover, the firm’s strategic pricing hurts the consumers more compared to the firm’s
profit gain, resulting in a lower social welfare. A further welfare implication is that
crowdfunding is a win-win alternative (benefits both the consumers and the firm) fundraising solution to bank financing, when market uncertainty is relatively high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We position our paper in the related
literature in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 sets up the model. The firm’s optimal pricing strategies under crowdfunding and bank financing are investigated in Section 3.4 and Section
3.5, respectively. Section 3.6 discusses the firm’s optimal choice of funding schemes. We
investigate the impact of the firm’s funding scheme choice on the consumer surplus and
social welfare in Section 3.8 and conclude the paper in Section 3.10. All proofs and
additional results are given in the appendices.

3.2

Literature Review
Our work is mainly related to four streams of research in the literature: crowdfunding,

WoM communication, advance selling, and the interface of operations and finance.
There is a rising research stream on crowdfunding [67, 94, 95]. A number of papers,
both empirical [96, 97] and theoretical [68, 69], address the dynamics of contribution
patterns observed over the duration of crowdfunding campaigns. A class of recent papers
have focused on the impact of information asymmetry and moral hazard on the campaign
design [67, 98, 99]. In a bargaining game setting, [70] and [100] study the informational
role of the crowdfunding campaign and its effect on the entrepreneur’s choice between
crowdfunding and venture capital. By contrast, our primary focus is on the choice between
crowdfunding and bank financing. [101] also compare crowdfunding with traditional bank
financing, but focus on the crowdfunding platform design to provide guidelines for how to
reduce various types financing frictions resulting from both moral hazard and information
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asymmetry during the crowdfunding campaign. Different from the above studies, we
investigate a firm’s funding choice when launching an innovative product to the market
with WoM communication and market uncertainty.
Other analytical works on crowdfunding attempt to optimize the operational design
(e.g., pricing, rewards, product line) of a crowdfunding campaign. [65] study how the AoN
crowdfunding mechanism affects a firm’s pricing and product line design strategies under
a simple two-period model with one potential buyer in each period. More recently, [102]
analyze the optimal design of a crowdfunding campaign as well as the optimal menu
of rewards to mitigate the strategic behavior of contributors. [103] develop a revenue
management model of crowdfunding dynamics to obtain insights on how to maximize
revenues by optimizing both the pledge level and the campaign duration. [36] investigate
the optimal choice of crowdfunding rewards in the presence of social learning, network
externalities and strategic consumers/contributors. We also characterize the firm’s optimal operational (pricing) strategy under crowdfunding, but our focus is the comparison
between crowdfunding and traditional bank financing, and examines the impacts of various market parameters on the firm’s funding scheme choice and the corresponding social
welfare implications.
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the AoN design in the context
of equity-based crowdfunding, and its impact on moral hazard [67], information cascade
and herding [104], and financing efficiency [105]. [106] compares the choice between fixed
vs. flexible funding mechanism to signal project value to backers and finds that a fixed
funding commitment can generate higher revenues. [107] show theoretically and find empirically that the size and likelihood of a pledge is affected positively by the size of the
most recent pledges, and negatively by the time elapsed since the most recent pledge.
Our work departs from these studies in many ways, most notably by considering the interactions between the AoN mechanism and the WoM benefit under market uncertainty,
which none of these papers take into consideration. As a cautionary tale, we find that
the AoN crowdfunding mechanism entangles the financial and operational risks (as the
funding amount and the market size are realized simultaneously), which could make the
firm worse-off compared to traditional bank financing.
A growing number of studies have empirically examined WoM communication and
shown that the volume and valence of WoM can have a significant impact on consumers’
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purchase and adoption behaviors [108–111]. On the analytical side, [112] captures social
learning via WoM communication and finds the optimal advertising targets are generally
not the individuals with the most friends. [113] study the problem of dynamic pricing when
selling to a network of consumers. [114] investigates the relationship between product
quality and WoM communication. In contrast to all of these works, however, we provide
a unified model to study crowdfunding, in addition to its financing role, as a marketing
tool to control production information diffusion via WoM communication and to test
potential market size.
Crowdfunding is similar to advance selling in certain aspects because both encourage
customers to place orders before the product is released. A major benefit of advance
selling is to help firms plan for inventory by using early demand information [49, 50, 115].
Another reason for firms to adopt advance selling is to exploit consumers’ uncertainty
about their valuations. [52] demonstrate that selling to consumers who have uncertain
consumption utility can substantially increase the firm’s profit. More recently, [53] find
that capacity rationing in advance selling can be an effective device to signal quality.
Our model of crowdfunding differs from advancing selling in several key aspects: firms’
financing/funding needs, potential project failure (AoN mechanism), and the awarenessexpanding benefit via WoM communication. These factors are rarely considered in the
advance selling literature.
More broadly, our paper is also related to research at the interface of operations and
finance, studying how firm’s financial decisions affect its operations [1,11,14,28,116–118].
Closely related are those study the financing and operations strategies of startups. [119]
examine the benefits of IPO under product market competition and demand uncertainty.
[120] consider the impact of capital market imperfections (fixed bankruptcy cost) on firm
technology choice, whereas the main financing friction in our model is the credit rating
(financing accessibility) and our focus is the funding choice between crowdfunding and
bank financing. More recently, [121] study the extent to which risk-averse entrepreneurs
can transfer venture risk to fully diversified investors under ICO financing9 . We refer the
reader to [126] for a review of this literature and [16] for a discussion of recent contributions and future directions, which highlights crowdfunding as one of the main research
9

ICO (initial coin offering), a new type of crowdfunding based on blockchain technology, allows companies
and entrepreneurs to raise money through cryptocurrencies, in exchange for a “token” that can be sold
on the Internet or used in the future to gain products or services [121–125].
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areas at the interface of Operations Management and Finance. Our paper focuses on the
comparisons of two financing schemes (traditional capital markets, i.e., bank financing,
and an innovative alternative: crowdfunding) for startup firms that have received little
attention in the operations management literature. Our work extends this stream of literature by showing how market uncertainty and WoM communication affect the funding
choice between bank financing and crowdfunding.

3.3

The Model
This section introduces the model by describing the firm’s decisions and the market

environment.

3.3.1

The Firm

A firm (she) wants to launch an innovative product in the marketplace with quality
q, which is exogenous and publicly known10 . The firm is cash constrained. To develop
and produce the product, the firm needs to raise capital, either via crowdfunding or
bank financing, to meet an initial investment requirement z. Note that z is an indicator
of the severity of the firm’s financial constraint, and can be interpreted as the funding
needs, or simply the fixed setup cost when there is no internal funding source. For
expositional convenience, we normalize the marginal production cost to zero11 . High
fixed setup costs are not uncommon for launching new products, which may include
the expenditures on early stage R&D, prototyping, and manufacturing capacities. In
many situations, a capital-constrained firm can choose between two funding schemes:
crowdfunding and bank financing. If the firm chooses crowdfunding, she needs to sell
the product through two stages: the crowdfunding stage with crowdfunding price p1 and
the retail stage with retail price p2 . In this paper, we focus on the commonly used
AoN funding mechanism: The firm sets a funding target T , together with a pricing path
{p1 , p2 }. Surviving the crowdfunding stage requires p1 d1 ≥ T , where d1 denotes the
number of consumers purchasing in crowdfunding. If the funding target is successfully
10

Quality uncertainty can be incorporated into our model without changing the main results (see Appendix C).
11
The zero marginal cost is commonly assumed in the crowdfunding literature for expositional convenience [98–100]. Our model can easily extended to the positive marginal cost without affecting the main
insights. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion.
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reached, then the firm proceeds with the production in period 1 and continues selling the
product in period 2; otherwise the crowdfunding project fails without further production
activities.
Alternatively, the firm could use bank financing as the source of capital. Given the
funding target z and the firm’s credit rating Cs , the bank evaluates the market risk and
decides the interest rate rs to charge (the bank may directly reject the loan request by
setting a prohibitively high interest rate). After securing the loan, the firm will produce
the product and sell to the market by setting a retail price pb . More details about bank
financing will be provided in Section 3.5.

3.3.2

The Market

Since it is a new product, the firm is uncertain about the market response. We use
a variable I, referred to as market interest, to capture the uncertainty about consumers’
interest in the product, or equivalently the potential market size. The firm does not
know the exact market interest before introducing the product, but knows that it follows
a two-point distribution:

I=



1 − β, with probability 1/2

,

(3.1)

1 + β, with probability 1/2
where β ∈ [0, 1] reflects the market uncertainty. We normalize the expected market size
to 1.
The consumer population is divided into two segments. A fraction α ∈ (0, 1) (called
crowdfunding consumer segment) of consumers is active in the crowdfunding market12 ,
and the rest of consumers are present in the retail market. Each consumer’s valuation of
the product is θq, where q is the exogenously given product quality, and θ represents the
consumer’s willingness-to-pay for quality (i.e., consumer’s marginal value of quality). We
assume θ follows uniform distribution on [0, 1]. It is worth pointing out that products
in crowdfunding typically exhibit high quality uncertainty. Our assumption that the
product quality is perfectly known to the consumer is mainly for expositional clarity, and
12

It is straightforward to show that even consumers in the crowdfunding market are also present in the
retail market, they have no incentive to delay their purchase decisions due to the optimal pricing strategy
discussed in Section 3.4.
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the model can be extended to incorporate quality uncertainty without affecting the main
results (see Appendix C for details).
To conclude this section, we introduce the following notations to facilitate the analysis
and exposition. Let ∨ denote the maximum operator (i.e., x ∨ y = max(x, y)) and define
(x)+ = max(x, 0). Monotonic relations (increasing, decreasing) are used in the weak
sense unless otherwise stated. A summary of notations is given in Appendix A.

3.4

Crowdfunding Strategy
In this section, we analyze the crowdfunding strategy. In the crowdfunding stage,

the firm chooses the crowdfunding price p1 ≤ q, and consumers with θ ≥ θ1 = p1 /q
will purchase. Note that the price decision p1 is equivalent to the choice of consumers’
purchase threshold θ1 . Similar observation holds for the price decision p2 in the retail
stage. Henceforth, we will use θi and pi interchangeably to represent the pricing strategy
in period i, i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, the total number of early adopters in the crowdfunding
stage is ρI = α(1 − θ1 )I, where the value of I is ex ante unknown.

3.4.1

Word-of-Mouth Communication

Consumers active in the crowdfunding market are aware of the firm’s innovative product, while consumers in the retail market get informed about the product with some
probability associated with the word-of-mouth (WoM) communication. During the retail
stage, consumers buy the product if and only if they are aware of it and their utility
exceeds the retail price. We define the awareness function A(ρ) to represent the probability that consumers in the retail market become aware of the innovation product, where
ρ ∈ [0, α] is the fraction of consumer population who has already purchased in the crowdfunding stage. For expositional convenience, we assume a simple form of the awareness
function as follows,
A(ρ) = (ρ0 + kρ) ∧ 1,

(3.2)

where ρ0 ∈ (0, 1) is the awareness base, k > 0 is the WoM intensity, and ∧ denotes the
minimum operator (i.e., x ∧ y = min(x, y)). Note that the awareness function A(ρ) ∈
[ρ0 , 1] increases in ρ, meaning the larger the fraction of consumers purchasing in the
crowdfunding stage, the more likely a consumer in the retail market will be informed
77

about the product. In contrast, in the bank financing case, the firm sells directly to the
entire market in the retail stage with product awareness A(0) = ρ0 . Additional discussion
on the assumption of awareness base under bank financing is provided in Appendix C.
The function A(ρ) has the flexibility to capture different market scenarios along two
dimensions: the awareness base ρ0 and the WoM intensity k. The awareness base ρ0 represents the firm’s extant brand awareness or the awareness of the particular crowdfunding
product before the crowdfunding campaign. For example, an established brand typically
has a higher ρ0 compared to a new startup when both choose to launch a product through
crowdfunding. The WoM intensity k captures how actively the consumers are communicating with each other, or how much buzz the product can generate. A product’s WoM
intensity also reflects the propensity that its information disseminates among consumers
via social forces. More specifically, a product with more chat-worthy features shall have
a higher WoM intensity13 .
To first highlight the role of WoM communication, we start our exposition by providing
a closed-form characterization of the optimal pricing strategy {θ1∗ , θ2∗ } and corresponding
profits in the base model without financial constraint in Section 3.4.2. In Section 3.4.3,
we further incorporate the financial constraint and analyze the optimal pricing problems
in different scenarios based on the project features we defined later. In Section 3.4.4,
we present our sensitivity analysis regarding market uncertainty, WoM intensity, and the
crowdfunding consumer segment, respectively.

3.4.2

Crowdfunding without Financial Constraint

Without financial constraint, the crowdfunding project can be guaranteed to succeed
by simply setting a zero funding target, even under the AoN funding mechanism. We
solve the pricing problem backwards, starting with the retail stage. The firm needs to
choose the retail price p2 at the beginning of period 2 given the installed market base
13

The extant literature models WoM communication in three ways. The first type is called “informative
WoM” [114], where WoM communication drives the amount of information in the market about the
product’s existence and conditional on knowing about the product, the customer knows the quality
perfectly. The second type is “persuasive WoM” [127], where the larger the installed base, the more
likely the remaining consumers will adopt. Such models mostly examine aggregate market behavior,
while ignoring the adoption decision of individual consumers. The third type is “learning WoM” [114,
128], where the larger the installed base, the more likely the remaining consumers will discover their
quality evaluations, by learning from consumer-generated quality information (e.g., reviews). The WoM
communication studied in this paper falls into the first category.
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ρ = α(1 − θ1 ) through crowdfunding. Suppose the firm chooses the retail price p2 , and
the consumers in the retail market with θ ≥ θ2 = p2 /q will purchase. The expected
revenue in retail stage can be written as π2 (θ2 ; θ1 ) = (1 − α)A(θ1 )(1 − θ2 )θ2 q, where
A(θ1 ) = A[α(1 − θ1 )] = [ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 )] ∧ 1. The optimal solution is θ2∗ = 1/2, i.e.,
p∗2 = q/2. Notice that the optimal retail price is always p∗2 = q/2, which is not affected
by either the funding target or the WoM effect. Hence, the optimal revenue in the retail
stage becomes π2∗ (θ1 ) = π2 (θ2∗ ; θ1 ) = q(1 − α)A(θ1 )/4. Back to the crowdfunding stage,
the expected revenue is π1 (θ1 ) = qαθ1 (1 − θ1 ). If the firm myopically focuses only on
maximizing the crowdfunding revenue, then the myopic pricing should be p∗1 = p∗2 = q/2.
Considering the initial investment requirement z, the expected total profit over the two
periods becomes
π(θ1 ) = π1 (θ1 ) + π2∗ (θ1 ) − z =

q
[4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − z.
4

(3.3)

Through analysis, we find the firm’s optimal (unconstrained) pricing strategy {θ1u , θ2u }
exhibits different structures under different ranges of the WoM intensity k, which is
formally summarized in the following proposition and depicted in Figure 3.1 accordingly.
Proposition 3.4.1 Without financial constraint, the optimal pricing strategy {θ1u , θ2u } is:


(4 − k + kα)+



, if 0 ≤ k < km 




8




+
1
(kα
−
1
+
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θ1 =
, θ2u = ,
(3.4)
,
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≤
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k
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n


2
kα








1,

if k ≥ kn
2
where kn = 2(1 − ρ0 )/α and km > 0 is the unique positive solution to kα(4 − k + kα) =
8(kα − 1 + ρ0 ).
We emphasize several points in Proposition 3.4.1 (Figure 3.1). First, when the WoM
intensity is weak (W.1: 0 ≤ k < km ) or medium (W.2: km ≤ k < kn ), it is optimal
to adopt strategic/intertemporal pricing, i.e., the crowdfunding price is lower than the
retail price (p1 < p2 ). The intuition is that the lower price in crowdfunding can induce
higher installed market base, which helps increase the product awareness in the retail
stage. However, when the WoM intensity is high (W.3: k ≥ kn ), it is optimal to adopt
myopic/uniform pricing, i.e., setting the crowdfunding price equal to the retail price. The
reason is that the strong WoM intensity can already guarantee the highest (full) product
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Figure 3.1.: Optimal Crowdfunding Price p∗1 and Profit without Financial Constraint

awareness in the retail market (i.e., ρ0 + kα/2 ≥ 1, A(1/2) = 1) even without offering
any crowdfunding rewards.
Second, under medium and high WoM intensities, the optimal crowdfunding price
will drive the full product awareness in the retail market, while this is not the case
for low WoM intensity. In Figure 3.1(a), we plot the optimal crowdfunding price as a
function of the WoM intensity k. When the WoM intensity k is relatively low as in region
(W.1), the optimal crowdfunding price decreases in k since it is set to well balance the
immediate revenue loss from offering crowdfunding rewards to encourage the product
information diffusion through WoM, and the future profit gain from selling the product
to the additional consumer population that would remain otherwise uninformed without
WoM. As the WoM intensity k increases to a higher level as in region (W.2), the optimal
crowdfunding price is set to induce full product awareness in the retail market (i.e.,
A(θ1u ) = ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1u ) = 1). When the WoM intensity k is even higher as in region
(W.3), a myopic/uniform pricing strategy is adopted, because no crowdfunding reward is
needed as the product awareness already reaches the maximum. Figure 3.1(b) presents
the optimal profit as an increasing function of the WoM intensity k. That said, more
active social interactions always benefit the firm, as the WoM benefit becomes stronger.
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The gap between the solid and dashed lines indicates the profit increase with strategic
pricing, compared to the case with myopic pricing. This difference can be interpreted as
the pure WoM benefit, or the awareness-expanding benefit of crowdfunding.

3.4.3

Crowdfunding with Financial Constraint

After understanding the marketing role of crowdfunding, we proceed to incorporate
the funding needs and investigate the financing role of crowdfunding, as well as the
strategic interaction between these two roles. Due to the AoN funding mechanism, the
funding target is an important decision as it will affect the success probability under
market uncertainty. We start by showing the optimal funding target should always be
equal to the actual fund needed.
Lemma 9 The optimal funding target is equal to the initial investment, i.e., T ∗ = z.
With the funding target T ∗ = z and the crowdfunding price p1 = qθ1 , the project
succeeds if the realized market size satisfies I ≥

z
αp1 (1−θ1 )

=

z
.
αqθ1 (1−θ1 )

Since I ∈ {1 −

β, 1 + β}, the project success probability given θ1 can be summarized as






1,
if z ≤ αq(1 − β)θ1 (1 − θ1 )






P(θ1 ) = 1/2, if αq(1 − β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) < z ≤ αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) .









0,
if z > αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 )

(3.5)

Note that the success probability P(θ1 ) depends on the crowdfunding price and achieves
its maximum at θ1 = 1/2. We further distinguish the projects with different success
probabilities, by categorizing them into two groups: risky project with P(θ1 ) = 1/2 and
safe project with P(θ1 ) = 1.
Now, we introduce a key metric F for crowdfunding projects, defined as
F=

αq
.
4z

(3.6)

The value of F captures the investment feasibility of a project, which increases in the
crowdfunding consumer segment α and the product quality q, but decreases in the initial
investment z. Depending on the value of F, we further define two investment feasibility
levels as follows.
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Definition 3.4.1 (Investment Feasibility Level) (I.1) Low Investment Feasibility: 1/2 ≤
F < 1; and (I.2) High Investment Feasibility: F ≥ 1.
The key difference is that under low initial investment, we have the maximal success probability P(1/2) ∈ {0, 1/2}; under high investment feasibility, we have P(1/2) ∈
{1/2, 1}. With uniform pricing, the project with F ≥ 1 is always feasible under any
market uncertainty β ∈ [0, 1], while the project with 1/2 ≤ F < 1 could be potentially
infeasible. Moreover, the project is always infeasible if F < 1/2.
(I.1) Low Investment Feasibility Case. We first consider the case of low investment feasibility. By definition of F, the reason for the low investment feasibility could
be: The crowdfunding consumer segment is relatively small and thus limits the firm’s
capital-raising capability; or the initial investment is relatively high compared to the output product quality. In this case, the crowdfunding campaign will succeed only if the
realized market size is high (I = 1 + β). Because of the funding target z, the feasible
pricing strategy θ1 should also satisfy
αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) ≥ z.

(3.7)

All feasible projects, with θ1 satisfying equation (3.7), have a success probability of 1/2.
Notice that some pricing strategies are always Pareto dominated, as illustrated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 10 The Pareto set for pricing strategy θ1 is [θl , 1/2], where θl is the smaller
root of the quadratic equation αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z. Moreover, θl increases in z and
0 < θl ≤ 1/2.
Denote the firm’s profit function in this case as π r (θ1 ), where the superscript r is
mnemonic for “risky”. Then, the firm’s problem becomes maxθ1 ∈[θl ,1/2] π r (θ1 ), where
q
z
π r (θ1 ) = (1 + β)[4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − .
8
2

(3.8)

Compared to the profit function (3.3) without financial constraint, the two profit functions
share a similar structure with two differences: the coefficient outside the square brackets
and the constant term. By incorporating the constraint of the feasible domain [θl , 1/2],
it is straightforward to see the optimal pricing strategy is θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θl and θ2∗ = θ2u = 1/2,
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where θ1u is given in (3.4). The crowdfunding price formula θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θl clearly demonstrates the key trade-off: the immediate financing needs and the potential marketing
benefits. A further observation is that the financial constraint has no impact under extremely high or low WoM intensity, since the corresponding unconstrained optimal profit
is already the highest possible for the firm in the crowdfunding stage. Otherwise, the
financial constraint would limit the firm’s leverage of the WoM communication effect.
(I.2) High Investment Feasibility Case. We continue to analyze the more complicated case of high investment feasibility (I.2). Different from the previous case (I.1),
the crowdfunding is always feasible regardless of the market uncertainty realization. But,
the choice of the crowdfunding price could affect the project success probability. The
project is ensured to be successful if the pricing strategy θ1 satisfies
αq(1 − β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) ≥ z.

(3.9)

Let θh be the smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1 − β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z. Similar
argument as in Lemma 10 shows that the Pareto set of θ1 is [θh , 1/2], where θh increases
in z and satisfies 0 < θl ≤ θh ≤ 21 . Under high investment feasibility, it is still feasible
to choose the pricing strategy within the range [θl , θh ], under which the project becomes
risky with a success probability 1/2. Hence, we categorize the two pricing regimes: (1)
safe pricing scheme: θ1 ∈ [θh , 1/2] and P(θ1 ) = 1 (safe project); (2) risky pricing scheme:
θ1 ∈ [θl , θh ] and P(θ1 ) = 1/2 (risky project).
Under low investment feasibility (I.1), the safe pricing scheme is not achievable, since
the maximal success probability P(1/2) = 1/2 < 1. Under high investment feasibility
(I.2), crowdfunding could be either safe or risky, depending on the adoption of either a
safe or risky pricing scheme. Note that the firm’s profit is different under the two pricing
schemes. When a safe pricing scheme is adopted, the profit function π s (θ1 ) is the same
as in the base model without financial constraint, which is given in (3.3). When a risky
pricing scheme is adopted, the profit function π r (θ1 ) is given in (3.8). Then, for projects
with high investment feasibility, the firm’s problem becomes:


r
s
max π(θ1 ) = max
max π (θ1 ), max π (θ1 ) .
θ1 ∈[θl ,1/2]

θ1 ∈[θl ,θh )

θ1 ∈[θh ,1/2]

(3.10)

The safe pricing scheme ensures the success of the crowdfunding project (and thus the
ability to profit from both high and low market sizes), but at the expense of limited
pricing flexibility to fully explore the WoM benefit of crowdfunding (and thus a revenue
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loss in the retail stage). It is not clear which pricing scheme is more beneficial. An
intuitive conjecture would be that it should depend on the market uncertainty and the
WoM intensity.
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Figure 3.2.: (Color Online) An illustration of Profit Functions under Safe and Risky
Pricing Regimes

Comparing the two pricing schemes, the profit functions share similar structure with
two differences: the coefficient outside the square brackets and the feasible domain. Figure
3.2 provides a pictorial interpretation of these differences, where the red (blue) region
represents the risky (safe) pricing scheme. Essentially, the startup needs to compare
the optimal profit in each region and choose the pricing strategy with the higher profit.
When the two pricing schemes generate the same expected profit, we assume the safe
pricing is preferred. A first observation is that safe pricing is more likely to dominate in a
broader parameter regions, but both safe and risky pricing scheme could be optimal. As
illustrated in the two plots, the left one has a profit maximizer in the safe pricing regime,
while the right one prefers the risky pricing scheme.
To fully characterize the firm’s optimal crowdfunding pricing strategy under different
investment scenarios, we define the following two auxiliary functions:
Hr (β) = π r (θ1u ∨ θl ∧ θh ), β ∈ [0, 1] and Hs (β) = π s (θ1u ∨ θh ), β ∈ [0, βm ],

(3.11)

4z
where βm = 1−F −1 = 1− αq
. Note that βm could be either positive or negative, depending

on the value of F. Essentially, the two auxiliary functions Hr (β) and Hs (β) represent
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the optimal profits under risky and safe pricing schemes, respectively, as a function of
the market uncertainty β. Then, we can further denote the following threshold βτ : βτ
is the unique solution to Hr (β) = Hs (β) if Hs (βm ) < Hr (βm ); otherwise, βτ = βm . The
optimal pricing strategy under different investment scenarios is fully characterized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.4.2 The optimal crowdfunding pricing strategies are as follows:
(i) Under low investment feasibility, the project is feasible if and only if (iff ) β ≥ −βm ,
and it is optimal to adopt the risky pricing scheme with θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θl and θ2∗ = 1/2.
(ii) Under high investment feasibility, if β ≤ βτ , it is optimal to adopt the safe pricing
scheme with θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θh , θ2∗ = 1/2; otherwise, it is optimal to adopt the risky
pricing scheme in (i).
Proposition 3.4.2 characterizes the firm’s optimal pricing strategy and identifies the
scenarios under which different pricing schemes should be adopted through the lens of
market uncertainty level β. Part (i) characterizes the condition under which the project
with low investment feasibility is feasible, and the corresponding optimal pricing strategy.
Since F < 1 in this case, we have βm < 0. The condition β ≥ −βm implies that the
crowdfunding project is feasible if and only if the market uncertainty level is higher
than the threshold −βm . Part (ii) provides a clean solution to the decision puzzle for
projects with high investment feasibility. The choice between the safe and the risky pricing
schemes critically depends on the market uncertainty level β. The general structure
remains consistent with one’s intuition: A safe pricing scheme should be adopted when
the market is relatively “safe”, i.e., market uncertainty is lower than a certain threshold;
otherwise, risky pricing is optimal. But the meaning of the threshold βτ or the mechanism
driving such results is not unambiguous. We have more detailed discussion in Section
3.4.4, where the impact of market uncertainty is carefully investigated.

3.4.4

Impact of Market Uncertainty

In the following analysis, we conduct sensitivity analysis to understand the impacts
of key model parameters, e.g., market uncertainty, WoM intensity, and crowdfunding
consumer segment, on the firm’s crowdfunding strategy and corresponding profit. We
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start our investigation from the market uncertainty β, which plays a key role in evaluating the risk and the performance of a specific project, as it affects both the feasibility
regime given a firm’s profile and the optimal pricing schemes. It is clear that as market
uncertainty increases, the firm may not be able to ensure the project success and the safe
pricing scheme may become infeasible. The following proposition formalizes such results.
Proposition 3.4.3 As the market uncertainty β increases in [0, 1]:
(i) Under low investment feasibility, crowdfunding is infeasible on [0, −βm ); while the
optimal crowdfunding price decreases on [−βm , 1], and the optimal profit increases
on [−βm , 1].
(ii) Under high investment feasibility, the optimal crowdfunding price increases on [0, βτ ]
and remains fixed on (βτ , 1]; while the optimal profit decreases on [0, βτ ] and increases on (βτ , 1].
The change of market uncertainty would affect the pricing strategy and profitability
of a given project. More specifically, part (i) focuses on the low investment feasibility
case, i.e., 1/2 ≤ F < 1, and shows that there is a threshold (−βm ) (which is positive as
βm < 0) of market uncertainty, below which the project is not feasible. Recall that with
low investment feasibility, the firm can only bet on the “good-enough outcome”, which
occurs when market uncertainty is high given the fixed expected market size. When the
market uncertainty is higher than βm , the optimal profit increases in the uncertainty level
β, since the success probability is always 1/2 and the firm benefits from an increased
high demand realization. In contrast, the optimal price always decreases as the firm
strategically prices low to exploit the WoM benefit of crowdfunding. As β increases
further, the optimal crowdfunding price may remain constant; the reason could be either
the product awareness in the retail market has reached one at the current price, or the
WoM intensity is relatively low, making it not worthwhile to further reduce the price.
Figure 3.3 depicts the impact of market uncertainty on the optimal profit as stated in
Proposition 3.4.3.
On the other hand, part (ii) focuses on the high investment feasibility case, i.e., F ≥ 1,
and shows that the market uncertainty may have some opposite impacts compared to its
counterpart discussed previously. In particular, as illustrated in Figure 3.3(b), when β
is low, it is optimal to adopt the safe pricing scheme and the project is ensured to be
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Figure 3.3.: (Color Online) The Impact of Market Uncertainty on Optimal Profit

successful. When β is in the intermediate range, the optimal crowdfunding price should
increase as β increases, which is mainly driven by the firm’s preference to stay within the
safe pricing regime and take advantage of the high success probability. This preference
shrinks the feasible domain of the pricing strategy θ1 , and hence leads to downward
revision in expected profits. It is also important to notice that the increase of market
uncertainty does not necessarily always bring down the profit of those safe projects. As we
can see from Figure 3.3(b), the market uncertainty increase may have no impact within
a certain low range.
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Proposition 3.4.3 provides a useful managerial implication: The increase of market
uncertainty is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it always benefits risky projects. On
the other hand, it hurts some (not all) of the safe projects that face intermediate market
uncertainty. The important driving force of such phenomenon is the AoN mechanism:
The funding scheme conditions the firm’s initial investment on the realized market size,
and thus enables product-market-fit experimentation in a cost-effective way. We may call
such a benefit the “loser’s blessing”: Because firms are somewhat hedged against the
downside of the uncertain market outcome, they respond with more aggressive participation in crowdfunding.
A general prediction of our model is that crowdfunding encourages highly risky projects
and provides an important funding channel for high-risk ventures, which is typically the
case for innovative ideas and projects. Our model prediction is consistent with empirical
evidence that entrepreneurs entering Kickstarter shift to projects that face higher uncertainty when crowdfunding becomes relatively more costly [129]. Such favor for high-risk
projects can also help explain why the average success rate for crowdfunding projects
on Kickstarter is only 36% across all categorizes14 , and why the majority of unsuccessful
projects raise no more than 20% of their funding targets (i.e., extremely high or low
market size).

3.4.5

Impact of WoM Intensity

An important stage during the introduction of a new product is the time when information about the product is diffusing via WoM through the population, and crowdfunding
could function as an indispensable tool to stimulate such viral marketing. The WoM effect is a salient feature for the crowdfunding business model. In preceding analysis, we
have seen the WoM effect has significant structural implications for the optimal pricing scheme in crowdfunding, which could be categorized into the three scenarios (weak,
medium, strong) according to the strength of the WoM intensity. The WoM communication initiated by early adopters in crowdfunding stage drives the amount of information
in the retail market about the product’s existence. Conditional on knowing about the
product, customers would possibly buy the product if their utility exceeds the retail price.
14

Data retrieved from https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about subnav, on March 14, 2018
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As WoM expands the awareness of the product, it essentially expands the retail market
size. A natural conjecture is that a higher WoM intensity, representing a more powerful
expanding of product awareness, would benefit the startup.
Proposition 3.4.4 As the WoM intensity increases, the optimal profit always increases;
the optimal crowdfunding price decreases on [0, km ], increases on [km , kn ], and remains
fixed on [kn , +∞).
Proposition 3.4.4 confirms that a more intense WoM communication helps the startup
increase profit under both medium and high investment feasibility. As the WoM intensity increases, the optimal crowdfunding price follows a pattern of decreasing-increasingunchanged, while the optimal profit always increases. See Figure 3.1 for an illustration.
The key intuition behind this observation is that it is always better to have a higher WoM
intensity since it increases the product awareness and essential expand the potential market in the retail stage. For the crowdfunding price, it is optimal to fully explore the
benefit of WoM effect by offering lower price as the WoM intensity increases but within
a low range. As it further increases to a high level, a higher price can already guarantee
the maximum level of awareness enhancement.
It is important to point out this result draws an interesting contrast with the extant
literature of “learning WoM” (social learning) which has highlighted that a higher WoM
intensity typically drives down the firm’s profit [128]. This difference between “informative WoM” and “learning WoM” is intuitive to understand. The WoM communication in
our model framework is always beneficial as it helps spread the product information and
inform more consumers about the product, where each consumer’s quality valuation is
perfectly known. However, the WoM communication in social learning helps consumers to
discover their true valuation of the product, and stronger WoM intensity generally leads
to more heterogeneous consumer valuation, which undermines the firm’s surplus extraction. From the formula of θ1∗ in Proposition 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, it is also straightforward to
see that without the WoM effect (i.e., k = 0), it is always optimal to adopt the uniform
pricing strategy (i.e., no rewards should be offered in crowdfunding, p∗1 = p∗2 = q/2). This
reflects that taking advantage of the WoM effect in crowdfunding is the key rationale
behind the price discount or crowdfunding rewards.
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3.4.6

Impact of Crowdfunding Market Share

Lastly, the impact of the crowdfunding market share α is worth investigating, since
it not only affects the investment feasibility Fs but also influences the boundaries of
different WoM intensity scenarios (km and kn in Proposition 3.4.1 & 3.4.2). By definition,
the investment feasibility Fs =

αq
4zs

increases in α. Hence, as the crowdfunding market

share increases, the project may switch from medium to high investment feasibility, and
thus change the optimal pricing scheme from risky pricing to safe pricing. It is not not
immediately obvious how the optimal price should be adjusted according to change of
market share. However, it is intuitively clear that the increased share of crowdfunding
market shall benefit the startup, since it essentially increases the product awareness due
to more consumers directly knows the existence of the product from the crowdfunding
platform even without any WoM communication. This observation is formally presented
in the next proposition.
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Figure 3.4.: (Color Online) The Impact of Crowdfunding Market Share on Optimal Profit
and Crowdfunding Price

Proposition 3.4.5 The startup’s optimal profit always increases in the crowdfunding
market share.
The core result is that larger crowdfunding market share indeed benefits the startup.
Although this may be consistent with one’s ex ante intuition, it is critical to appreciate
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that the pricing mechanism driving it may be somewhat less intuitive. As we can see from
Figure 3.4, when the crowdfunding market is too small, i.e., α <

4zs
,
q(1+β)

it is not feasible

to go crowdfunding. As the crowdfunding market share increases, the project investment
feasibility first becomes medium (with risky pricing scheme), and then switches to high
(with safe pricing scheme). A jump in profit is observed at the threshold point α =
4zs
,
q(1−β)

where the investment feasibility changes (project success probability changes).

The optimal crowdfunding price, in general, would first decrease from 1/2, and then
increases to 1/2. In general, the optimal price increases as the market share increases,
with the lower bound

4−k+kα
8

(the dotted line) linearly increases in α.

Consequently, the startup should always prefer the crowdfunding platform with the
highest traffic rank, while adjusting the crowdfunding price accordingly with consideration of other parameters, e.g., WoM intensity, awareness base. Note that Figure 3.4
only gives the example pattern when the WoM intensity is relatively low, i.e., 2k <
q(1 − ρ0 )(1 − β)/z. For the other case, the price pattern is slight different. See Figure
3.5 below.
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3.5

Bank Financing Strategy
Besides crowdfunding, the firm may also have access to short-term financing provided

by a bank, and directly sell the product to the retail market. This section studies the firm’s
optimal pricing strategy under bank financing. We assume all consumers are present in
the retail market. This assumption helps disentangle the benefits of crowdfunding from
the consumer segment advantage and ensure fair comparisons. In the subsequent analysis,
we first characterize the bank’s interest rate decision given the firm’s profile in the bank
loan application, and then derive the firm’s optimal pricing decision and its corresponding
profit.
Compared to crowdfunding, bank financing has two main differences. One is the
product awareness. Crowdfunding has an advantage in this respect, as all consumers in
crowdfunding market are informed about the product, and crowdfunding sales can further
generate awareness expansion in the retail market. The other key difference is the funding
risk. Bank financing entails two risks: One is the firm’s credit risk, reflected by the credit
rating. Note that the credit rating is exogenously given, which could potentially depend
on the firm’s historical performance. For extremely low credit rating, the firm may not
have access to bank financing. The other is the demand risk, and the bank will charge a
higher interest rate or even reject the loan application if the current business is too risky.
But for crowdfunding, the funding risk purely depends on the demand uncertainty. If
the realized demand is high, the firm can raise enough funds to continue business. See
Figure 3.6 for a graphical illustration of the sequence of risk realization.
Crowdfunding

Bank Financing
Demand Risk

Demand Risk

Funding Risk

Funding Risk

Figure 3.6.: Funding Risk Difference between Bank Financing and Crowdfunding

When bank financing is adopted, the bank loan will be competitively priced but with
a premium reflecting the firm’s credit risk. The risk-free interest rate is normalized to
zero for expositional brevity. Based on the short-term credit practices described in [32]
92

and following the literature [1,31], we assume that η(Cs ) > 0 is the interest rate premium
charged by the bank based on the borrower’s credit rating Cs and η(·) is a general decreasing function. Extant empirical work in corporate finance substantiates the assumption
by reporting that credit ratings are negatively correlated to the borrowing costs of the
firm [130]. In our study, credit rating is adopted to reflect the heterogeneous financing
costs across firms and capture the firm’s accessibility to traditional bank financing.
Suppose the firm chooses the retail price pb , then the consumers with θ ≥ θb = pb /q
will purchase. Without the WoM communication, the probability that consumers in the
market are aware of the innovation product is A(0) = ρ0 . Then, the bank’s interest rate
rs for the firm would be chosen so that it is indifferent between issuing the loan to the
firm and earning a rate of return η(Cs ), i.e., z(1 + η(Cs )) = EI [min{qθb (1 − θb )ρ0 I, z(1 +
rs )}]. We refer to this interest rate pricing equation as the competitive credit pricing
equation. Now, we define the financing cost coefficient δ(Cs ) as δ(Cs ) = 1 + η(Cs ), which
is a decreasing function with δ(Cs ) > 1. Then, the competitive credit pricing equation
becomes
zδ(Cs ) = EI [min{qθb (1 − θb )ρ0 I, z(1 + rs )}].

(3.12)

Note that such competitive credit pricing is widely adopted in finance and operations management literatures [?, see, e.g.,]]burkart2004kind, chod2016inventory, kouvelis2012financing, kouvelis2018should. The essential idea is that the banking sector is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, with prices fully reflecting all relevant risk information. Default risks are priced at markups above the risk-free rate; that is, the expected
repayment the bank gets equals the loan principal plus the risk-free interest and an added
premium related to the borrower’s credit rating. Based on such risk pricing mechanism,
we can further derive the explicit formula of the bank’s interest rate rs , and its dependence on the firm’s profile as well as the market condition, as shown in the following
lemma.
Lemma 11 Given the firm’s profile (q, z, Cs , θb ) and the market condition (β, ρ0 ):
(i) When zδ(Cs ) > q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ), the bank will reject the loan request.
(ii) When q(1 − β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) < zδ(Cs ) ≤ q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ), the bank offers the
interest rate
1
rs = 2δ(Cs ) − qθb (1 − θb )ρ0 (1 − β) − 1.
z
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(3.13)

(iii) When zδ(Cs ) ≤ q(1 − β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ), the bank offers the lowest interest rate rs =
δ(Cs ) − 1.
Lemma 11 summarizes the bank’s decision on the interest rate and reflects three
different levels of risk associated with the firm’s borrowing activity. Part (i) of Lemma
11 represents the high financing risk situation where the firm’s credit rating is too low
relative to her operational risk, and the bank will always decline her credit application
since it cannot break even in high realization of the market size. Hence, bank financing
is not a feasible option for the firm in this extreme case. At the other extreme with low
financing risk as in part (iii), the firm may have a favorable position (high credit rating)
relative to her low operational risk, and could obtain the needed funding from the bank
with a low interest rate competitively priced based on her credit rating. The firm faces no
bankruptcy risk since even the low market size could guarantee her full repayment (with
interest) of the bank loan. Therefore, the bank charges an interest rate of rs = δ(Cs ) − 1,
which is the lowest interest rate for the firm (it only prices in the credit risk reflected by
the firm’s credit rating). Part (ii) represents the medium financing risk case, in which the
firm will claim bankruptcy if the market size turns out to be low, and thus the interest
rate of bank financing is higher than part (iii) to hedge against such operational risk.
We further highlight several observations. First, the bank’s interest rate decision
depends not only on the firm’s credit rating Cs and the loan size z, but also on her
operational decision θb . Second, suppose the objective is to minimize the interest rate rs
of bank financing, it is straightforward to derive the optimal pricing strategy as θb∗ = 1/2.
Third, consistent with our intuition, the bank’s interest rate rs is increasing in the market
uncertainty β according to equation (3.13).
Now, we proceed to analyze the firm’s expected profit function. Under medium financing risk, the firm goes bankrupt (zero profit) with probability 1/2, and makes a
positive profit with probability 1/2. Under low financing risk, the firm’s expected profit
is the profit over the mean market size, and the bank’s interest rate is rs = δ(Cs ) − 1. We
can further derive the firm’s profit function under bank financing as follows (see Lemma
22):
π(θb ) = qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs ).

(3.14)

It is interesting to observe that the profits under low and medium financing risk are
the same, even though the interest rates charged by the bank are different according
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to Lemma 11. This implies that, different from crowdfunding, the firm’s price strategy
under bank financing is not influenced by the market uncertainty level. Such a result is
driven by the fact that the bank loan is competitively priced, and the bank only claims
the time value of its investment, with credit rating adjusted risk premium. From equation
(3.13), we can see the interest rate increases in the level of market risk, leading to an
increase in financing cost. But as market risk increases, the firm’s expected revenue
also increases due to the firm’s limit liability of the bank loan (i.e., claim bankruptcy
when realized demand is low). By the competitive pricing nature, the cost increase and
the revenue increase are well balanced, resulting in the constant net profit. We further
define two threshold values of the credit rating, Cl (β) < Ch (β), which explicitly depend
on the market uncertainty β, and are derived from the equations 4zδ(Cl ) = qρ0 (1 + β)
and 4zδ(Ch ) = qρ0 (1 − β), respectively. The following proposition characterizes the final
equilibrium under bank financing.
Proposition 3.5.1 When the firm’s credit rating is low (Cs < Cl (β)), bank financing is
not accessible; otherwise, the optimal pricing strategy is θb∗ = 1/2 and the bank’s interest
rate is
rs∗ =


δ(Cs ) − 1,

if Cs ≥ Ch (β)




,

(3.15)

2δ(C ) − δ(C (β)) − 1, if C (β) ≤ C < C (β)
s
h
l
s
h
under which the optimal expected profit is πb∗ = qρ0 /4 − zδ(Cs ).
Proposition 3.5.1 states that, in contrast to crowdfunding, the optimal pricing and
profit under bank financing are independent of the market uncertainty β. That is, the
firm’s expected profit only depends on the expected market size (one) and the optimal
price is always q/2. This is due to the expected profit function in equation (3.14) as
discussed earlier. However, the firm’s credit rating Cs and the inherent market risk β
jointly determine the firm’s accessibility to bank financing. If the credit rating is relatively
low while the market uncertainty is relatively high, bank financing is not accessible.
Moreover, from the firm’s perspective, bank financing could be adopted only when the
optimal expected profit is positive, i.e., δ(Cs ) <

qρ0
.
4z

Compared to the threshold Cl (β),

bank financing is accessible as long as it is feasible for the firm.
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3.6

Optimal Funding Choice
In this section, we proceed to analyze the main research question regarding the firm’s

optimal choice of funding schemes: whether crowdfunding is more attractive than bank
financing. Particularly, we investigate the impact of market uncertainty β and initial
investment z on the optimal funding choice, and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
both funding schemes.

3.6.1

Impact of Market Uncertainty

It is clear that market uncertainty plays an important role when comparing crowdfunding with bank financing since it affects the optimal profit in crowdfunding but not in
bank financing. This suggests that one may dominate the other within a certain region of
market uncertainty. We conduct detailed comparisons between the two financing schemes
in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.6.1 Given the firm’s profile (α, ρ0 , q, z, Cs ) and the WoM intensity k:
(i) Under low investment feasibility, the following statements hold:
(a) When πb∗ < Hr (−βm ), crowdfunding is preferred iff β ∈ [−βm , 1].
(b) When πb∗ ≥ Hr (−βm ), there exists a βrb , such that crowdfunding is preferred iff
β ∈ (βrb , 1].
(ii) Under high investment feasibility, the following statements hold:
(a) When πb∗ ≤ Hr (βm ), crowdfunding is always preferred.
(b) When Hr (βm ) < πb∗ < Hs (βm ), there exists a βrb , such that crowdfunding is
preferred iff β ∈ [0, βm ] ∪ (βrb , 1].
Recall that Hr (β) := π r (θ1u ∨ θl ∧ θh ) with β ∈ [0, 1], and Hs (β) := π s (θ1u ∨ θh ) with
β ∈ [0, βm ], are the auxiliary functions defined in equation (3.11). The threshold βrb is
uniquely derived from equation Hr (βrb ) = πb∗ . Proposition 3.6.1 identifies the conditions of
the market uncertainty under which crowdfunding is preferred over bank financing. Under
low investment feasibility (I.1), bank financing is only favored when market uncertainty is
relatively low (i.e., β < −βm or β < βrb ), whereas crowdfunding is always preferred under
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high market uncertainty (i.e., β > −βm or β > βrb ). Crowdfunding cannot dominate bank
financing since the latter is accessible at low market uncertainty (β < −βm ) whereas
crowdfunding is not. This result calls attention to the important advantage of bank
financing as it is inertial to the level of market uncertainty as reflected in Proposition 3.5.1.
In contrast, crowdfunding would gain a competitive edge under high market uncertainty.
Part (ii) presents the comparison for projects with high investment feasibility (I.2).
In this case, bank financing could be dominated as in case (a) due to two potential
reasons: a weak awareness base, or a poor credit rating that leads to high financing
cost from the bank’s competitive pricing. When crowdfunding is not dominating, case
(b) provides a range of market uncertainty under which one is preferred over the other.
It is of particular interest and importance to see that under high investment feasibility,
bank financing could only be favored when the market uncertainty is within a certain
intermediate range (i.e., βm < β < βrb ), whereas crowdfunding is always preferred by
either safe projects (i.e., 0 ≤ β ≤ βm ) or risky projects with high market uncertainties
(i.e., βrb < β ≤ 1).
The intuition behind Proposition 3.6.1 (ii)(b) can be explained by the underlying
trade-off between two countervailing forces of crowdfunding: the capital-raising benefit
and the demand-validating benefit. The capital-raising benefit represents the free capital
injection through monetary contributions from the crowd, without any financing cost
(no interest charged). For safe projects, such benefit is relatively high due to the ensured
project success. For risky projects, such benefit is weakened due to the lower success probability. The demand-validating benefit comes from the fact that the firm can condition
its production (and relevant costs) on high demand realization. Moreover, crowdfunding possesses a third benefit of awareness-expanding. However, the magnitude of this
benefit, unlike the previous two, is independent of the market uncertainty. Then, it is
straightforward to see with extremely low (high) market uncertainty, the capital-raising
(demand-validating) benefit is prominent while the demand-validating (capital-raising)
benefit is negligible. When the market uncertainty is intermediate, both benefits are
mediocre, leaving crowdfunding potentially inferior to bank financing.
Next, we decouple the capital-raising and the awareness-expanding benefits of crowdfunding, and compare the two funding schemes to focus solely on the demand-validating
benefit of crowdfunding.
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Corollary 2 When ρ0 → 1 and δ(Cs ) → 1, crowdfunding strictly dominates bank financing iff β ∈ (βrb , 1] under both low and high investment feasibilities.
The conditions ρ0 → 1 and δ(Cs ) → 1 in Corollary 2 indicate a perfect credit position
in the banking system and a perfect marketing position (full product awareness) in the
retail market. That is, under such extreme conditions, crowdfunding has no advantage
in either its marketing benefit via WoM or its financial benefit (both accessibility and
cost of financing). But, even in such an ideal case, bank financing is still strictly dominated by crowdfunding over the high market uncertainty range. Such decoupling of the
financing (capital-raising) and marketing (awareness-expanding) benefits helps identify
the ambiguous operational advantage (demand-validating benefit) of crowdfunding - that
it can hedge against demand risk by leveraging the AoN funding mechanism.
The above analysis provides a rationale for the recent practices of established companies launching products via crowdfunding platforms. A well-known example of such a
successful crowdfunding project was run by FirstBuild, a subsidiary of General Electric.
In July 2015, FirstBuild launched a campaign on Indiegogo15 for a countertop nugget ice
maker, the Opal. While the funding goal was only $150,000, the firm raised $2.8 million
from over 6,000 backers within a month [87]. A director of FirstBuild commented: “The
benefits of launching a new product like Opal using the Indiegogo crowdfunding platform
allows us immediate feedback on market acceptance.” Following its success on Indiegogo,
FirstBuild soon made the Opal available for purchase in regular retail stores. That is,
even without capital-raising and awareness-expanding needs, General Electric can still
use crowdfunding as a market test to validate the potential demand before committing
to large-scale production and distribution, as pointed out by Corollary 2.

3.6.2

Impact of Initial Investment

The level of initial investment z (i.e., funding target) has a critical role in both crowdfunding and bank financing. For a given product quality q, the initial investment z
essentially captures the investment efficiency of the project (the smaller, the better).
The following proposition captures the firm’s optimal funding scheme choice through the
lens of initial investment z.
15

Indiegogo has recently announced a new service called Enterprise Crowdfunding, targeting on large
companies that are interested in crowdfunding their innovative projects.
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Proposition 3.6.2 Suppose ρ0 → 1 and Cτ satisfies α(1 − β)(2δ(Cτ ) − 1) = 2ρ0 − 1 − β.
(i) When z ≤

(1−β)αq
,
4


If Cs ≥ Cτ , there exists a zb ∈ (1−β)αq
, (1+β)αq
, such
4
4

that bank financing is preferred iff z ∈ (1−β)αq
, zb . Otherwise, crowdfunding is
4

(ii) When

(1−β)αq
4

crowdfunding is always preferred.

<z≤

(1+β)αq
:
4

always preferred.
Proposition 3.6.2 characterizes the firm’s preference over the two financing schemes
at different levels of initial investments. When the initial investment is low, the crowdfunding project is always successful as the target can be achieved even with low demand
realization. For bank financing, even without bankruptcy risk in such a situation, the
bank’s capital injection is not free, but at a cost of interest rate rs = δ(Cs ) − 1 > 0, which
reduces the firm’s total profit. Therefore, crowdfunding is always preferred in this case as
shown in part (i), which corresponds to the left region in Figure 3.7. We further remark
that in Proposition 3.6.2, the marketing (awareness-expanding) benefit of crowdfunding
has already been decoupled (as ρ0 → 1); hence the comparison only accounts for the operational (demand-validating) benefit and financial (capital-raising) benefit. In addition,
since the crowdfunding project is safe, there is no demand-validating benefit. Hence, the
pure capital-raising benefit drives the preferred position of crowdfunding.
4
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Figure 3.7.: (Color Online) The Impact of Initial Investment on Profits under Different
Funding Schemes
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As the initial investment increases to the range of

(1−β)αq
4

<z≤

(1+β)αq
,
4

the crowd-

funding project becomes risky. Part (ii) considers two scenarios: If the firm’s credit
rating is too low (Figure 3.7(b)), crowdfunding still dominates bank financing since
the corresponding interest rate charged by the bank is too high. Otherwise, bank financing could outperform crowdfunding in some medium range of the initial investment
( (1−β)αq
< z < zb ). This result is driven by the downside of the AoN mechanism, i.e.,
4
the expected market shrinkage as the firm could only target on high demand realization
under a risky crowdfunding project. Given the market uncertainty level, the demandvalidating benefit of the AoN mechanism increases in the initial investment. When the
initial investment is relatively small, the loss from market shrinkage outweighs the gain
from demand validating, leading to a worse performance of crowdfunding compared to
that of bank financing, when the latter has a relatively low financing cost.

3.6.3

A Holistic View

So far, we have shown how the firm’s optimal funding choice depends on market
uncertainty and initial investment, separately. We now conclude this section by discussing
their joint effect from a holistic view. More importantly, the funding scheme comparison
in this subsection is extended to a broader parameter region, with the inclusion of the
region where crowdfunding is not feasible (i.e., F < 1/2).
Figure 3.8 depicts the firm’s optimal funding scheme choice in the space of market
uncertainty and initial investment under different awareness bases. There are several
noteworthy observations. First, when the firm’s awareness base is limited as in Figure 3.8(a), bank financing is always infeasible. Hence, crowdfunding could dominate
bank financing when its marketing benefit predominates (low awareness base) or bank
financing is prohibitively expensive (low credit rating). The crowdfunding-feasible region is represented by regions C1 and C2, where C1 (C2) comprises those safe (risky)
projects. Second, as the awareness base increases, bank financing becomes complementary to crowdfunding and it could be adopted in a certain parameter region (i.e., region
B1 in Figure 3.8(b)), where the initial investments are relatively high and crowdfunding is not feasible. This crowdfunding-infeasible region contains projects with relatively
low market uncertainties and/or high initial investments. Third, as the awareness base
increases further in Figure 3.8(c), the advantage of bank financing becomes more promi100
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Figure 3.8.: (Color Online) The Impact of Initial Investment and Market Uncertainty on
Funding Choice

nent, as it covers a broader crowdfunding-infeasible region (B1) and also substitutes part
of the crowdfunding-feasible region (B2). The reason is that although bank financing is
costly and takes away a portion of the firm’s profit, such loss could be less significant
than that from the market shrinkage under crowdfunding as the firm could only target
on high market realization. As the awareness base fully expands, bank financing could be
feasible even for those projects with extremely high initial investments (expanding region
B1 to the right side), regardless of the market uncertainty. It is also preferred by the
firm in more crowdfunding-feasible region (B2) with medium levels of market uncertainty
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and initial investment. Finally, an important overall observation is that crowdfunding is
always preferred for safe projects (C1), i.e., those projects with relatively low levels of
both initial investment and mark uncertainty.
To sum up, our model is endowed with the flexibility and the capability to compare the
two funding schemes under different business environments. The advantage of adopting
traditional bank financing is two-fold: First, compared to crowdfunding, it has a broader
feasibility, especially for capital-intensive projects (large initial investments). Second, it
enables full market exploitation, covering both high and low demand realizations. The
advantage of crowdfunding can be explicitly categorized into the following three underlying benefits: (1) Capital-raising benefit, which represents the free (zero-interest) capital injection through monetary contributions from the crowd; (2) Awareness-expanding
benefit, which means early adopters in the crowdfunding stage can help expand product awareness, and thus increase the potential market size in the retail stage; and (3)
Demand-validating benefit, which comes from the fact that the firm can condition its
production (and relevant cost) on high demand due to the AoN mechanism. As such, the
optimal funding choice is involved as the firm needs to carefully balance the ensued benefits of each funding scheme in accordance with detailed market conditions and project
attributes.

3.7

Advance Selling
In this section, we study the equilibrium outcomes when the startup can adopt ad-

vance selling with bank financing, and to further compare with the results we get in
crowdfunding. Different from the crowdfunding case, consumers active in the advance
selling market and in the retail market get informed about the product with same probability ρ0 . That said, there is WoM benefit in advance selling. In the advance selling
stage, the expected revenue is π1 (θ1 ) = qαρ0 θ1 (1 − θ1 ). The expected revenue in the retail
stage can be written as π2 (θ2 ) = (1 − α)ρ0 (1 − θ2 )θ2 q. Then, it is straightforward to see
the optimal solution is always uniform pricing θ1∗ = θ2∗ = 1/2. Hence, the total profit is
q
ρ0 q
− z.
π ∗ = [αρ0 + (1 − α)ρ0 ] − z =
4
4

(3.16)

However, the key difference between advance selling and crowdfunding is that there
should not exist any product development and delivery risk in advance selling, which
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means the funding collected in any demand realization must be able to support the
initial investment z. Mathematically, the additional constraint is
qαρ0 (1 − β)
≥ z.
4

(3.17)

The constraint indicates that advance selling is only feasible for projects with relatively
low market uncertainty, i.e., relatively small β. Compared with bank financing, the
advance selling has the capital-raising advantage as crowdfunding, since there is not
interest tied with the funding collected. But, the downside is the feasibility issue as
advance selling needs the condition of less market uncertainty.
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Figure 3.9.: (Color Online) Funding Choice: Crowdfunding, Bank Financing, or Advance
Selling

Proposition 3.7.1 Advance selling is only feasible when the market uncertainty is less
than a threshold. Moreover, advance selling may outperform bank financing, but is always
dominated by crowdfunding.
In Figure 3.9, we plot the optimal profit in crowdfunding, bank financing, and advance
selling. The shadowed red region is where advance selling is feasible. We can observe
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the red line (advance selling) is always above the black line (bank financing), but bank
financing is feasible for all range of market uncertainty. Compared with crowdfunding,
advance selling is always dominated. The intuition is that when advance selling is feasible,
the firm can also adopt crowdfunding with safe pricing scheme, which has the same capital
raising benefit with additional WoM benefit.

3.8

Consumer Surplus and Welfare Implications
The previous sections analyze the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding

profit for the firm, under both crowdfunding and traditional bank financing. In this
section, we investigate the impact of the firm’s funding choice on the consumer surplus,
which is measured by the utility that people gain from consuming the product, and the
social welfare, which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profit.
For the crowdfunding scheme, given the firm’s optimal pricing strategy θ1∗ , we can
derive the consumer surplus as follows. For risky projects, let C1r (C2r ) be the surplus in
the crowdfunding stage (the retail stage). Then, it is straightforward to get C1r (θ1∗ ) =
1
(1
4

+ β)αq(1 − θ1∗ )2 and C2r (θ1∗ ) =

1
(1
16

+ β)(1 − α)qA(θ1∗ ). Taken together, the total

consumer surplus can be formulated as
C r (θ1∗ ) =



1
q(1 + β) 4α(1 − θ1∗ )2 + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ ) .
16

(3.18)

Similarly, for safe projects, we can obtain the consumer surplus as

1 
C s (θ1∗ ) = q 4α(1 − θ1∗ )2 + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ ) .
8

(3.19)

The social welfare can be written as S i (θ1∗ ) = π i (θ1∗ ) + C i (θ1∗ ), i ∈ {r, s}, where π i (θ1∗ )
is given in Section 3.4.3. For bank financing, based on the results in Section 5, we can
derive the expected consumer surplus Cb and the total social welfare Sb , respectively, as
follows:
1
Cb = ρ0 q,
8

3
Sb = πb∗ + Cb = ρ0 q − zδ(Cs ).
8

(3.20)

Now, we are ready to analyze and answer several important questions pertaining to
consumer surplus and social welfare. In the following proposition, we first investigate
the effects of both the WoM intensity and the market uncertainty under crowdfunding,
as those factors will not affect the consumer surplus and the social welfare under bank
financing.
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Proposition 3.8.1 For feasible crowdfunding projects, the following statements hold:
(i) As WoM intensity increases, the consumer surplus and the social welfare first increase, then decrease, and remain fixed afterwards.
(ii) As market uncertainty increases, the consumer surplus and the social welfare increase for risky projects, but decrease for safe projects.
Interestingly, Proposition 3.8.1 (i) shows that consumer surplus and social welfare
may decrease as the WoM intensity increases in the medium range. This is contrary
to the conventional wisdom that stronger informative WoM should benefit consumers [?,
e.g.,]]jing2011social. The underlying reason is that, although more active WoM communication helps diffuse product information and make more consumers aware of the product
in the retail market, it also encourages the firm to strategically increase the crowdfunding
price and extract more consumer surplus. More importantly, such strategic firm behavior hurts consumers more compared to the firm’s profit gain, resulting in a lower social
welfare. Part (ii) suggests that both the consumer surplus and the social welfare are
influenced by the market uncertainty in a similar fashion as the firm’s profit, due to the
similar functional structures with respect to β.
Proposition 3.8.2 For feasible crowdfunding projects, when bank financing is not dominated, i.e., πb∗ > Hr (|βm |), there exist two thresholds βsb and βcb such that:
(i) Bank financing offers a higher consumer surplus when β ∈ (|βm |, βcb ).
(ii) Bank financing offers a higher social welfare when β ∈ (|βm |, βsb ).
Proposition 3.8.2 provides the preference over bank financing and crowdfunding, from
the perspectives of both consumer surplus and social welfare. Similar to the discussion
from the firm’s perspective, as stated in Proposition 3.6.1, we find bank financing could
only be preferred when the market uncertainty is relatively low while there always exists a
range of high market uncertainty where crowdfunding is a better choice. We also numerically observe that the threshold from the firm’s profit perspective (βrb ) could be smaller
than the one from the social welfare perspective (βsb ), and the one from the consumer
surplus perspective (βcb ) is the largest. Consequently, there may exist an intermediate
range of market uncertainty, where the firm prefers crowdfunding but bank financing is
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favored by consumers. Moreover, a further implication based on Propositions 3.6.1 and
3.8.2 is that crowdfunding is a win-win alternative fund-raising solution to bank financing
when market uncertainty is relatively high (i.e., β > βcb ∨ βrb ).

3.9

Endogenous Quality Design
In the new Section 8, we endogenize the product quality decision and investigate

the startup’s optimal quality choice under both crowdfunding and bank financing. The
analysis of this section centers around two main questions. The first pertains to the
impact of financing sources (crowdfunding v.s. bank financing) on the startup’s optimal
quality choice and the corresponding consumer surplus and social welfare: Should firms
increase or decrease product quality when they go crowdfunding? Which financing option
could increase the consumer surplus or the social welfare? The second question concerns
the impact of several important exogenous parameters on the optimal quality choices:
What happens to the optimal quality as the awareness base, the WoM intensity, the
crowdfunding market share, or the credit rating increases? Should firms always offer
better products when consumers interact more frequently?

3.9.1

Optimal Quality under Crowdfunding

We assume that a quality design with target q incurs a quadratic fixed setup/investment
cost zs = c(q) = q 2 . The crowdfunding failure threshold Im (θ1 ) can be written as
Im (θ1 ) =

zs
q
=
,
αqθ1 (1 − θ1 )
αθ1 (1 − θ1 )

(3.21)

and the minimal value is Im (1/2) = 4q/α. Hence, the investment feasibility of the
startup’s crowdfunding project becomes a function of q, Fs (q) =

α
,
4q

indicating a higher

quality choice dampens the investment feasibility and would potentially switch the project
investment feasibility from high to medium scenario. Depending on the choice of quality
q, there are three different scenarios as follows:
(I.1) Low Investment Feasibility: Fs (q) < (1 + β)−1 , i.e., 4q > α(1 + β);
(I.2) Medium Investment Feasibility: (1 + β)−1 ≤ Fs (q) < (1 − β)−1 , i.e., α(1 − β) <
4q ≤ α(1 + β);
(I.3) High Investment Feasibility: Fs (q) ≥ (1 − β)−1 , i.e., 4q ≤ α(1 − β).
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Taking this into account, we can start by analyzing the quality design and pricing
problem independently for the case (I.2) and case (I.3), within which the optimal pricing
problem given the quality decision has been analyzed in previous sections. The only
difference is the boundary value θl and θh of the feasible range, which becomes a function
of q now. Let θl (q) and θh (q) be functions of q that are derived from α(1+β)θl (1−θl ) = q,
and α(1 − β)θh (1 − θh ) = q, respectively.
(I.2) Medium Investment Feasibility
Given the optimal pricing policy, the quality design problem (P1 ) can be formulated as

max π(1) (q) = max ψ ∗ (q, β)q − q 2 ,
q∈Q1

q∈Q

(3.22)

where

Q1 = α(1 − β)/4, α(1 + β)/4 ,
ψ1∗ (q, β) =

(1 + β)
[4αθ1∗ (q)(1 − θ1∗ (q)) + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ (q))],
8

(3.23)
(3.24)

and


(4 − k + kα)+



∨ θl (q), if 0 ≤ k < km 




8




+
(kα
−
1
+
ρ
)
∗
0
θ1 (q) =
∨ θl (q), if km ≤ k < kn  .

kα








1

 ,
if k ≥ kn
2
(I.3) High Investment Feasibility

(3.25)

Given the optimal pricing policy, the quality design problem (P2 ) can be formulated as

max π(2) (q) = max ψ ∗ (q, β)q − q 2 ,
q∈Q2

q∈Q

(3.26)

where


Q2 = 0, α(1 − β)/4 ,

(3.27)

1
ψ2∗ (q, β) = [4αθ1∗ (q)(1 − θ1∗ (q)) + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ (q))]
4

(3.28)



(4 − k + kα)+



∨ θh (q), if 0 ≤ k < km 




8




+
(kα
−
1
+
ρ
∗
0)
θ1 (q) =
∨ θh (q), if km ≤ k < kn  .

kα








1
 ,

if k ≥ kn
2

(3.29)

and
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Proposition 3.9.1 There exists a unique optimal solution qi∗ for Problem Pi and the
optimal quality choice under crowdfunding is
q ∗ = arg max{π(1) (q1∗ ), π(2) (q2∗ )}.
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Figure 3.10.: (Color Online) Optimal Profit w.r.t. Quality Choice q

3.9.2

Optimal Quality under Bank Financing

The optimal price is p∗b = q/2 and the corresponding optimal profit is
πb∗ = qρ0 /4 − zs δ(Cs ) = qρ0 /4 − δ(Cs )q 2 .

(3.30)

Note the constraint for quality choice is 4qδ(Cs ) ≤ ρ0 (1 + β), since the bank financing is
not accessible/feasible otherwise. Hence, the quality design problem can be formulated
as
0

q − δ(Cs )q
4
ρ0 (1 + β)
s.t. 0 < q ≤
.
4δ(Cs )

max πb (q) = max
q

nρ

q
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2

o

,

(3.31)
(3.32)

It is straightforward to derive the optimal quality is
qb∗ =

ρ0 (1 + β)
ρ0
ρ0
∧
=
.
8δ(Cs )
4δ(Cs )
8δ(Cs )

(3.33)

Proposition 3.9.2 For any credit rating Cs , the firm will choose the optimal pricing and
quality as follows,
q
p∗b = ,
2

qb∗ =

ρ0
,
8δ(Cs )

under which bank financing is always accessible, and the optimal expected profit is
πb∗ =

ρ20
.
64δ(Cs )

It is worth noticing from Proposition 3.9.2 that when the quality is chosen optimally,
the startup can always get access to bank financing, even with low credit rating. As the
credit rating decreases, the optimal quality choice also decreases.

3.10

Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate a firm’s optimal funding choice when launching an innovative product to the market with demand uncertainty and WoM communication. The
firm could fund its product by either running a crowdfunding campaign, or applying for
a traditional bank loan. We build an analytical model to study the firm’s optimal pricing
strategies under each funding scheme, and then compare them to investigate the firm’s
optimal choice of funding scheme and the corresponding impacts on consumer surplus
and social welfare.
We report several main results from this paper. First, in crowdfunding, the firm
should use intertemporal pricing, which depends on both WoM and market uncertainty.
Such a pricing strategy is driven by the trade-off between the immediate revenue loss
from offering crowdfunding rewards to induce more early adoption and expand product
awareness via WoM, and the future profit gain from selling the product to the consumer
population that would remain otherwise uninformed. For bank financing, we find that the
firm’s credit rating and the market uncertainty jointly determine the feasibility of bank
financing, but the optimal pricing strategy is independent of them. Next, the choice between crowdfunding and bank financing is not monotonic in the market uncertainty, with
bank financing preferred only within an intermediate range. Similar observation holds
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for initial investment requirement. Although featured with benefits of capital-raising,
awareness-expanding, and demand-validating, crowdfunding has never been perfect for
every type of project. Bank financing could be either a complementary financing option
when crowdfunding is not feasible, or a more appropriate funding choice that substitutes
crowdfunding. Lastly, we find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, more active social
interactions could hurt consumers and even social welfare under crowdfunding.
This paper is among the first to study a firm’s funding scheme choice between crowdfunding and traditional bank financing, and to rationalize the advantage of crowdfunding
by explicitly demonstrating the three underlying benefits: capital-raising, awarenessexpanding, and demand-validating. As such, our research can help explain several phenomenal real-world puzzles, such as why established companies have began to launch
products via crowdfunding platforms. The key contribution of our work is to provide
thorough comparisons (firm profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare) between crowdfunding and bank financing under different scenarios along three key dimensions: market
uncertainty, WoM communication, and initial investment. The managerial insights provide useful guidance on whether firms (including startups and established firms) should
go crowdfunding, and (if yes) how to jointly exploit the operational, financial, and marketing benefits of crowdfunding. Our model also provides welfare implications on when
crowdfunding is a win-win alternative fund-raising solution to support entrepreneurship
and innovation.
This research can be extended in several directions to address other open questions
about crowdfunding. First, the current model studies the optimal pricing strategies in
crowdfunding and bank financing, but leaves the product quality decision as exogenously
given. One interesting extension would focus on investigating the effect of different funding schemes on the firm’s optimal product quality design. Second, besides the WoM
communication through crowdfunding, the firm can directly invest in informative advertising to spread the product information and increase consumer awareness. It is worth
studying when the firm might find it beneficial to directly invest in advertising. Finally,
the firm is assumed to be a monopolist in the marketplace. It would also be interesting to
explore the effect of market competition on the firm’s funding scheme choice and pricing
strategies.
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APPENDICES

A. Appendix for Chapter 1
Appendix A: Summary of Model Notations
To help the reader keep track of different components of our model, we summarize in
Table A.1 the notations that we use throughout the paper.

Table A.1: Summary of Model Notations
Parameters
p

retail price of the product

c

supplier’s unit production cost at time 0

t1

supplier’s production lead-time

t2

retailer’s deferral payment period, i.e., trade credit payment term

tc

supplier’s current cash conversion cycle tc = t1 + t2

αj

investment return rate per unit time, j = r (retailer) and s (supplier)

Cj

borrower j’s credit rating score, j = r (retailer) and s (supplier)

ρj = ρ(Cj )

default probability of a borrower with credit rating Cj

ηj = η(Cj )

interest rate premium charged by the bank/factor based on credit rating Cj

Decisions
wi

retailer’s wholesale price, i ∈ {B, F, S, R}

qi

supplier’s production quantity, i ∈ {B, F, S, R}

ri

bank’s interest rate (per time unit) for the supplier’s loan, i ∈ {B, F, S, R}

τ

retailer’s payment extension in reverse factoring

Li

supplier’s cash advance obtained from the factor at t1 , i ∈ {F, S, R}

Derived
bB

supplier’s bank financing bankruptcy threshold

bF

supplier’s recourse factoring bankruptcy threshold

ci

supplier’s effective unit production cost, i ∈ {B, F, S, R}

F̄ (·)

The complementary c.d.f. of the demand distribution

z(·)
S(q)

the failure rate of the demand distribution z(ξ) = f (ξ)/F̄ (ξ)
Rq
Rq
S(q) = E[min(D, q)] = q − 0 F (ξ)dξ = 0 F̄ (ξ)dξ

j(q)

j(q) = S(q)/F̄ (q)

ᾱF

threshold for supplier’s investment return rate ᾱF := ηs − t−1
2 ln(1 − ρs )

ᾱS

threshold for supplier’s investment return rate defined in equation (1.15)

ᾱR

threshold for supplier’s investment return rate defined in equation (1.19)

ψ(αs )

a function of supplier’s investment return rate αs defined in equation (2.11)
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Appendix B: Proofs of the Statements
We put all the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1:
(i) First, we derive the supplier’s best response of production quantity to the retailer’s
wholesale price. For a given w, we have shown the supplier’s expected profit is πB (q; w) =
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )(wS(q) − cB q). Then,
∂πB (q; w)
= (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )(wF̄ (q) − cB ),
∂q
which is strictly decreasing in q. Hence, πB (q; w) is quasi-concave in q, and the supplier’s
optimal production quantity qB given a wholesale price w can be solved from the firstorder condition, wF̄ (qB ) = cB .
Next, we analyze the retailer’s profit function given the supplier’s best response derived above. We have shown ΠB (w) = (1 − ρr )(p − w)S(qB ). Taking derivatives with
respect to w, we have


dqB
dΠB (w)
= (1 − ρr ) − S(qB ) + (p − w)F̄ (qB )
.
dw
dw
Taking derivatives for both sides of the supplier’s best response equation wF̄ (qB ) = cB
with respect to w, we now have
−wf (qB )

dqB
+ F̄ (qB ) = 0,
dw

dqB
F̄ (qB )
1
=
=
> 0.
dw
wf (qB )
wz(qB )

Under our assumption, z(qB ) increases in qB . Hence, dqB /dw is positive and decreasing
in w. Thus, we can conclude that dΠB (w)/dw strictly decreases in w, and thus ΠB (w)
is strictly concave in w. Here, the range for wholesale price is w ∈ [cB , p]. And it’s
straightforward to check that
dΠB (w)
dw

dΠB (w)
dw

> 0,
w=cB

< 0.
w=p

Therefore, there exists a unique optimal wS that can be solved from
S(qB ) = (p − w)F̄ (qB )

dqB
(p − w)F̄ (qB )
=
,
dw
wz(qB )

pF̄ (qB ) = wF̄ (qB )[1 + z(qB )j(qB )].
Then, the result follows as wF̄ (qB ) = cB .
(ii) As the credit rating Cj of either party increases or the payment term t2 decreases, it is
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straightforward to see the effective unit production cost cB =

ceηs tc
(1−ρs )(1−ρr )

decreases. Then,

based on the system of equations it is direct to show the wholesale price wB∗ decreases,
the production quantity qB∗ and both parties’ profits increase.



Proof of Lemma 9:
(1) Case 1: No exogenous default happens, with probability (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ). In this case,
the factor’s expected repayment from the supplier can be derived as follows,
Z bF
cqeηs tc
rF t2
+ wξ]
Ω1 (bF , rF ; w, q) = wS(q)e F̄ (bF ) +
[wS(q)eαs t2 −
1 − ρs
0
{z
}
|

dF (ξ)

factor’s repayment under supplier’s bankruptcy

= wS(q)erF t2 F̄ (bF ) + w

Z

bF

(S(q)erF t2 − bF + ξ)dF (ξ)

0

= wS(q)erF t2 F̄ (bF ) + w(S(q)erF t2 − bF )F (bF ) + wS(bF ) − wbF F̄ (bF )
= wS(q)erF t2 − wbF + wS(bF ).
By definition of the supplier’s recourse factoring bankruptcy threshold, we have bF =
ηs tc

cqe
(erF t2 − eαs t2 )S(q) + w(1−ρ
. Thus, we can write the Ω1 (bF , rF ; w, q) as a function of only
s)

bF , which gives
Ω1 (bF ; w, q) = wS(q)eαs t2 −

cqeηs tc
+ wS(bF ).
1 − ρs

(2) Case 2: The retailer defaults due to exogenous default, but the supplier does not, with
probability ρr (1 − ρs ). In this case, the factor’s expected repayment from the supplier is
simply the investment output wS(q)eαs t2 minus the full repayment of bank’s loan cqerB tc .
That gives,
Ω2 (bF ; w, q) = wS(q)e

αs t2

rB tc

− cqe

αs t2

= wS(q)e

cqeηs tc
−
.
1 − ρs

Summarizing, the factor’s expected total repayment from the supplier can be derived as
follows,


cqeηs tc
αs t2
Ω(bF ; w, q) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) wS(q)e
−
+ wS(bF )
1 − ρs


cqeηs tc
αs t2
+ ρr (1 − ρs ) wS(q)e
−
1 − ρs
= (1 − ρs )wS(q)eαs t2 − cqeηs tc + (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(bF ).
Remark : The factor’s expected total repayment from the supplier depends not only the
supplier’s credit rating (exogenous default), but also the retailer’s. The reason is the
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retailer’s default will directly cause the supplier’s default, by the nature of the supply
chain relationship.



Proof of Proposition 3:
For a given w, the supplier’s expected profits under pure bank financing and recourse
factoring are
πB (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(q) − cqeηs tc ,


πF (q; w) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 wS(q) − cqeηs tc .
Then, recourse factoring is adopted when (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 ≥ (1 −
ρs )(1 − ρr ), which can be simplified as (1 − ρs )eαs t2 ≥ eηs t2 , αs > ᾱF := ηs − t−1
2 ln(1 − ρs ).
By similar argument as in proof of Proposition 1.3.1, the equilibrium (wF∗ , qF∗ ) can be
uniquely derived from: pF̄ (q) = cF [1 + z(q)j(q)], w = cF /F̄ (q), where cF is defined in
equation (2.6). Lastly, the relationships wF∗ < wB∗ , qF∗ > qB∗ , πF∗ > πB∗ , and Π∗F > Π∗B are
direct from the comparisons of effective unit production costs: cF < cB .



Proof of Corollary 1:
By definition, we have ᾱF = ᾱF (Cs , t2 ) := ηs − t−1
2 ln(1 − ρs ), where ηs and ρs are
decreasing in Cs . Then, it is straightforward to see the threshold ᾱF decrease in Cs and
t2 .



Proof of Lemma 2:
The factor’s expected value of the supplier accounts receivable is (1 − ρr )wS(q), where
(1 − ρr ) indicates the retailer’s default risk. The factor’s expected cost of lending LS to
the supplier, whose credit rating is Cs , becomes LS eηs t2 . Hence, we have the following
competitive pricing equation, LS eηs t2 = (1 − ρr )wS(q), from which we further obtain
LS = e−ηs t2 (1 − ρr )wS(q).



Proof of Proposition 3.4.2:
Under the competitive credit pricing, we have cqeηs tc = (1 − ρs )cqerB tc . From Lemma 2,
we know the supplier will have LS = e−ηs t2 (1 − ρr )wS(q) amount of cash available for

123

investment at time t1 , with the investment period of t2 . Hence, the supplier’s profit at
time tc can be derived as follows:
πS (q; w) = (1 − ρs )[LS eαs t2 − cqerB tc ]


cqeηs tc
(αs −ηs )t2
−
= (1 − ρs ) (1 − ρr )wS(q)e
1 − ρs
= e(αs −ηs )t2 (1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )wS(q) − cqeηs tc
Compared to the pure bank financing case, where πB (q; w) = (1−ρs )(1−ρr )wS(q)−cqeηs tc .
If αs ≤ ηs , then non-recourse factoring is not adopted and (wS∗ , qS∗ ) = (wB∗ , qB∗ ). Then,
∂πS (q; w)
= e(αs −ηs )t2 (1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )wF̄ (q) − ceηs tc .
∂q
Note that ∂πS (q; w)/∂q is strictly decreasing in q, hence πS (q; w) is quasi-concave in q,
and the supplier’s optimal production quantity given a wholesale price w can be solved
from the following equation,
wF̄ (q) =

ceηs (tc +t2 )−αs t2
= cS .
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )

In addition, the retailer’s profit function is ΠS (w) = (1 − ρr )(p − w)S(qS ). By similar
argument as in the proof of Proposition 1.3.1, the equilibrium (wS∗ , qS∗ ) can be derived
from the equation system: pF̄ (q) = cS [1 + z(q)j(q)] and w = cS /F̄ (q). Lastly, the
relationships wS∗ < wB∗ , qS∗ > qB∗ , πS∗ > πB∗ , and Π∗S > Π∗B are direct from the comparisons
of effective unit production costs: cS < cB .



Lemma 12 Consider a Stackelberg game with follower’s profit function π(q; w) = λwS(q)−
cq where λ > 0, and the leader’s profit function Π(w) = (p − w)S(q). Denote the Stackelberg equilibrium outcome as (w∗ , q ∗ , π ∗ , Π∗ ).Then, as λ increases, w∗ decreases; q ∗ , π ∗
and Π∗ increase.
Proof of Lemma 12:
The follower’s best response qw for a given w can be derived from the following first-order
condition:
∂π(q; w)
= λwF̄ (q) − c = 0.
∂q
For the leader’s profit function, taking derivatives with respect to w, we have
dΠ(w)
dq
= −S(q) + (p − w)F̄ (q) .
dw
dw
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From λwF̄ (q) = c, we have
−λwf (q)

dq
+ λF̄ (q) = 0,
dw

dq
1
=
> 0.
dw
wz(q)

Under our assumption, z(q) increases in q. Hence, dq/dw is positive and decreasing in
w. Thus, we can conclude that dΠ(w)/dw strictly decreases in w, and thus Π(w) is
strictly concave in w. Therefore, in equilibrium (w∗ , q ∗ ) can be solved from λpF̄ (q) =
c[1 + z(q)j(q)] and λwF̄ (q) = c. Then, it is straightforward to see that as λ increases,
q ∗ increases (from the first equation), and thus λF̄ (q ∗ ) increases, which indicates w∗
decreases from the second equation. Moreover, π ∗ = λw∗ S(q ∗ ) − cq ∗ = c(j(q ∗ ) − q ∗ )
increases in q ∗ since j 0 (q) = 1 + j(q)z(q) > 1. Lastly, Π∗ = (p − w∗ )S(q ∗ ) increases as w∗
decreases and q ∗ increases.



Proof of Proposition 1.4.3:
The supplier’s expected profit under pure bank financing, recourse factoring and nonrecourse factoring can be summarize as πi (q; w) = λi wS(q) − cqeηs tc , i ∈ {B, F, S}, where
the coefficients of the expected revenue part λi are defined as



(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),



λi = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 ,




(1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )e(αs −ηs )t2 ,



i = B



i=F .




i = S

Based on Lemma 12, we know the supplier’s preference is simply based on λi .
(1) Bank financing is preferred by the supplier when λB > λF and λB > λS . That is
αs should satisfy the following two conditions:

(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) ≥ (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 ,
(1 − ρ )(1 − ρ ) ≥ (1 − ρ )(1 − ρ )e(αs −ηs )t2 .
s
r
r
s
Simplifying the above conditions gives αs ≤ ηs .
(2) Non-recourse factoring is better than pure bank financing and recourse factoring
when λS > λB and λS > λF . The former is equivalent to αs > ηs . The latter is equivalent
to,


(1 − ρs ) 1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηs t2 eαs t2 ≤ eηs t2 − (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),
eηs t2 − (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
,
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηs t2 ]
 ηs t2

1
e
− (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
αs ≤ ᾱS = ln
.
t2
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηs t2 ]
eαs t2 ≤
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Hence, when ηs < αs ≤ ᾱS , the non-recourse factoring is adopted, with equilibrium
(wS∗ , qS∗ ) given in Proposition 3.4.2.
(3) Lastly, when αs > ᾱS , we have λF > λB and λF > λS . Hence, in this case recourse
factoring is adopted, with equilibrium (wF∗ , qF∗ ) as given Proposition 3.



Proof of Proposition 1.4.4:
The results are straightforward based on Lemma 12, hence details are omitted.



Proof of Lemma 11:
The factor’s expected value of the supplier accounts receivable is (1 − ρr )wS(q), where
(1 − ρr ) indicates the retailer’s default risk. The factor’s expected cost of lending L to
the supplier, whose credit rating is Cs , becomes LR eηs t2 . Hence, we have the following
competitive pricing equation, LR eηs (t2 +τ ) = (1 − ρr )wS(q), from which we further obtain
LR = e−ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρr )wS(q).



Proof of Lemma 22:
Given the retailer’s offer of (w, τ ) and the bank’s competitively priced loan, the supplier’s
problem is to choose optimal production quantity q to maximize πR (q; w, τ ), where
πR (q; w, τ ) = (1 − ρs )(LR eαs t2 − cqerB tc )
= eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(q) − cqeηs tc .
Taking derivative with respect to q, we have
∂πR (q; w, τ )
= eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wF̄ (q) − ceηs tc .
∂q
Note that ∂πR (q; w, τ )/∂q is strictly decreasing in q, hence πR (q; w, τ ) is strictly concave, and the optimal production quantity can be solved from the first-order condition,
∂πR (q; w, τ )/∂q = 0, i.e.,
eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wF̄ (q) − ceηs tc = 0,
wF̄ (q) =

ceηs tc +ηr (t2 +τ )−αs t2
= cR (τ ),
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )

where cR (τ ) is the effective unit production cost under reverse factoring.



Proof of Proposition 3.6.1:
First, consider the retailer’s decision of payment extension τ . For a given wholesale price
w, the retailer’s profit function (ignoring the constant term (1 − ρr ) for now) can be
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written as a function of the payment extension τ : ΠR (τ ) = (p − e−αr τ w)S(qR ), where
qR is the supplier’s optimal production quantity under reverse factoring and satisfies
wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ) as shown in Lemma 22. Hence,
Π0R (τ ) = αr we−αr τ S(qR ) + (p − e−αr τ w)F̄ (qR )

dqR
.
dτ

Since wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ), we have
dqR
ηr cR (τ )
ηr F̄ (qR )
ηr
=−
=−
=−
< 0.
dτ
wf (qR )
f (qR )
z(qR )

(A.1)

Hence,
Π0R (τ ) = αr we−αr τ S(qR ) − (p − e−αr τ w)F̄ (qR )

ηr
z(qR )

F̄ (qR )
[αr we−αr τ j(qR )z(qR ) − ηr (p − we−αr τ )]
z(qR )
F̄ (qR )
=
[(αr j(qR )z(qR ) + ηr )we−αr τ − ηr p].
z(qR )

=

As τ increases, qR decreases based on derivative in A.1, and thus j(qR )z(qR ) decreases.
Hence, ΠR (τ ) is strictly quasi-concave in τ . Therefore, given the unchanged wholesale
price w, the retailer’s (unconstrained) optimal payment extension τ0∗ and the supplier’s
optimal production quantity in equilibrium can be solved from: {w(αr j(q)z(q) + ηr ) =
pηr eαr τ , wF̄ (q) = cR (τ )}.
Next, we consider when should the retailer offer reverse factoring and how to ensure
it is acceptable to the supplier. The supplier’s expected profit under different financing
alternatives can be summarized as follows:
πi (q; w) = λi wS(q) − cqeηs tc ,

i ∈ {B, F, S};

πR (q; w, τ ) = φR (τ )wS(q) − cqeηs tc ,
where the coefficients λi and φR (τ ) are defined as



(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),



λi = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 ,




(1 − ρr )(1 − ρs )e(αs −ηs )t2 ,



i = B



i=F ;




i = S

φR (τ ) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) .
It is straightforward to see the supplier’s preference is simply based on the comparison
between λi , i ∈ {B, F, S} and φR (τ ).
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(1) Bank financing is better than reverse factoring with zero payment extension when
λB > φR (0) ≥ φR (τ ), i.e., αs < ηr . Thus, the reverse factoring should not be offered to the
supplier, since the best reverse factoring program is the one without payment extension,
which is still dominated by the pure bank financing from the supplier’s perspective.
(2) When ηr < αs ≤ ηs , the supplier is adopting pure bank financing before the retailer
introduced the reverse factoring program. Hence, the retailer needs to choose the payment
extension so that the supplier is indifferent between reverse factoring and pure bank
financing, i.e., λB = φR (τ ). Therefore, the maximal payment extension τs = (αs /ηr −1)t2 .
(3) Based on Proposition 1.4.3, we know non-recourse factoring is better than pure
bank financing and recourse factoring when ηs < αs ≤ ᾱS . Hence, in this case nonrecourse factoring should be the one adopted by the supplier before introducing the
reverse factoring program. To induce the supplier to adopt reverse factoring, the retailer
needs to choose the payment extension so that the supplier is indifferent between reverse
factoring and non-recourse factoring, i.e., λS = φR (τ ). Therefore, the maximal payment
extension τs = (ηs /ηr − 1)t2 .
(4) Recourse factoring is better than reverse factoring with zero payment extension
from the supplier’s perspective when λF > φR (0) ≥ φR (τ ). Equivalently,
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 > e(αs −ηr )t2 (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),
eηs t2 − (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
,
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηr t2 ]
 ηs t2

e
− (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
1
.
αs > ᾱR = ln
t2
(1 − ρs ) [1 − (1 − ρr )e−ηr t2 ]
Hence, when αs > ᾱR , the reverse factoring should not be offered to the supplier (since
eαs t2 >

the supplier wouldn’t adopt it even without payment extension).
(5) When ᾱS < αs < ᾱR , the supplier is adopting recourse factoring before the
retailer introduced the reverse factoring program. Hence, the retailer needs to choose
the payment extension so that the supplier is indifferent between reverse factoring and
recourse factoring, i.e., λF = φR (τ ). Equivalently,
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 = eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ),
eηs t2
eαs t2
−
= eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) .
1 − ρr (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
Hence, the maximal payment extension τs is




αs
1
eαs t2
eηs t2
τs =
− 1 t2 − ln 1 +
−
.
ηr
ηr
1 − ρr (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
1+
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We complete the proof.



Proof of Proposition 3.6.2:
(i) We have shown in proof of Proposition 3.6.1 that ΠR (τ ) is strictly quasi-concave in
τ , and
Π0R (τ ) =

F̄ (qR )
[(αr j(qR )z(qR ) + ηr )we−αr τ − ηr p].
z(qR )

Then, it is optimal to choose τ = 0 if Π0R (0) ≤ 0. Note that Π0R (0) is increasing in αr .
Hence, the threshold αrτ can be solved from: {w(αr j(q)z(q) + ηr ) = pηr , wF̄ (q) = cR (0)}.
The retailer should not extend the payment term if αr ≤ αrτ .
(ii) A direct result from the definition of the maximal payment extension τs .
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Appendix C: Complementary Results
In this appendix, we provide several complementary results to the main paper.

C.1 High Cash Investment Return Rate in Recourse Factoring
The recourse factoring bankruptcy threshold we derived in equation (3.7) is
bF = (erF t2 − eαs t2 )S(q) +

cqeηs tc
.
w(1 − ρs )

If the supplier’s cash investment return rate αs is high enough, the recourse factoring
bankruptcy threshold will become zero (bF = 0) as demand is non-negative, which means
there is no bankruptcy risk for the supplier. Note that in such cases the formula defined
above becomes negative, i.e.,
w(1 − ρs )(erF t2 − eαs t2 )S(q) + cqeηs tc < 0.

(A.2)

Now, the factor’s expected total repayment Ω(rF ; w, q) from the supplier under recourse
factoring can be written as a function of rF :
Ω(rF ; w, q) = (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )wS(q)erF t2 + ρr (1 − ρs )wS(q)erF t2
{z
} |
{z
}
|
Case 1: no exogenous default

Case 2: retailer defaults

= (1 − ρs )wS(q)erF t2 .
Note that even when the retailer defaults in Case 2, the supplier can still fully repay both
the bank and the factor (as long as no supplier’s own default) according to the condition
(A.2).
Hence, the competitive credit pricing equation for the factor becomes (1−ρs )wS(q)erF t2 =
wS(q)eηs t2 . Without supplier’s exogenous default, at time tc the supplier’s expected cash
inflow is (1 − ρr )wS(q) + wS(q)eαs t2 and expected cash outflow is cqerB tc + wS(q)erF t2 .
Therefore, the supplier’s expected profit can be written as
πF (q; w) = (1 − ρs )[(1 − ρr )wS(q) + wS(q)eαs t2 − cqerB tc − wS(q)erF t2 ]


= (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr ) + (1 − ρs )eαs t2 − eηs t2 wS(q) − cqeηs tc ,
where the second equality is based on the two competitive pricing equations (1−ρs )cqerB tc =
cqeηs tc and (1 − ρs )wS(q)erF t2 = wS(q)eηs t2 . Therefore, we have shown in this special
case, the supplier’s expected profit function remains the same as in (3.8).
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C.2 Wholesale Price Adjustment in Reverse Factoring
The retailer’s and supplier’s profit under reverse factoring can be formulated as follows:
ΠR (q, τ ) = (1 − ρr )[pS(q) − e−αr τ cR (τ )j(q)],
πR (q, τ ) = eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )cR (τ )j(q) − cqeηs tc .
Let N (q, τ ) = ΠR (q, τ ) + πR (q, τ ) be the overall supply chain profit. Then,
N (q, τ ) = (1 − ρr )pS(q) + [eαs t2 −ηr (t2 +τ ) (1 − ρs ) − e−αr τ ](1 − ρr )cR (τ )j(q) − cqeηs tc
 cj(q)

− cqeηs tc .
= (1 − ρr )pS(q) + (1 − ρs )eηs tc − eηs tc +(ηr −αs )t2 +(ηr −αr )τ
1 − ρs
With wholesale price w and payment extension τ , the retailer’s profit function (ignoring
the constant term (1−ρr ) for now) can be written as ΠR (w, τ ) = (p−e−αr τ w)S(qR ), where
qR is the supplier’s optimal production quantity under reverse factoring and satisfies
wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ) as shown Lemma 22. First, for a given payment extension τ , we have
∂ΠR (w, τ )
∂qR
= −e−αr τ S(qR ) + (p − e−αr τ w)F̄ (qR )
.
∂w
∂w
Since wF̄ (qR ) = cR (τ ), we have
∂qR
1
=
> 0.
∂w
wz(qR )
Hence,
∂ΠR (w, τ )
F̄ (qR )
= −e−αr τ S(qR ) + (p − e−αr τ w)
.
∂w
wz(qR )
As w increases, qR increases. Thus, both the first term and the second term in the
above equation strictly decrease in w. Therefore, we can conclude that

∂ΠR (w,τ )
∂w

is strictly

decreasing in w. Hence, for a given τ , there exists a unique optimal (wR , qR ) which can
be obtained from the following equation system

wz(q)j(q) = peαr τ − w,


wF̄ (q) = cR (τ ).

Now, the retailer’s profit function can be written as a function of τ ,
ΠR (τ ) = (p − e−αr τ w)S(q),
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(A.3)

where (w, q) depends on τ through the equation system A.3. Plugging the second equation
of A.3 into the first one gives
j(q) =

e αr τ p
1
eαr τ pF̄ (q)
1
−
=
−
,
wz(q) z(q)
cR (τ )z(q) z(q)
pF̄ (q)
.
e−αr τ cR (τ ) =
1 + j(q)z(q)

(A.4)

Then, we can rewrite the profit function as a function of q,
ΠR (q) = pS(q) − e−αr τ cR (τ )j(q) = pS(q) −

pj(q)F̄ (q)
pS(q)j(q)z(q)
=
=
1 + j(q)z(q)
1 + j(q)z(q)

pS(q)
.
1
+
1
j(q)z(q)

Since z(q), S(q) and j(q) are strictly increasing in q, it’s straightforward to see ΠR (q)
strictly increases in q. Hence, the retailer’s problem becomes find the maximal q subject
to the constraint A.4. Since the right-hand side of equation A.4, as function of q, strictly
decreases in q, the problem is to minimize the left-hand side of equation A.4, which is a
function of τ and denoted as H(τ ). Rearranging the terms gives
H(τ ) = e

−αr τ

ceηs tc +ηr (t2 +τ )−αs t2 −αr τ
ceηs tc +ηr t2 −αs t2 +(ηr −αr )τ
cR (τ ) =
=
,
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )
(1 − ρs )(1 − ρr )

which is strictly decreasing (increasing) in τ if ηr < αr (ηr > αr ). Therefore, when
ηr > αr , it is optimal not to extend payment term, i.e., τR∗ = 0. When ηr < αr , it is
optimal to choose the maximal possible payment term. Suppose there exists a longest
term the retailer could potentially adopted in reverse factoring, denoted as τmax . Then,
τR∗ = τmax . With the optimal payment extension τR∗ , the retailer’s optimal strategy
is to offer the wholesale price such that the supplier’s IR constraint is satisfied, i.e.,
∗
≥ max{πB∗ , πF∗ , πS∗ }.
πR
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B. Appendix for Chapter 2
Appendix A: Proofs of Statements
We present the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions in Appendix A. We use φ
(Φ) to denote the probability density function (p.d.f.) and the cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f.) of the standard Normal distribution, with the following properties that
are extensively used throughout the proofs:
φ0 (x) = −xφ(x),

φ(−x) = φ(x),

Φ(−x) = Φ̄(x).

For a general normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, the p.d.f. f
and the c.d.f. F can be written as
1 x − µ
,
f (x|µ, σ 2 ) = φ
σ
σ

F (x|µ, σ 2 ) = Φ

x − µ
.
σ

Lemma 13 Given the purchasing fraction ρ1 in the crowdfunding stage and the average
quality review q̄r , the posterior of true quality is normally distributed, µq |q̄r ∼ N (µ1 , σ12 ),
with
µ1 =

ρ1 M γ
q̄r ,
ρ1 M γ + 1

σ12 =

σ02
,
ρ1 M γ + 1

γ=

σ02
.
σq2

Proof of Lemma 13:
We assume that the distribution of ex post quality perceptions in the population is
Normal, Q ∼ N (µq , σq2 ), where µq is the product’s unobservable true quality, or the
unknown parameter to learn. Both the firm and consumers share a common and public
Normal prior belief µq ∼ N (µ0 , σ02 ). From the Bayesian statistics theory, we know Normal
is a conjugate prior for Normal distribution with unknown mean and known variance.
The posterior distribution and its derivation can be found from standard textbooks [131].
Let d = ρ1 M denote the crowdfunding sales volume. After the reviews q = (q1 , ..., qd ) are
observed, the posterior distribution of µq is the product of the prior and the likelihood
Q
function. Hence, we have f (µq |q) ∝ f (µq )f (q|µq ) = f (µq ) di=1 f (qi |µq ), where


1
1
2
f (µq ) = √
exp − 2 (µq − µ0 ) ,
2σ0
2πσ0


1
1
2
exp − 2 (qi − µq ) .
f (qi |µq ) = √
2σq
2πσq
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Furthermore,
d
Y




1
1
2
2
f (µq |q) ∝
exp − 2 (qi − µq ) exp − 2 (µq − µ0 )
2σq
2σ0
i=1
!
dq̄r



+ σµ02 2 
1 d
1
σq2
0

∝ exp −
µq − d
.
+
1
2 σq2 σ02
+
2
2
σ
σ


q

0

Therefore, the conditional distribution of µq given q is N (µ1 , σ12 ) with
σq2
dσ02
dγ
1
µ1 = 2
µ
+
q̄r =
q̄r +
µ0 ,
0
2
2
2
dσ0 + σq
dσ0 + σq
dγ + 1
dγ + 1
where γ =

σ02
.
σq2

σ12

σ02 σq2
σ02
= 2
=
,
dσ0 + σq2
dγ + 1

When µ0 = 0, we obtain the result in Lemma 13.



Proof of Lemma 5:
The posterior of true quality µq , is normally distributed, µq |q̄r ∼ N (µ1 , σ12 ), with µ1 =
dγ
q̄ ,
dγ+1 r

and σ12 =

σ02
,
dγ+1

where d = ρ1 M is the crowdfunding sales volume. In the first

period, the posterior mean µ1 is a random variable, since it depends on the unobservable
P
realization of product quality q̄r . Since q̄r = d1 di=1 qi , and qi ∼ N (µq , σq2 ), we know
q̄r |µq ∼ N (µq ,

σq2
).
d

Then,

dγ 2 σq2
dγ
µ1 |µq ∼ N
µq ,
.
dγ + 1
(dγ + 1)2


Since µq ∼ N (0, σ02 ), we can further calculate f (µ1 ) according to equation
Z
Z
f (µ1 ) = f (µq , µ1 )dµq = f (µq )f (µ1 |µq )dµq .
After tedious but straightforward algebra, we can obtain

− 21


2πdγσ02
dγ + 1 2
f (µ1 ) =
exp −
µ .
dγ + 1
2dγσ02 1


dγ
1M γ
Thus, we have shown µ1 ∼ N 0, dγ+1
σ02 , i.e., µ1 ∼ N 0, ρ1ρM
σ2 .
γ+1 0



Lemma 14 Given the purchasing fraction ρ1 in the crowdfunding stage, the rational belief of true quality perception, defined as its prior predictive distribution, has the following
2 
e ∼ N 0, σ02 + σp .
form: Q
ρ1 M
Proof of Lemma 14:
The rational belief of the quality distribution can be represented by the prior predictive
P
distribution of average quality review, q̄r . Let d = ρ1 M . Since q̄r = d1 di=1 qi , and
σ2

qi ∼ N (µq , σq2 ), we know q̄r |µq ∼ N (µq , dq ). Since µq ∼ N (0, σ02 ), we can further calculate
2
R
e ∼ N 0, σ 2 + σp .
f (q̄r ) = f (µq )f (q̄r |µq )dµq . After some algebra we can show Q

0
d
134

Proposition B.0.1 Consider a consumer with the preference value v. For any pricing
scheme {p1 , p2 }, and any purchasing rules adopted by all other consumers, it is optimal
for the consumer to follow a threshold policy. Namely, the consumer in the crowdfunding
stage will purchase a unit if v ≥ θ1 ; otherwise, the consumer will wait for the retail stage
and will purchase if v ≥ θ2 .
Proof of Proposition B.0.1:
In the second period, after observing the actual crowdfunding sales volume fraction ρ1
and the average rating of product quality reviews q̄r , a customer purchases the product
if and only if v +

ρ1 M γ
q̄
ρ1 M γ+1 r

+ k(ρ1 + ρ̃2 ) − p2 ≥ 0, where ρ̃2 is the consumer’s belief of

consumer population fraction in period 2. Then, for any given beliefs ρ̃2 , a consumer’s
expected net utility is strictly increasing in v. Thus, the threshold policy is optimal in
period 2.
In the first period, a consumer’s expected net utility from purchasing the product in
each stage can be written as:
u1 (v, ρ̃1 ) = v + E0Q [k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))] − p1 ,

u2 (v, ρ̃1 ) = E0Q [v + µ1 + k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 )) − p2 ]+
Z +∞
[v + µ1 + k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 )) − p2 ]+ f (µ1 |ρ̃1 )dµ1 .
=
−∞

Define ∆(v, ρ̃1 ) = u1 (v, ρ̃1 ) − u2 (v, ρ̃1 ) as the expected net utility difference between
purchasing and waiting. Then we have
∆(v, ρ̃1 ) =

v+E0Q [k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))]−p1 −

Z

+∞

[v+µ1 +k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))−p2 ]+ f (µ1 |ρ̃1 )dµ1 .

−∞

To prove the threshold policy, it suffices to show the strict monotonicity of ∆(v, ρ̃1 ) in v
for any belief ρ̃1 . By Leibnitz’s Rule, the derivative of ∆(v, ρ̃1 ) with respect to v is
Z +∞


∂∆(v, ρ̃1 )
= 1−
f (µ1 |ρ̃1 )dµ1 = 1− F̄ p2 −v −k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))|ρ̃1 > 0.
∂v
p2 −v−k(ρ̃1 +ρ̃2 (µ1 |ρ̃1 ))
Since the above strict monotonicity holds for any arbitrary belief ρ̃1 , it follows that the
threshold policy is also optimal in period 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.1:
The FEE in the P-L game is essentially a fixed point of the outcome function

G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) = Ξ[0,1] P(θ1 , q̄r ) − k[(1 − θ1 ) + (θ1 − x)+ ] ,
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(1−θ1 )M γ
where P(θ1 , q̄r ) = p2 − (1−θ
q̄r by definition. When k < 1, it is straightforward to see
1 )M γ+1

for any quality review q̄r , there is a unique fixed point for the outcome function (there is a
unique solution θ2w∗ to the equation G[0,1] (x; θ1 ) = x). When the fixed point θ2w∗ ∈ (0, θ1 ),
it can be solved from P(θ1 , q̄r ) − k(1 − θ2 ) = θ2 , which yields θ2w∗ =

P(θ1 ,q̄r )−k
.
1−k

Using

the two boundary cases and the fact that any threshold policy θ2 ≥ θ1 is equivalent to
θ2 = θ1 , we can obtain θ2w∗ = θ1 ∧

[P(θ1 ,q̄r )−k]+
.
1−k

When k ≥ 1, and the quality review q̄r

is high such that P(θ1 , q̄r ) − k ≤ 0, then the preferred FEE should be θ2i∗ = 0, i = b, s.
Otherwise, the FEE threshold policy should be θ1 .



Proof of Lemma 6:
(1) Weak Network Externalities (WN)
The FEE equation under weak network externalities can be rearranged to be:
Z +∞


θ1 + k(1 − θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 − p1 =
µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + (θ1 − p2 )F̄ z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 ,
z(θ1 )
+∞

Z


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 − z(θ1 )F̄ z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 ,

θ1 + k(1 − θ1 ) − p1 =
z(θ1 )
+∞

Z


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 − z(θ1 )F̄ z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 ,

−z(θ1 ) + p2 − p1 =
z(θ1 )
+∞

Z
rp = p2 − p1 =


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + z(θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1 .

z(θ1 )

Therefore, the FEE equation (2.11) is equivalent to Hw (θ1 ) = rp , by the definition of
Hw (θ1 ). Then, we have the following simplification:
Z +∞

µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + z(θ1 )F z(θ1 )|1 − θ1
Hw (θ1 ) =
z(θ1 )




Z +∞
µ1
z(θ1 )
µ1
=
φ
dµ1 + z(θ1 )Φ
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )
z(θ1 ) σ(θ1 )
= σ(θ1 )φ[z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 )].
(2) Strong Network Externalities (SN)
When k > 1, we have z(θ1 ) = (k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k ≥ z(0) = p2 − k. Based on the discussion
of the P-L game, we can obtain the first period consumer’s expected total social utility
E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ] conditional on the belief of threshold policy θ1 ,

E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ] = k(1 − θ1 )F z(0)|1 − θ1
{z
}
|
social utility under low quality


= k − kθ1 F z(0)|1 − θ1 .
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+


k F̄ z(0)|1 − θ1
|
{z
}

social utility under high quality

By the definition of FEE, the threshold policy θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1) in the P-W game in period 1
can be solved using the following equation:
Z +∞

(µ1 + θ1 + k − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 .
θ1 + k − kθ1 F z(0)|1 − θ1 − p1 =

(B.1)

z(0)

The FEE equation under strong network externalities can be rearranged to be:
Z +∞

(µ1 + θ1 − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 ,
θ1 + k(1 − θ1 )F z(0)|1 − θ1 − p1 =
z(0)
+∞

Z


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 − z(θ1 )F̄ z(0)|1 − θ1 ,

θ1 + k(1 − θ1 ) − p1 =
z(0)
+∞

Z


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 − z(θ1 )F̄ z(0)|1 − θ1 ,

−z(θ1 ) + p2 − p1 =
z(0)
+∞

Z


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + z(θ1 )F z(0)|1 − θ1 .

rp = p2 − p1 =
z(0)

Similarly, we define the potential regret function Hs (θ1 ) as
Z +∞

Hs (θ1 ) =
µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + z(θ1 )F z(0)|1 − θ1 .
z(0)

Therefore, the FEE equation (B.1) is equivalent to Hs (θ1 ) = rp , by the definition of
Hs (θ1 ). After further simplification, we have Hs (θ1 ).



Lemma 15 The potential regret function Hw (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing in θ1 on [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 15:
Let y(θ1 ) = z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 ). Then, the potential regret function can be written as Hw (θ1 ) =
σ(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 )]. Taking derivative of Hw (θ1 ), we have
Hw0 (θ1 ) = σ 0 (θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )] + σ(θ1 )φ0 [y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 ) + z 0 (θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 )
= σ 0 (θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )] − σ(θ1 )y(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 ) + z 0 (θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 )
= σ 0 (θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )] − z(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 ) + z 0 (θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )]y 0 (θ1 )
= σ 0 (θ1 )φ[y(θ1 )] + z 0 (θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 )].
Since z(θ1 ) = (k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k, we have z 0 (θ1 ) = k − 1 < 0 as k < 1. It is straightforward
to show σ 0 (θ1 ) < 0, which leads to Hw0 (θ1 ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.4.2:
(i) In preparation for the proof, we first prove the following claim.
Claim: H(x) = φ(x) + xΦ(x) > 0 for x ∈ (−∞, +∞).
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Since H0 (x) = −xφ(x) + Φ(x) + xφ(x) = Φ(x) > 0, we know that for x ∈ (−∞, +∞),
H(x) > limx→−∞ H(x) = limx→−∞ φ(x) + xΦ(x) = 0, which completes the proof of the
claim.
Under WN, the potential regret function can be written as
 



z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
Hw (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 ) φ
+
Φ
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )



= σ(θ1 ) φ ~(θ1 ) + ~(θ1 )Φ ~(θ1 ) ,
q
(1−θ1 )M γσ02
> 0 for θ1 ∈ [0, 1), ~(θ1 ) ∈
where ~(θ1 ) = z(θ1 )/σ(θ1 ). Since σ(θ1 ) =
(1−θ1 )M γ+1
(−∞, +∞). Then, applying the claim we directly have Hw (θ1 ) > 0 for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1).
Under SN, the potential regret function satisfies
 

z(0)
Hs (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 ) φ
+
σ(θ1 )
 

z(0)
≥ σ(θ1 ) φ
+
σ(θ1 )



z(θ1 )
z(0)
Φ
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )


z(0)
z(0)
Φ
,
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )

where the inequality comes from the fact that z(θ1 ) ≥ z(0) when k > 1. Applying similar
argument as in the WN case yields Hs (θ1 ) > 0 for θ1 ∈ [0, 1).
(ii) When θ1 < 1, the crowdfunding price under WN satisfies p1 = p2 − rp = p2 −
Hw (θ1 ). Since z(1) = p2 − 1 and σ(1) = 0, we have




p2 − 1
p2 − 1
lim Hw (θ1 ) = lim σφ
+ (p2 − 1)Φ
= (p2 − 1)+ .
σ→0
θ1 →1
σ
σ
Since Hw (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing in θ1 , we know p1 ≤ p2 − limθ1 →1 Hw (θ1 ) = p2 − (p2 −
1)+ = p2 ∧ 1. Therefore, the crowdfunding price p1 under WN must be less than 1 in
order to avoid non-purchase.
(iii) The potential regret function can be written as a function of both θ1 and k:
Hw (θ1 , k) = σ(θ1 )φ[y(θ1 , k)] + z(θ1 , k)Φ[y(θ1 , k)], where z(θ1 , k) = p2 − θ1 − k(1 − θ1 ) and
y(θ1 , k) = z(θ1 , k)/σ(θ1 ). Then, taking partial derivative with respect to k gives
1 − θ1
1 − θ1
∂Hw (θ1 , k)
= σ(θ1 )y(θ1 , k)φ[y(θ1 , k)]
− (1 − θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 , k)] − z(θ1 , k)φ[y(θ1 , k)]
∂k
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )
= y(θ1 , k)φ[y(θ1 , k)](1 − θ1 ) − (1 − θ1 )Φ[y(θ1 , k)] − y(θ1 , k)φ[y(θ1 , k)](1 − θ1 )
= −Φ[y(θ1 , k)](1 − θ1 ) ≤ 0.
Since we have shown ∂Hw (θ1 , k)/∂θ1 < 0, by the Implicit Function Theorem, we have
∂θ1
∂Hw (θ1 , k)/∂k
=−
≤ 0.
∂k
∂Hw (θ1 , k)/∂θ1
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Hence, for a given rp , θ1 = Hw−1 (rp ) decreases in k.
Since σ(θ1 ) increases in M and σ02 , while decreases in σq2 , it is equivalent to show for
a given θ1 , Hw (θ1 ) increases in σ(θ1 ) (implicitly by the fact that Hw (θ1 ) decreases in θ1 ).
Rewriting Hw (θ1 ) as a function of σ(θ1 ) gives




z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
H(x) = xφ
+ z(θ1 )Φ
,
x
x
and we are left to show H 0 (x) > 0. Taking derivative with respect to x, we have



0

0


z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
z(θ1 )
0
− z(θ1 )φ
H (x) = φ
+ z(θ1 )φ
x
x
x
x
x


z(θ1 )
=φ
> 0.
x
We complete the proof.



Proof of Proposition 2.5.1:
The derivatives of the potential regret functions can be written as
Hw0 (θ1 ) = −σ0 φ[`(θ1 )]`(θ1 )`0 (θ1 ) + z 0 (θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )
= (k − 1)Φ[`(θ1 )],
Hs0 (θ1 ) = (k − 1)Φ[`(0)].
Then, Hw0 (θ1 ) < 0 (Hs0 (θ1 ) > 0) is a direct result of k < 1 (k > 1).



Proof of Proposition 2.5.2:
In the absence of social learning of uncertain quality, we can first show that none of
the consumers will purchase in the retail stage (see Proposition B.0.2). The two-period
problem now reduces to a single period problem, which is equivalent to the P-L game as
we have discussed, with p2 replaced by p1 . Without social learning, the quality component
in the utility function can be treated as a fixed constant, or setting to be zero without loss
of generality. Then, based on the purchasing patterns in the P-L game in Proposition
2.4.1, we know all consumers will purchase if the crowdfunding price is lower than a
threshold; otherwise none of them will purchase under SN. Therefore, the Veblen effect
will not happen in this case.
In the absence of strong positive network externalities, it is straightforward to show the
nonexistence of the Veblen effect by using the properties of the potential regret functions
Hw (θ1 ) and Hb (θ1 ) as described in Proposition 2.5.1.
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s
Lemma 16 There are the Pareto sets Rw
p and Rp for the reward choice under WN


and SN, respectively, which can be characterized as Rw
=
H
(1),
H
(0)
and Rsp =
w
w
p


Hs (0), Hs (1) .

Proof of Lemma 16:
We need to show that any reward choice outside the set Rp is (weakly) dominated by the
reward choices in the set. A reward choice is dominating if it generates the same FEE in
period 1 but yields a (weakly) higher expected profit for the firm.
First, consider the WN case. Note the function Hw (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing and the
profit in period 1 is (p1 − c)M (1 − θ1 ). So, any reward rp0 > Hw (0) is strictly dominated
by rp = Hw (0), since θ1 = 0 in both cases and a higher reward rp0 results in a lower profit,
i.e., (p01 − c)M < (p1 − c)M . For any reward rp0 < Hw (1), the resulting profit is the same
as rp = Hw (1) (both zero profit) since θ1 = 1 in equilibrium. Therefore, the Pareto set


under WN can be characterized as Rw
=
H
(1),
H
(0)
.
w
w
p
Next, consider the SN case. Note the function Hs (θ1 ) is strictly increasing and the
profit in period 1 is (p1 − c)M (1 − θ1 ). So, any reward rp0 > Hs (1) is strictly dominated
by rp = Hs (0) < rp0 , since θ1 = 0 in equilibrium in both cases but a higher reward rp0
results in a lower profit, i.e., (p01 − c)M < (p1 − c)M . For any rp0 < Hs (0), the resulting
profit is the same as rp = Hs (1) (both zero profit) since θ1 = 1 in equilibrium. Therefore,



the Pareto set under SN can be characterized as Rsp = Hs (0), Hs (1) .
Proof of Lemma 7:
When k < 1, from Proposition 2.4.1, we have

Z +∞ 
(p2 − µ1 − k)+
ρ2w (θ1 ) =
θ1 −
f (µ1 )dµ1
1−k
z(θ1 )

Z z(0) 
p2 − µ1 − k
= θ1 F̄ (z(0)) +
θ1 −
f (µ1 )dµ1
1−k
z(θ1 )


Z z(0)

z(0) 
1
= θ1 F̄ (z(0)) + θ1 −
F (z(0)) − F z(θ1 ) +
µ1 f (µ1 )dµ1
1−k
1 − k z(θ1 )


 



z(θ1 )
z(0)
z(0)
z(θ1 )
= θ1 − θ1 Φ
−
Φ
−Φ
σ0
1−k
σ0
σ0
 



σ0
z(θ1 )
z(0)
+
φ
−φ
1−k
σ0
σ0
n
o
o
p2 − k
σ0 n
= θ1 Φ[−`(θ1 )] +
Φ[`(θ1 )] − Φ[`(0)] +
φ[`(θ1 )] − φ[`(0)] .
1−k
1−k

When k > 1, from Proposition 2.4.1, we have ρ2s (θ1 ) = θ1 F̄ z(0) = θ1 Φ[−`(0)]. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.5.3:
(1) Weak Network Externalities (i = w).
When 0 ≤ k < 1, the firm’s expected profit can be written as Πw (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[1 − θ1 +
ρ2w (θ1 )]−(1−θ1 )Hw (θ1 ). Hence, Π0w (θ1 ) = (p2 −c)[ρ02w (θ1 )−1]+Hw (θ1 )−(1−θ1 )Hw0 (θ1 ).
We already have the expected purchasing fraction in the second period under WN (Lemma
7). Taking derivative of ρ2w (θ1 ) gives
p2 − k
σ0
φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 ) −
`(θ1 )φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )
1−k
1−k
p2 − k
φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )
= Φ[−`(θ1 )] − θ1 φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 ) +
1
−
k


σ0 p2 − k (k − 1)θ1
−
+
φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )
1−k
σ0
σ0

ρ02w (θ1 ) = Φ[−`(θ1 )] − θ1 φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 ) +

= Φ[−`(θ1 )].
Now, we plug the above simplified ρ02w (θ1 ) into Π0w (θ1 ):
Π0w (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[ρ02w (θ1 ) − 1] + Hw (θ1 ) − (1 − θ1 )Hw0 (θ1 )
= −(p2 − c)Φ[`(θ1 )] + σ0 φ[`(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )(k − 1)Φ[`(θ1 )]


= Φ[`(θ1 )] c + 2(k − 1)θ1 − 2k + 1 + σ0 φ[`(θ1 )]


φ[`(θ1 )]
.
= Φ[`(θ1 )] c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1 + σ0
Φ[`(θ1 )]
φ[`(θ1 )]
, we have Π0w (θ1 ) = Φ[`(θ1 )]B(θ1 ). Next,
Since B(θ1 ) = c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1 + σ0 Φ[`(θ
1 )]

we need to show B 0 (θ1 ) < 0.
−`(θ1 )φ[`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )] − φ2 [`(θ1 )]`0 (θ1 )
B (θ1 ) = 2(k − 1) + σ0
Φ2 [`(θ1 )]


`(θ1 )φ[`(θ1 )]Φ[`(θ1 )] + φ2 [`(θ1 )]
= (k − 1) 2 −
.
Φ2 [`(θ1 )]
0

Now, define another function C(x) =

xφ(x)Φ(x)+φ2 (x)
Φ2 (x)

and let y = −x. Then, we have


0
−xφ(x)Φ̄(x) + φ2 (x)
φ(x)
C(y) =
=
= h0 (x),
Φ̄2 (x)
Φ̄(x)
where h(x) = φ(x)/Φ̄(x) is the failure rate of the standard Normal distribution. Since the
failure rate function is increasing and convex, we can further obtain h00 (x) = −C 0 (y) > 0,
which means C 0 (y) < 0. Thus, we have the following relationships:
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xφ(x)Φ(x) + φ2 (x)
x→−∞
Φ2 (x)

2
xφ(x)
φ(x)
= lim
+ lim
x→−∞ Φ(x)
x→−∞ Φ(x)

2
φ(x) − x2 φ(x)
−xφ(x)
= lim
+ lim
x→−∞
x→−∞
φ(x)
φ(x)

C(x) > lim C(x) = lim
x→−∞

= lim 1 − x2 + x2 = 1;
x→−∞

xφ(x)Φ(x) + φ2 (x)
= lim xφ(x) = 0.
x→+∞
x→+∞
Φ2 (x)

C(x) < lim C(x) = lim
x→+∞

Therefore, 0 < C(x) < 1. Figure B.1 below provide an illustration of the functions h(y)
and C(x).
Failure Rate of Standard Normal Distribution

Function C(x) decreases from 1 to 0
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Figure B.1.: Illustration of functions h(y) and C(x)

Now, we know C[`(θ1 )] ≤ 1 for any θ1 . Since 0 < k < 1, we can further obtain


`(θ1 )φ[`(θ1 )]Φ[`(θ1 )] + φ2 [`(θ1 )]
0
B (θ1 ) = (k − 1) 2 −
< 0.
Φ2 [`(θ1 )]
Therefore, we can conclude Πw (θ1 ) is strictly quasi-concave in θ1 , i.e., the firm’s profit
function is unimodal on [0, 1].
(2) Strong Network Externalities (i = s).
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When k > 1, we have ρ2s (θ1 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(0)]. Taking derivatives gives ρ02s (θ1 ) = Φ[−`(0)].
Now, we plug the above simplified ρ02s (θ1 ) into Π0s (θ1 ):
Π0s (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[ρ02s (θ1 ) − 1] + Hs (θ1 ) − (1 − θ1 )Hs0 (θ1 )
= −(p2 − c)Φ[`(0)] + σ0 φ[`(0)] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(0)] − (1 − θ1 )(k − 1)Φ[`(0)]
= Φ[`(0)][2(k − 1)θ1 + c − 2k + 1] + σ0 φ[`(0)],
and Π00s (θ1 ) = 2(k − 1)Φ[`(0)] > 0 as k > 1. Therefore, the firm’s profit function Πs (θ1 ) is
strictly convex on [0, 1]. We can conclude that the optimal θ1 must be on the boundary
of its domain, i.e., either 0 or 1. We only need to directly compare the following two
values,
Πs (0) = (p2 − c) − σ0 φ[`(0)] − (p2 − k)Φ[`(0)],
Πs (1) = (p2 − c)Φ[−`(0)].
If Πs (0) ≥ Πs (1), then θ1s∗ = 0; otherwise, θ1s∗ = 1. The optimal crowdfunding reward
can be derived accordingly as rps∗ = Hs (θ1s∗ ).



Proof of Proposition 2.5.4:
First, we prove the following three claims.
Claim 1: x + φ(x)/Φ(x) > 0 for ∀x ∈ (−∞, +∞).
In proof of Proposition 2.5.3, we find


φ(x) φ(x)
+ x ∈ (0, 1),
C(x) =
Φ(x) Φ(x)

∀x.

Thus, we know x + φ(x)/Φ(x) > 0 for ∀x ∈ (−∞, +∞).
Claim 2: x + φ(x)/Φ(x) strictly increases in x on (−∞, +∞).
Taking derivatives gives

0


φ(x)
φ(x) φ(x)
x+
=1−
+ x = 1 − C(x) > 0,
Φ(x)
Φ(x) Φ(x)
where the last inequality follows from the fact C(x) ∈ (0, 1) as shown in the preceding
proof.
Claim 3: φ(x)/Φ(x) is strictly decreasing in x on (−∞, +∞).
By taking derivative, we have

0


φ(x)
−xφ(x)Φ(x) − φ2 (x)
φ(x) φ(x)
=
=−
+ x < 0,
Φ(x)
Φ2 (x)
Φ(x) Φ(x)
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Figure B.2.: Illustration of function x + φ(x)/Φ(x) (left) and φ(x)/Φ(x) (right)

where the last inequality follows from Claim 1.
See Figure B.2 below for an illustration of Claim 1-3.
Now, we proceed to present the proof of this proposition.
(1) Under WN, we have Π0w (θ1 ) = Φ[`(θ1 )]B(θ1 ), where B(θ1 ) = c − 2k + 1 + 2(k −
φ[`(θ1 )]
1)θ1 + σ0 Φ[`(θ
, `(θ1 ) =
1 )]

z(θ1 )
σ0

=

(k−1)θ1 +p2 −k
.
σ0

We have shown Πw (θ1 ) is strictly quasi-

concave and B(θ1 ) is strictly decreasing in θ1 . It is straightforward to see B(θ1 ) is strictly
increasing in c. To prove statement (i), it suffices to show B(1) > 0 at c = p2 . When
θ1 = 1 and c = p2 , we have
B(1) = p2 − 1 + σ0

φ
Φ

p2 −1
σ0

p2 −1
σ0





φ($p )
= σ0 $p +
,
Φ($p )

where $p = (p2 − 1)/σ0 . From Claim 1, we know B(1) > 0 for any p2 and σ0 . Hence, ∃
w∗
w
cw
max ≤ p2 s.t. θ1 = 1 for c ≥ cmax .
w
To prove statement (ii), it suffices to show ∃ σmax
s.t.

B(1) = c − 1 + σ0 φ

p2 − 1 
p2 − 1 
/Φ
>0
σ0
σ0

w
for σ0 ≥ σmax
. When p2 > 1, i.e., p2 − 1 > 0, by Claim 3 we know B(1) strictly increases

in σ0 . When p2 = 1, B(1) is simply a linear function of σ0 and it is strictly increasing
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in σ0 . Thus, the statement holds for p2 ≥ 1. When p2 < 1, by taking derivative with
respect to σ0 , we have
φ
dB(1)
=
dσ0
Φ
=

φ
Φ


p2 −1
φ p2σ−1
φ p2σ−1
p2 − 1
σ0
0
0



−
p2 −1 − σ0
p2 −1
p2 −1 +
σ0
Φ
Φ
σ0
σ0
σ0
"
 
2 #
p2 −1
p −1
p2 − 1 φ 2σ0
p2 − 1
σ0
 1+

.
p2 −1
p2 −1 +
σ
σ0
Φ
0
σ0
σ0
| {z }
"



|

#



{z
1

}

p2 − 1
σ02



>0

Since φ(x)/Φ(x) is strictly decreasing in x on (−∞, +∞), we know xφ(x)/Φ(x) strictly
increases in x on (−∞, 0). Thus, term 1 is strictly increasing in σ0 . Let σm be the
solution to
p2 − 1 φ
1+
σ0 Φ
Then, we can conclude that

dB(1)
dσ0

p2 −1
σ0

p2 −1
σ0



= 0.

w
s.t. θ1w∗ = 1 for
> 0 for σ0 ≥ σm . Therefore, ∃ σmax

w
.
σ0 ≥ σmax

(2) Under SN, from Proposition 2.5.3, we have θ1s∗ = 1 if Πs (0) < Πs (1), where
Πs (0) = (p2 − c) − σ0 φ[`(0)] − (p2 − k)Φ[`(0)], Πs (1) = (p2 − c)Φ[−`(0)], and `(0) =
(p2 − k)/σ0 . Since
Πs (1) − Πs (0) = −(p2 − c)Φ[`(0)] + σ0 φ[`(0)] + (p2 − k)Φ[`(0)] = σ0 φ[`(0)] + (c − k)Φ[`(0)],
we know Πs (1) − Πs (0) is strictly increasing in c. In addition, when c = p2 ,


φ[`(0)]
Πs (1) − Πs (0) = σ0 φ[`(0)] + (p2 − k)Φ[`(0)] = σ0 Φ[`(0)]
+ `(0) > 0,
Φ[`(0)]
where the last inequality comes from Claim 1. Therefore, ∃ cbmax ≤ p2 s.t. θ1b∗ = 1 for
c ≥ cbmax .
s
Now, to prove statement (ii) under SN, we need to show ∃ σmax
s.t. Πs (1)−Πs (0) > 0
s
for σ0 ≥ σmax
. The proof proceeds by considering the following three cases. (a) When

c ≥ k, it is clear that Πs (1) − Πs (0) > 0 for ∀σ0 > 0. (b) When c < k ≤ p2 , `(0) =
(p2 − k)/σ0 decreases in σ0 . Now, rewrite Πs (1) − Πs (0) as


φ[`(0)] c − k
Πs (1) − Πs (0) = σ0 Φ[`(0)]
+
,
Φ[`(0)]
σ0
|
{z
}
2
and we know 2 strictly increases in σ0 , as the first part in 2 increases in σ0 because
of Claim 3, and the second part increases in σ0 because c < k. Also, as σ0 → +∞,
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s
s
2 → φ(0)/Φ(0) > 0. Hence, in this case ∃ σmax
s.t. Πs (1) − Πs (0) ≥ 0 for σ0 ≥ σmax
.

(c) When c ≤ p2 < k, `(0) = (p2 − k)/σ0 increases in σ0 . Now, rewrite Πs (1) − Πs (0) as
follows:


c − p2
φ[`(0)]
+ `(0) +
.
Πs (1) − Πs (0) = σ0 Φ[`(0)]
Φ[`(0)]
σ0
|
{z
}
3
We know 3 strictly increases in σ0 , as the first two parts in 3 increase in σ0 because
`(0) increases in σ0 , and the last part also increases in σ0 as c ≤ p2 . So the statement is
s
s.t. Πs (1) − Πs (0) > 0
also true in this case. Combining (a)-(c), we conclude that ∃ σmax
s
.
for σ0 ≥ σmax



Proposition B.0.2 In the absence of social learning, consumers will either purchase in
the crowdfunding stage or leave the market, and hence there is no sales in the retail stage.
Proof of Proposition B.0.2:
In the absence of social learning, a consumer’s expected net utility from purchasing the
product in the crowdfunding stage and from waiting in the market can be written as
u1 (v, ρ̃1 , ρ̃2 ) = v + k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 ) − p1 and u2 (v, ρ̃1 , ρ̃2 ) = v + k(ρ̃1 + ρ̃2 ) − p2 . Since p2 ≥ p1 ,
u1 (v, ρ̃1 , ρ̃2 ) ≥ u2 (v, ρ̃1 , ρ̃2 ), we know none of the consumers will purchase in the retail
stage, which means there is no sales in the retail stage.



Proof of Proposition 2.5.5:
In the absence of social learning, the consumers only choose between purchasing at price
p1 or leaving the market. Hence, the FEE characterization is similar to the case of P-L
game in Proposition 2.4.1, with P(θ1 , q̄r ) replaced by p1 and θ1 replaced by 1. Then, we
can conclude that there exists a unique FEE θ1in (p1 ) for a given crowdfunding price p1 ,
which has the following form:

(p − k)+

1 ∧ 1
,
1−k
θ1in (p1 ) =

1{p − k ≤ 0},
1



i = w

.


i=s

When i = w, θ1wn (p1 ) and the firm’s profit Πnw (p1 ) can be rewritten as






0,
p1 ≤ k








p1 − k
wn
θ1 (p1 ) =
, k < p1 < 1 ;


1−k









1,
p1 ≥ 1
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p1 − c,






p1 − k
n
,
Πw (p1 ) = (p1 − c) 1 −

1−k




0,








k < p1 < 1 .






p1 ≥ 1
p1 ≤ k

Then, we can obtain the optimal crowdfunding price pwn∗
to maximize the piecewise
1
profit function Πnw (p1 ) and the corresponding optimal profit Πn∗
w as follows:


c+1

k,

≤ k < 1
2
wn∗
p1 =
;

 c + 1 , k < c + 1 < 1

2
2


c+1



≤ k < 1
k − c,

2
n∗
Πw =
.
(1 − c)2
c+1




,
k
<
<
1


4(1 − k)
2
Next, when i = s, θ1sn (p1 ) = 1{p1 − k ≤ 0}. Then, the optimal crowdfunding price is
= k and the corresponding optimal profit Πn∗
psn∗
s is k − c. Therefore, the unique FEE
1
θ1n∗ in the crowdfunding stage and the corresponding optimal crowdfunding price pn∗
1 and
optimal profit Πn∗ can be summarized as follows:


c + 1 − 2k
c + 1 (1 − c)2


  2(1 − k) ∧ 1, 2 , 4(1 − k) ,
n∗
θ1n∗ , pn∗
,
Π
=
1



 0, k, k − c ,


1+c

k<
< 1

2
.

1+c


k≥
2

We now complete the proof.



Proof of Proposition 2.5.6:
(1) Weak Network Externalities (i = w)
The firm’s expected profit can be written as a function both θ1 and k, Πw (θ1 , k) = (p2 −
c)[1−θ1 +ρ2w (θ1 , k)]−(1−θ1 )Hw (θ1 , k), where Hw (θ1 , k) = σ0 φ[`(θ1 , k)]+σ0 `(θ1 , k)Φ[`(θ1 , k)],
and
o
o
p2 − k n
σ0 n
ρ2w (θ1 , k) = θ1 Φ[−`(θ1 , k)]+
Φ[`(θ1 , k)]−Φ[`(0, k)] +
φ[`(θ1 , k)]−φ[`(0, k)] .
1−k
1−k
First, let us consider the case with 0 < θ1w∗ < 1. Then, θ1w∗ satisfies the following firstorder condition:
c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1w∗ + σ0

φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]
= 0,
Φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]

c − 2k + 1 + 2[σ0 `(θ1w∗ , k) + k − p2 ] + σ0
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φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]
= 0,
Φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]

or equivalently,
2`(θ1w∗ , k) +

2p2 − c − 1
φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]
=
.
w∗
Φ[`(θ1 , k)]
σ0

We have shown x + φ(x)/Φ(x) strictly increases in x on (−∞, +∞) (see Claim 2 in
the proof of Proposition 2.5.4). Then, it is straightforward to see that 2x + φ(x)/Φ(x)
also strictly increases in x. Hence, we know in equilibrium, `(θ1w∗ , k) remains fixed
as k changes, i.e., p2 − θ1w∗ − k(1 − θ1w∗ ) = C1 , where C1 is a constant. Therefore,
dθ1w∗
dk

=−

1−θ1w∗
1−k

< 0, which means θ1w∗ decreases in k. Moreover, we have the following

relationship: `(1, k) ≤ `(θ1w∗ , k) ≤ `(0, k).
Since Hw (θ1w∗ , k) = σ0 φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)] + σ0 `(θ1w∗ , k)Φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)] and `(θ1w∗ , k) is fixed for
0 < θ1w∗ < 1, we know rp∗ = Hw (θ1w∗ , k) is also a fixed constant, which means the optimal
crowdfunding reward remains fixed when k changes. Since `(θ1 , k) =
have

∂`(θ1 ,k)
∂k

p2 −θ1 −k(1−θ1 )
,
σ0

we

1
= − 1−θ
. Taking partial derivatives with respect to k gives
σ0

−(1 − θ1 )
∂Hw (θ1 , k)
= −σ0 `(θ1 , k)φ[`(θ1 , k)]
− (1 − θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 , k)]
∂k
σ0
−(1 − θ1 )
+ σ0 `(θ1 , k)φ[`(θ1 , k)]
σ0
= −Φ[`(θ1 , k)](1 − θ1 ),
o
∂ρ2w (θ1 , k)
1 − θ1
p2 − 1 n
= θ1 φ[`(θ1 , k)]
+
Φ[`(θ1 , k)] − Φ[`(0, k)]
∂k
σ0
(1 − k)2
o
p2 − k n
+
φ[`(0, k)] − (1 − θ1 )φ[`(θ1 , k)]
(1 − k)σ0
o
σ0 n
φ[`(θ
,
k)]
−
φ[`(0,
k)]
+
1
(1 − k)2
o
σ0 n `(θ1 , k)(1 − θ1 )
`(0, k)
+
φ[`(θ1 , k)] −
φ[`(0, k)]
1−k
σ0
σ0
n
o
p2 − 1
=
Φ[`(θ1 , k)] − Φ[`(0, k)]
(1 − k)2


`(0, k)
p2 − k
σ0
−
φ[`(0, k)]
+
−
(1 − k)σ0 (1 − k)2
1−k


θ1 (1 − θ1 ) (p2 − k)(1 − θ1 )
σ0
`(θ1 , k)(1 − θ1 )
+
−
+
+
φ[`(θ1 , k)]
σ0
(1 − k)σ0
(1 − k)2
1−k
o
o
p2 − 1 n
σ0 n
=
Φ[`(θ1 , k)] − Φ[`(0, k)] +
φ[`(θ1 , k)] − φ[`(0, k)]
(1 − k)2
(1 − k)2
o
σ0 n
=
`(1,
k)Φ[`(θ
,
k)]
+
φ[`(θ
,
k)]
−
`(1,
k)Φ[`(0,
k)]
−
φ[`(0,
k)]
,
1
1
(1 − k)2
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∂Πw (θ1 , k)
∂ρ2w (θ1 , k)
∂Hw (θ1 , k)
= (p2 − c)
− (1 − θ1 )
∂k
∂k
∂k
o
σ0 (p2 − c) n
=
`(1,
k)Φ[`(θ
,
k)]
+
φ[`(θ
,
k)]
−
`(1,
k)Φ[`(0,
k)]
−
φ[`(0,
k)]
1
1
(1 − k)2
+ Φ[`(θ1 , k)](1 − θ1 )2 .
Using the Envelope Theorem, we have

dΠ∗w
dk

=

∂Πw (θ1w∗ ,k)
,
∂k

and

o
σ0 (p2 − c) n
dΠ∗w
w∗
w∗
=
`(1, k)Φ[`(θ1 , k)] + φ[`(θ1 , k)] − `(1, k)Φ[`(0, k)] − φ[`(0, k)]
dk
(1 − k)2
+ Φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)](1 − θ1w∗ )2 .
To show

dΠ∗w
dk

> 0, it is sufficient to show `(1, k)Φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)]+φ[`(θ1w∗ , k)] ≥ `(1, k)Φ[`(0, k)]+

φ[`(0, k)]. We have shown `(1, k) ≤ `(θ1w∗ , k) ≤ `(0, k), so it is sufficient to prove J1 (x) =
`(1, k)Φ(x) + φ(x) decreases in x for x ≥ `(1, k). Note J10 (x) = `(1, k)φ(x) − xφ(x) =
φ(x)(`(1, k) − x) ≤ 0 as `(1, k) ≤ x. Therefore, we can now conclude that

dΠ∗w
dk

> 0.

Next, we further consider the case with θ1w∗ = 0, 1. When θ1w∗ = 0, the optimal profit
function becomes Π∗w = Πw (0, k) = (p2 − c) − Hw (0, k), and Hw (0, k) = σ0 φ[`(0, k)] +
σ0 `(0, k)Φ[`(0, k)], where `(0, k) = (p2 − k)/σ0 . Let J2 (x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x), then J20 (x) =
Φ(x) + xφ(x) − xφ(x) = Φ(x) > 0. Then, we know rpw∗ = Hw (0, k) decreases in k as
`(0, k) decreases in k. Hence, Π∗w increases in k.
When θ1w∗ = 1, the potential regret function becomes Hw (1, k) = σ0 φ[`(1, k)] +
σ0 `(1, k)Φ[`(1, k)] and the optimal profit function becomes Π∗w = Πw (1, k) = (p2 −
c)ρ2w (1, k), where
ρ2w (1, k) = Φ[−`(1, k)] +

o
o
p2 − k n
σ0 n
Φ[`(1, k)] − Φ[`(0, k)] +
φ[`(1, k)] − φ[`(0, k)] .
1−k
1−k

It is straightforward to see the optimal reward rpw∗ = Hw (1, k) remains constant when
k increases. Note that `(1, k) = (p2 − 1)/σ0 and `(0, k) = (p2 − k)/σ0 . We have the
following derivative of ρ2w (1, k),
o `(0, k)φ[`(0, k)]
dρ2w (1, k)
p2 − 1 n
=
Φ[`(1,
k)]
−
Φ[`(0,
k)]
+
dk
(1 − k)2
1−k
n
o
σ0
`(0, k)φ[`(0, k)]
+
φ[`(1, k)] − φ[`(0, k)] −
2
(1 − k)
1−k
n
o
σ0
=
`(1, k)Φ[`(1, k)] + φ[`(1, k)] − `(1, k)Φ[`(0, k)] − φ[`(0, k)] .
(1 − k)2
We have shown `(1, k) ≤ `(0, k), and J1 (x) = `(1, k)Φ(x) + φ(x) decreases in x for
x ≥ `(1, k). Hence, we have `(1, k)Φ[`(1, k)] + φ[`(1, k)] ≥ `(1, k)Φ[`(0, k)] + φ[`(0, k)],
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which means

dρ2w (1,k)
dk

> 0. Therefore, Π∗w also increases in k in this case.

(2) Strong Network Externalities (i = s)
From Proposition 2.5.3, θ1s∗ = 1 if Πs (0, k) < Πs (1, k), and θ1s∗ = 0, otherwise. That means
firm’s optimal profit is chosen from Πs (0, k) = (p2 − c) − σ0 φ[`(0, k)] − (p2 − k)Φ[`(0, k)]
and Πs (1, k) = (p2 − c)Φ[−`(0, k)]. Note that `(0, k) =

p2 −k
,
σ0

and thus

d`(0,k)
dk

= − σ10 . Let

Π∆ (k) = Πs (1, k) − Πs (0, k), then we have
Π∆ (k) = −(p2 − c)Φ[`(0, k)] + σ0 φ[`(0, k)] + (p2 − k)Φ[`(0, k)]
= σ0 φ[`(0, k)] + (c − k)Φ[`(0, k)]


c − p2
φ[`(0, k)]
+ `(0, k) +
.
= σ0 Φ[`(0, k)]
Φ[`(0, k)]
σ0
By Claim 2 in proof of Proposition 2.5.4, we know x + φ(x)/Φ(x) strictly increases in
x. Then, we have `(0, k) + φ[`(0, k)]/Φ[`(0, k)] strictly decreases in k as `(0, k) strictly
decreases in k. Therefore, there exists a threshold value k̄ ≥ 1 such that Π∆ (k) < 0
for k > k̄ and Π∆ (k) ≥ 0 as k ≤ k̄. Equivalently, θ1s∗ = 1 for k ≤ k̄ and θ1s∗ = 0
for k > k̄, which means θ1s∗ decreases in k. The potential regret function under SN is
Hs (θ1 , k) = σ0 φ[`(0, k)] + σ0 `(θ1 , k)Φ[`(0, k)]. Hence,
Hs (0, k) = σ0 {φ[`(0, k)] + `(0, k)Φ[`(0, k)]},
Hs (1, k) = σ0 {φ[`(0, k)] + `(1, k)Φ[`(0, k)]}.
We have shown J2 (x) = xΦ(x) + φ(x) increases in x, together with the fact that `(0, k)
decreases in k, we can conclude Hs (0, k) decreases in k. Similarly, we have shown J1 (x) =
`(1, k)Φ(x) + φ(x) decreases in x for x ≥ `(1, k), then we can obtain that Hs (1, k) also
decreases in k. Moreover, Hs (0, k) > Hs (1, k) as `(0, k) > `(1, k). We have shown the
optimal threshold θ1s∗ will jump from 1 to 0 at some threshold value of k (or possibly
remains at 0 for any k). Now, we can conclude rps∗ = Hs (θ1s∗ , k) decreases in k.
Now, we are left to show the optimal profit Πs (0, k) and Πs (1, k) both increases in k.
We can derive the following derivatives:
dΠs (0, k)
d`(0, k)
d`(0, k)
= −σ0
− (p2 − k)φ[`(0, k)]
+ Φ[`(0, k)]
dk
dk
dk
= 1 + `(0, k)φ[`(0, k)] + Φ[`(0, k)],
dΠs (1, k)
d`(0, k)
(p2 − c)φ[`(0, k)]
= −(p2 − c)φ[`(0, k)]
=
.
dk
dk
σ0
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It is straightforward to see

dΠs (1,k)
dk

> 0. Now, we need to show

dΠs (0,k)
dk

> 0. Let J3 (x) =

1 + xφ(x) + Φ(x). We can show J30 (x) = φ(x)(2 − x2 ) and the minimum point is attained
√
at point x∗ = − 2. Then, it is straightforward to show J3 (x∗ ) > 0, as illustrated in
Figure B.3 below.



4

2.0

3

1+x ϕ[x]+ Φ[x]

ϕ[x]+xΦ[x]

1.5

2

1.0

1

0.5

0

0.0
-4

-2

0

2

4

-4

-2

0

2

4

x

x

Figure B.3.: An Illustration of Functions J2 (x) (left) and J3 (x) (right)

Proof of Lemma 8:
(i) Since Hw (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )] and Hw0 (θ1 ) = (k − 1)Φ[`(θ1 )] under WN,
we have
Zw0 (θ1 ) = −[p2 − Hw (θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hw0 (θ1 )
= σ0 φ[`(θ1 )] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 )] − p2 − (1 − θ1 )(k − 1)Φ[`(θ1 )]
= Φ[`(θ1 )][2(k − 1)θ1 + p2 − 2k + 1] + σ0 φ[`(θ1 )] − p2


p2
φ[`(θ1 )]
= Φ[`(θ1 )] 2(k − 1)θ1 + p2 − 2k + 1 + σ0
−
Φ[`(θ1 )] Φ[`(θ1 )]


p2
= Φ[`(θ1 )] B(θ1 ) − c + p2 −
,
Φ[`(θ1 )]
φ[`(θ1 )]
where B(θ1 ) = c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1 + σ0 Φ[`(θ
. We have shown in section 5.2 that the
1 )]

function B 0 (θ1 ) < 0. When 0 ≤ k < 1, it is straightforward to see Φ[`(θ1 )] is decreasing in
θ1 . Taken together, we know the term in the braces is strictly decreasing in θ1 . Hence, we
can conclude that Zw (θ1 ) is strictly quasi-concave in θ1 . By the property of quasi-concave
function, we know the feasible set for θ1 , Θw
F = {θ1 |Zw (θ1 ) ≥ S/M, θ1 ∈ [0, 1]} is the
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upper contour set for function Zw (θ1 ) if it is not empty, hence is convex. Therefore, if
 w w
w
w
w
w
w
Θw
=
6
∅,
there
exist
θ
and
θ
such
that
0
≤
θ
≤
θ
≤
1
and
Θ
=
θl , θu .
u
u
F
F
l
l
(ii) From Lemma 15, we know Hs (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(0)] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(0)], Hs0 (θ1 ) = (k −
1)Φ[`(0)], and
Zs0 (θ1 ) = −[p2 − Hs (θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hs0 (θ1 )
= σ0 φ[`(0)] + z(θ1 )Φ[`(0)] − p2 − (1 − θ1 )(k − 1)Φ[`(0)]
= σ0 φ[`(0)] + [(k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k]Φ[`(0)] − p2 − (1 − θ1 )(k − 1)Φ[`(0)]
= 2(k − 1)Φ[`(0)]θ1 + σ0 φ[`(0)] + (1 − 2k)Φ[`(0)] − p2 Φ[−`(0)],
which is strictly increasing in θ1 as k > 1. Thus, Zs (θ1 ) is a strictly convex function with
Zs (1) = 0. Therefore, when ΘsF 6= ∅, there exists a unique θus such that Zs (θus ) = S/M


and the resulting feasible set is ΘsF = 0, θus .

Proof of Proposition 2.6.1:
 w w
Based on the property of the feasible set obtained in Lemma 8, Θw
F = θl , θu , and
the quasi-concavity of the firm’s profit function Πw (θ1 ), we can derive the results in this
proposition by similar argument used in the proof of Proposition 2.5.3. Based on the


property of the feasible set obtained in Lemma 8, ΘbF = 0, θub , and the strict convexity
of the firm’s profit function Πs (θ1 ) as derived in Proposition 2.5.3, we can derive the
results in this proposition by similar argument used in the proof of Proposition 2.5.3. 
Proof of Proposition 2.6.2:
Due to the one-to-one relationship between rpic∗ and H(θ1ic∗ ), it is sufficient to prove
statement (ii) of this proposition. Proof of statement (ii) will proceed by analyzing the
following scenarios.
(1) Under WN, from the proof of Lemma 8, we have Π0w (θ1 ) = Φ[`(θ1 )]B(θ1 ), and


p2
0
−c ,
Zw (θ1 ) = Φ[`(θ1 )] B(θ1 ) + p2 −
Φ[`(θ1 )]
|
{z
}
⊕

φ[`(θ1 )]
where B(θ1 ) = c − 2k + 1 + 2(k − 1)θ1 + σ0 Φ[`(θ
. It is straightforward to see ⊕ < 0, and
1 )]

thus Π0w (θ1 ) > Zw0 (θ1 ) for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1]. From the preceding proof, we know both Πw (θ1 )
and Zw (θ1 ) are strictly quasi-concave in θ1 . Then, there are three possible scenarios
for the pattern of Πw (θ1 ): (a) strictly increasing, (b) strictly decreasing, and (c) first
increasing then decreasing. In case (a), i.e., when Π0w (θ1 ) > 0 for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], from
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Proposition 2.6.1 we know θ1wc∗ = θuw . If Zw0 (θ1 ) > 0 for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1], then Θw
F = ∅ since
Zw (1) = 0. If Zw (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing, or first increasing then decreasing, the feasible
set shrinks as S increases and θuw decreased. In case (b), Zw0 (θ1 ) < Π0w (θ1 ) < 0, then θuw
decreases. In case (c), if Zw (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing, then as S increases, θuw decreased
and the optimal θ1wc∗ first remains the same and then decreases as θuw decreases. If Zw (θ1 )
is first increasing and then decreasing, since Π0w (θ1 ) > Zw0 (θ1 ), it is clear to see θ1wc∗ first
remains the same and then decreases as θuw decreases. Taken together, we can conclude
that statement (ii) is true under WN.
(2) Under SN, from Lemma 8, we know θus decreases as S increases. Then, the optimal
θ1sc∗ remains unchanged if θ1s∗ = 0. Or θ1sc∗ decreases as θus decreases if θ1s∗ = 1 and Πs (θ1 )
is strictly increasing on [0, 1]. Or θ1sc∗ first decreases and then jumps to 0 and remains
unchanged afterwards, as S increases, if θ1s∗ = 1 and Πs (θ1 ) is first decreasing and then increasing on [0, 1]. Taken together, we can conclude that statement (ii) is true under SN. 
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Appendix B: Endogenous Retail Price
The basic model in the paper have assumed the retail price p2 is exogenous determined due to a competitive retail market. This assumption helps maintain analytical
tractability and deliver clean insights. Now, we relax this assumption by endogenizing
the retail price as an additional decision variable for the firm and derive further insights
into the crowdfunding problem. We will show the optimal structure of crowdfunding
pricing scheme {p∗1 , p∗2 } under different network externalities, present some important observations based on numerical experiments. Following the notations in previous sections,
we shall define the threshold function as
`(θ1 , p2 ) =

(k − 1)θ1 + p2 − k
.
σ0

(B.2)

All the functions of θ1 (equivalently, p1 ) shall be written as the functions of (θ1 , p2 ).

Weak Network Externalities
When k < 1, the firm’s profit function can be written as Πw (θ1 , p2 ) = (p2 − c)[1 −
θ1 + ρ2w (θ1 , p2 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hw (θ1 , p2 ). Note that the potential regret function becomes
Hw (θ1 , p2 ) = σ0 φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] + z(θ1 , p2 )Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )], and the expected purchasing fraction in
the retail stage can be written as ρ2w (θ1 , p2 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(θ1 , p2 )] + χ(θ1 , p2 ), where
χ(θ1 , p2 ) =

o
o
p2 − k n
σ0 n
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )] +
φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − φ[`(0, p2 )] .
1−k
1−k

In preparation for the next result, we define the following two auxiliary functions,


T1 (θ1 , p2 ) = Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] c + 2(k − 1)θ1 − 2k + 1 + σ0 φ[`(θ1 , p2 )],


T2 (θ1 , p2 ) = (p2 − c) Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )] + (1 − k) Φ[−`(θ1 , p2 )] + χ(θ1 , p2 ) .

w∗
Proposition B.0.3 The optimal pricing scheme pw∗
1 , p2

under WN can be obtained

by comparing the following three scenarios:
w∗
w∗
w∗
(a) Adoption Frenzy: θ1w∗ = 0, pw∗
1 = p2 − Hw (0, p2 ), and p2 = +∞;
w∗
w∗
(b) Adoption Inertia: θ1w∗ = 1, pw∗
= pw∗
is the solution to
1
2 − Hw (1, p2 ), and p2

T2 (1, p2 ) = 0;
w∗
w∗ w∗
w∗
w∗
(c) Adoption Dispersion: 0 < θ1w∗ < 1, pw∗
1 = p2 − Hw (θ1 , p2 ), where θ1 and p2 are
w∗ w∗
solved from T1 (θ1w∗ , pw∗
2 ) = 0 and T2 (θ1 , p2 ) = 0.
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We plot in Figure B.4 the numerical illustrations of the firm’s profit function under
SN.
σ0 =1, c=0, k=0.6
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(a) Adoption Frenzy: θ1w∗ = 0
σ0 =1, c=0.6, k=0.4
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(b) Adoption Inertia: θ1w∗ = 1
σ0 =1, c=0, k=0.4
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(c) Adoption Dispersion: 0 < θ1w∗ < 1
Figure B.4.: Illustration of Firm’s Profit Function with Endogenous Retail Price
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5

Briefly, the proposition implies that the equilibrium purchasing pattern in the consumer population under the firm’s optimal pricing strategy is similar to the base model in
the main paper, where the crowdfunding purchase can be any fraction of the population.
Similar intuition applies as well: When the network effect intensity is relatively small,
the immediate network benefit and the potential learning benefit are close to each other,
thus the optimal strategy is to take advantage of both benefits, resulting in any dispersed
adoption. Note that the proof of Proposition B.0.3 (b) and (c) only provide first-order
necessary conditions for optimality, without guarantee of uniqueness. Throughout our
extensive numerical experiments, we observe the optimal pricing scheme is unique and
Figure B.4 provides an example.
An important observation is that in case (a), the optimal retail price is +∞. The
intuition is that when adoption frenzy strategy is optimal, the firm should charge an
extremely high retail price. It would decreases the consumer’s potential regret, hence
increases the firm’s crowdfunding price, but still with all-purchase in equilibrium.

Strong Network Externalities
When k > 1, the expected purchasing fraction in the second period can be written
as ρ2s (θ1 , p2 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(0, p2 )], where `(0, p2 ) = (p2 − k)/σ0 . We also have the potential
regret function in this case as Hs (θ1 , p2 ) = σ0 φ[`(0, p2 )] + z(θ1 , p2 )Φ[`(0, p2 )]. Hence, the
firm’s profit function can be written, in terms of θ1 and p2 , as
Πs (θ1 , p2 ) = (p2 − c)[1 − θ1 + ρ2s (θ1 , p2 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hs (θ1 , p2 ).
Based on Proposition 2.5.3, we know for any p2 , the optimal θ1 can only be either 0
or 1. Hence, it is sufficient to focus on the structural property of functions Πs (0, p2 )
and Πs (1, p2 ).

In preparation for the next result, we denote pτ2 as the solution to

(p2 − c)h[`(0, p2 )] = σ0 , where h[·] is the failure rate function of the standard Normal
distribution.

s∗
Proposition B.0.4 The optimal pricing scheme ps∗
under SN can be summarized
1 , p2
as
s∗
τ
(a) Adoption Frenzy: θ1s∗ = 0, ps∗
1 = k, and p2 = +∞, if Πs (1, p2 ) ≤ k − c;
τ
τ
s∗
τ
τ
(b) Adoption Inertia: θ1s∗ = 1, ps∗
1 = p2 − Hs (1, p2 ), and p2 = p2 , if Πs (1, p2 ) > k − c.
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Proposition B.0.4 summarizes the optimal pricing strategy under strong network externalities. When we extend the base model to endogenize the retail price p2 , the induced
equilibrium purchasing pattern remains the same: the optimal pricing strategy will induce
all consumers to either adopt the product early (case (a) adoption frenzy) or adopt the
product late (case (b) adoption inertia). We plot in Figure B.5 the numerical illustrations
of the firm’s profit function under SN.
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(a) Adoption Frenzy: θ1s∗ = 0
σ0 =1, c=1.4, k=1.2
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(b) Adoption Inertia: θ1s∗ = 1
Figure B.5.: Illustration of Firm’s Profit Function with Endogenous Retail Price

Proof of Proposition B.0.3:
When k < 1, we have
∂`(0, p2 )
1
∂z(θ1 , p2 )
∂`(θ1 , p2 )
=
= ,
= 1.
∂p2
∂p2
σ0
∂p2
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5.0

Then, we can further derive the following partial derivatives with respect to p2 :
∂`(θ1 , p2 )
∂z(θ1 , p2 )
∂Hw (θ1 , p2 )
= −σ0 `(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )]
+ Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )]
∂p2
∂p2
∂p2
∂`(θ1 , p2 )
+ z(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )]
∂p2
= Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )];
∂ρ2w (θ1 , p2 )
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] z(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] Φ[`(0, p2 )]
p2 − k
=
+
−
−
φ[`(0, p2 )]
∂p2
1−k
(1 − k)σ0
1−k
(1 − k)σ0
o
1 n
+
− `(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] + `(0, p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )]
1−k
1 n
=
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] + `(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )]
1−k
o
− `(0, p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )] − `(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] + `(0, p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )]
o
1 n
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )] ;
=
1−k
∂Πw (θ1 , p2 )
∂ρ2w (θ1 , p2 )
∂Hw (θ1 , p2 )
= [1 − θ1 + ρ2w (θ1 , p2 )] + (p2 − c)
− (1 − θ1 )
∂p2
∂p2
∂p2
z(θ1 , p2 )
p2 − k
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] −
Φ[`(0, p2 )]
=1+
1−k
1−k
o
σ0 n
+
φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − φ[`(0, p2 )]
1−k
o
p2 − c n
+
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )] − (1 − θ1 )Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )]
1−k
o
2p2 − c − k n
Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − Φ[`(0, p2 )] + Φ[−`(θ1 , p2 )]
=
1−k
n
o
σ0
+
φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] − φ[`(0, p2 )] .
1−k
There are three possible cases to consider:
(a) When θ1w∗ = 0,

∂Πw (0,p2 )
∂p2

= Φ[−`(0, p2 )] > 0. Hence, the optimal retail price is

pw∗
2 = +∞.
∂Πw (1,p2 )
∂p2
∂Πw (θ1 ,p2 )
∂p2

(b) When θ1w∗ = 1, the first-order necessary condition for optimal p2 is

=0

(c) When 0 < θ1w∗ < 1, the first-order necessary conditions are

= 0,

∂Πw (θ1 ,p2 )
∂θ1

= 0. From the preceding proofs and the definition of T1 (θ1 , p2 ) and T2 (θ1 , p2 ),

we have


∂Πw (θ1 , p2 )
= Φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] c + 2(k − 1)θ1 − 2k + 1 + σ0 φ[`(θ1 , p2 )] = T1 (θ1 , p2 );
∂θ1
∂Πw (θ1 , p2 )
T2 (θ1 , p2 )
=
.
∂p2
1−k
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Therefore, the results in part (b) and (c) follow.



Proof of Proposition B.0.4:
Taking derivatives with respect to p2 , we have
∂`(0, p2 )
θ1
∂ρ2s (θ1 , p2 )
= −θ1 φ[−`(0, p2 )]
= − φ[`(0, p2 )];
∂p2
∂p2
σ0
∂Hs (θ1 , p2 )
∂`(0, p2 )
∂z(θ1 , p2 )
= −σ0 `(0, p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )]
+ Φ[`(0, p2 )]
∂p2
∂p2
∂p2
∂`(0, p2 )
+ z(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )]
∂p2
= −`(0, p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )] + Φ[`(0, p2 )] + `(θ1 , p2 )φ[`(0, p2 )]
= Φ[`(0, p2 )] +

(k − 1)θ1
φ[`(0, p2 )].
σ0

Since the profit function is Πs (θ1 , p2 ) = (p2 − c)[1 − θ1 + ρ2s (θ1 , p2 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hs (θ1 , p2 ),
we have
∂ρ2s (θ1 , p2 )
∂Hs (θ1 , p2 )
∂Πs (θ1 , p2 )
= [1 − θ1 + ρ2s (θ1 , p2 )] + (p2 − c)
− (1 − θ1 )
∂p2
∂p2
∂p2
(p2 − c)θ1
= 1 − θ1 Φ[`(0, p2 )] −
φ[`(0, p2 )]
σ0


(k − 1)θ1
φ[`(0, p2 )]
− (1 − θ1 ) Φ[`(0, p2 )] +
σ0
θ1
= 1 − Φ[`(0, p2 )] − [(k − 1)(1 − θ1 ) + p2 − c]φ[`(0, p2 )].
σ0
Based on Proposition 2.5.3, we know for any p2 , the optimal θ1 can only be either 0 or 1.
Hence, it is sufficient to focus on the structural property of Πs (0, p2 ) and Πs (1, p2 ), and
Πs (0, p2 ) = (p2 − c)[1 + ρ2s (0, p2 )] − Hs (0, p2 ), Πs (1, p2 ) = (p2 − c)ρ2s (1, p2 ). We can show
∂Πs (0, p2 )
= 1 − Φ[`(0, p2 )],
∂p2
∂Πs (1, p2 )
p2 − c
= 1 − Φ[`(0, p2 )] −
φ[`(0, p2 )].
∂p2
σ0
It is straightforward to see ∂Πs (0, p2 )/∂p2 > 0 and as p2 → +∞, ∂Πs (0, p2 )/∂p2 → 0.
Then, the optimal p2 for θ1 = 0 is p∞
2 = +∞. The corresponding maximal profit for the
firm is
Πs (0, p∞
2 ) = lim (p2 − c)[1 + ρ2s (0, p2 )] − Hs (0, p2 )
p2 →+∞

= lim p2 − c − σ0 φ[`(0, p2 )] − (p2 − k)Φ[`(0, p2 )]
p2 →+∞

= k − c.
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Next, rewrite ∂Πs (1, p2 )/∂p2 as


p2 − c φ[`(0, p2 )]
∂Πs (1, p2 )
= Φ[−`(0, p2 )] 1 −
∂p2
σ0 Φ[−`(0, p2 )]


p2 − c
= Φ[−`(0, p2 )] 1 −
h[`(0, p2 )] .
σ0
Since `(0, p2 ) is strictly increasing in p2 and Normal distribution has a strictly increasing
failure rate function h[·], we know the component within the braces is strictly decreasing
in p2 . Thus, Πs (1, p2 ) is strictly quasi-concave in p2 , and the optimal retail price for
θ1 = 1 can be denoted as pτ2 and solved from (p2 − c)h[`(0, p2 )] = σ0 .
τ
Finally, we can simply compare the two optimal profits Πs (0, p∞
2 ) and Πs (1, p2 ), and

find the maximum one as the firm’s optimal profit under SN. If Πs (1, pτ2 ) ≤ k − c, the
∞
∞
∞
optimal retail price is ps∗
2 = p2 = +∞, and the optimal reward is Hs (0, p2 ) = p2 − k.
τ
Therefore, the optimal crowdfunding price is ps∗
1 = k. If Πs (1, p2 ) > k − c, we have
τ
τ
s∗
τ
ps∗
1 = p2 − Hs (1, p2 ) and p2 = p2 .
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Appendix C: Complementary Results for Boundary Scenario
In this appendix, we present all the complementary results for the boundary scenario
(BS) of network externalities (i.e., the case with k = 1).

Analysis of P-W Game
Lemma 17 The FEE equation under BS can be written as Hb (θ1 ) = rp , where
Hb (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 )φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )] + z(1)Φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )].

(B.3)

Proof of Lemma 17:
When k = 1, z(θ1 ) = p2 − 1 = z(1) and we can obtain the consumer’s expected total
social utility E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ] conditional on the belief of threshold policy θ1 as follows:

E0Q [s(ρ)|θ1 ] = (1 − θ1 )F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1
{z
}
|
social utility under low quality

+


F̄ (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1
{z
}
|

social utility under high quality


= 1 − θ1 F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 .
By definition of FEE, the threshold policy θ1∗ ∈ (0, 1) in the P-W game in period 1 can
be solved through the following FEE equation:
Z +∞


θ1 + 1 − θ1 F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 − p1 =
(µ1 + θ1 + 1 − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 .
p2 −1

The FEE equation under boundary scenario can be rearranged as follows,
Z +∞


θ1 + 1 − θ1 F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 − p1 =
(µ1 + θ1 − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1
p2 −1


+ F̄ (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 ,
Z +∞

θ1 + (1 − θ1 )F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 − p1 =
(µ1 + θ1 − p2 )f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 ,
p2 −1

Z

+∞

rp = p2 − p1 =


µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 + (p2 − 1)F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 .

p2 −1

Similar to the WN case, we define the potential regret function Hb (θ1 ) in BS case,
Z +∞

Hb (θ1 ) = (p2 − 1)F (p2 − 1)|1 − θ1 +
µ1 f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 .
p2 −1

Therefore, the FEE equation is equivalent to Hb (θ1 ) = rp , by definition of Hb (θ1 ). After
further simplification, we have Hb (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 )φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )] + z(1)Φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )].
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Lemma 18 The potential regret function Hb (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing in θ1 on [0, 1].
Proof of Lemma 18:
Since Hb (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 )φ
Hb0 (θ1 )

p2 −1
σ(θ1 )



+ (p2 − 1)Φ

p2 −1
σ(θ1 )


, taking derivative we have





0
p2 − 1
p2 − 1
p2 − 1
p2 − 1
= σ (θ1 )φ
− σ(θ1 )
φ
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )

0

p2 − 1
p2 − 1
+ (p2 − 1)φ
σ(θ1 )
σ(θ1 )


p2 − 1
= σ 0 (θ1 )φ
< 0.
σ(θ1 )
0

Hence, we complete the proof.



Optimal Reward Choice
Starting from this subsection, all analysis will be based on the assumption of perfect
learning.
Lemma 19 Under perfect learning, the potential regret function under BS becomes
Hb (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(1)] + z(1)Φ[`(1)], and Hb0 (θ1 ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 19:
Under perfect learning, we now have σ(θ1 ) = σ0 and `(1) = (p2 − 1)/σ0 = z(1)/σ0 .
Based on the potential regret function Hb (θ1 ) obtained previously, it is straightforward
to derive Hb (θ1 ) = σ(θ1 )φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )] + z(1)Φ[z(1)/σ(θ1 )] = σ0 φ[`(1)] + z(1)Φ[`(1)], and
its derivative Hb0 (θ1 ) = 0.



Lemma 20 Suppose consumer’s threshold policy in the P-W game is θ1 , then the expected
purchasing fraction in second period under BS is ρ2b (θ1 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(1)].
Proof of Lemma 20:
When k = 1, the expected purchasing fraction in the second period is straightforward to
derive based on Proposition 2.4.1,
Z +∞
ρ2b (θ1 ) =
(θ1 − 0)f (µ1 |1 − θ1 )dµ1 = θ1 F̄ (p2 − k|1 − θ1 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(1)].
z(θ1 )

We complete the proof.
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Now, we analyze the firm’s profit and optimal crowdfunding reward choice under the
BS case. Based on previous analysis, we have the profit function is Πb (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[1 −
θ1 +ρ2b (θ1 )]−(1−θ1 )Hb (θ1 ), where Hb (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(1)]+z(1)Φ[`(1)], ρ2b (θ1 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(1)].
Proposition B.0.5 The optimal reward is rpb∗ = Hb (θ1b∗ ), where θ1b∗ = 1{Πb (0) < Πb (1)}.
Proof of Proposition B.0.5:
When k = 1, z(θ1 ) = p2 − 1 = z(1), `(θ1 ) = (p2 − 1)/σ0 = `(1), Hb (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(1)] +
z(1)Φ[`(1)], Hb0 (θ1 ) = 0, ρ2b (θ1 ) = θ1 Φ[−`(1)] and ρ02b (θ1 ) = Φ[−`(1)]. Then, the profit
function is Πb (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[1 − θ1 + ρ2b (θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hb (θ1 ), and its derivative becomes
Π0b (θ1 ) = (p2 − c)[ρ02b (θ1 ) − 1] + Hb (θ1 ) − (1 − θ1 )Hb0 (θ1 ) = −(p2 − c)Φ[`(1)] + σ0 φ[`(1)] +
(p2 −1)Φ[`(1)] = (c−1)Φ[`(1)]+σ0 φ[`(1)], which is a constant. Hence, the profit function
should be (weakly) monotonic, and the optimum shall be attained at the two boundary
points. When Π0b (θ1 ) = 0, any threshold θ1 generates the same profit, hence should be
optimal. To break this tie, let the smallest one (left boundary point θ1 = 0) be preferred
by the firm, since it yields the same profit without any risk (all purchases happen in the
crowdfunding stage).



Proposition B.0.6 The firm should not launch the crowdfunding campaign under BS
when: (i) the unit production cost is too high; (Formally, ∃ cbmax ≤ p2 s.t. θ1b∗ = 1 for
b
s.t.
c ≥ cbmax .) (ii) the prior product quality uncertainty is too high. (Formally, ∃ σmax
b
θ1b∗ = 1 for σ0 ≥ σmax
.)

Proof of Proposition B.0.6:
Under BS, we have Π0b (θ1 ) = (c − 1)Φ[`(1)] + σ0 φ[`(1)], where `(1) = (p2 − 1)/σ0 . Then,
#

"


p2 −1
φ
p
−
1
p2 − 1
2
σ0
0
Πb (θ1 ) = Φ
c − 1 + σ0 p2 −1  = Φ
B(1).
σ0
σ0
Φ σ
0

From proof of part (1) of Proposition 2.5.4, we know B(1) > 0 as c = p2 . Therefore, it is
straightforward to see Π0b (1) > 0 and statement (i) holds. If p2 ≥ k = 1, by Claim 3 in
the proof of Proposition 2.5.4 we know B(1) strictly increases in σ0 . If p2 < k = 1, in the
proof of part (1) of Proposition 2.5.4, we have shown ∃ σm s.t. B(1) strictly increases in
w
w
σ0 for σ0 ≥ σm . Taken together, ∃ σmax
s.t. B(1) > 0, i.e., θ1w∗ = 1 for σ0 ≥ σmax
and

statement (ii) holds.
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Financial Constraints
We can formulate the firm’s constrained optimization problem under BS as follows:
max Πb (θ1 ) = max p2 [1 − θ1 + ρ2b (θ1 )] − (1 − θ1 )Hb (θ1 )

θ1 ∈[0,1]

θ1 ∈[0,1]

s.t.

Zb (θ1 ) ≥ S/M

(B.4)

where Zb (θ1 ) = [p2 − Hb (θ1 )](1 − θ1 ) is the fundraising function. Then, the feasible set
for θ1 under constraint (B.4) as ΘbF = {θ1 |Zb (θ1 ) ≥ S/M, θ1 ∈ [0, 1]}. Next, we present
the property of the feasible set in the following lemma.


Lemma 21 If ΘbF 6= ∅, there exists a θub such that 0 ≤ θub ≤ 1 and ΘbF = 0, θub .
Proof of Lemma 21:
From Lemma 19, we know Hb (θ1 ) = σ0 φ[`(1)] + z(1)Φ[`(1)] and Hb0 (θ1 ) = 0 when k = 1.
Thus Zb0 (θ1 ) = −[p2 − Hb (θ1 )] = σ0 φ[`(1)] + z(1)Φ[`(1)] − p2 , which is a constant. Since
Zb (1) = 0, we know Zb (θ1 ) ≤ 0 if Zb0 (θ1 ) ≥ 0. Hence, if Zb0 (θ1 ) ≥ 0, ΘbF = ∅ for any
positive fundraising target S. If Zb0 (θ1 ) < 0 and ΘbF 6= ∅, then there exists a unique θub


such that Zb (θub ) = S/M and the resulting feasible set is ΘbF = 0, θub .

Proposition B.0.7 The optimal reward is rpbc∗ = Hb (θ1bc∗ ), where θ1bc∗ = θub 1{Π(0) <
Π(θub )}.
Proof of Proposition B.0.7:


Based on the property of the feasible set in Lemma 21, we have ΘbF = 0, θub . In
addition, the firm’s profit function Πb (θ1 ) is (weakly) monotonic as shown in the proof of
Proposition B.0.5, and the optimum shall be attained at the two boundary points of the
feasible set ΘbF . Therefore, the optimal purchasing threshold θ1bc∗ and the corresponding
optimal reward choice rpbc∗ have the form as presented in this proposition.



Proposition B.0.8 As the fundraising target increases, the optimal crowdfunding reward
decreases and the equilibrium purchasing fraction in the crowdfunding stage increases
under BS. (Formally, as S increases, rpbc∗ decreases and θ1bc∗ decreases.)
Proof of Proposition B.0.8:
Under BS, from Lemma 21 and Proposition B.0.5, we know both Zb0 (θ1 ) and Π0b (θ1 ) are
164

p 2 =1.2, k=1, σ0 =1

p 2 =1.2, k=1, σ0 =2

0.8

0.6

0.5
0.6

Π(θ)

0.4

Z(θ)
0.4

Z(θ)

0.2

S/M

0.2

S/M

0.3

Π(θ)

0.1

0.0

0.0
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0.0

θ

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

θ

Figure B.6.: Firm’s Profit Function and Feasible Set under BS

constant and ΘbF 6= ∅ only when Zb0 (θ1 ) < 0. Then, it is straightforward to see as S
increases, θub decreases. Also, θ1bc∗ remains unchanged if Π0b (θ1 ) ≤ 0 and θ1bc∗ decreases as
θub decreases. Taken together, we can conclude that statement (ii) is true under BS.
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C. Appendix for Chapter 3
Appendix A: Summary of Notations
To keep track of the different components in our model, we summarize the notations
throughout the paper in Table C.1.

Table C.1: Summary of Model Notations
Parameters
α

crowdfunding market share

z

initial investment/fixed setup cost

I

market size (random variable)

q

product quality

k

word-of-mouth (WoM) intensity

ρ0

awareness base of the crowdfunding product

β

market uncertainty

Cs

startup’s credit rating

η(Cs )

interest rate premium under bank financing for the credit rating Cs

δ(Cs )

financing cost coefficient, defined as δ(Cs ) = 1 + η(Cs )

Decisions
p1 , θ1

crowdfunding price/consumers’ purchase threshold in period 1, θ1 = p1 /q

p2 , θ1

retail price/consumers’ purchase threshold in period 2, θ2 = p2 /q

T

funding target of the crowdfunding campaign

Derived
F
A(θ1 )

investment feasibility of the crowdfunding project, F =

αq
4z

awareness function A(θ1 ) = [ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 )] ∧ 1

θb

consumers’ purchase threshold under bank financing, θb = pb /q

θl

smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z

θh

smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1 − β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z

km

WoM intensity threshold, satisfying kα(4 − k + kα) = 8(kα − 1 + ρ0 )

kn

WoM intensity threshold kn = 2(1 − ρ0 )/α

βrb

market uncertainty threshold satisfying Hr (βrb ) = πb∗

βm

market uncertainty threshold βm = 1 −

βτ

unique solution to Hr (β) = Hs (β) if Hs (βm ) < Hr (βm ); otherwise, βτ = βm

Cτ

credit rating threshold satisfying α(1 − β)(2δ(Cτ ) − 1) = 2ρ0 − 1 − β
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4z
αq

Appendix B: Proofs of Statements
We present all the proofs of the Lemmas, Propositions and Corollaries in this section.
Proof of Proposition 3.4.1:
Case (i): k ≤ (1 − ρ0 )/α. In this case, the awareness function can be written as
A(θ1 ) = [ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 )] ∧ 1 = ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 ), its first-order derivative with respect to
θ1 is A0 (θ1 ) = −kα. Hence, the first-order derivative of the profit function π(θ1 ) becomes
1
1
π 0 (θ1 ) = q(1 + β)α − q(1 + β)αθ1 − q(1 + β)(1 − α)αk.
2
8
The optimal solution θ1∗ to the unconstrained profit-maximization problem maxθ1 ∈[0,1] π(θ1 )
is
θ1∗ =

(4 − k + kα)+
.
8

Case (ii): k > (1 − ρ0 )/α. In this case, the awareness function could be truncated with
ρ0 +kα(1−θ1 ) > 1. Hence, its first-order derivative with respect to θ1 can be summarized
as


1 − ρ0 

dA(θ1 )
kα
.
=

dθ1
 − kα, if θ1 > 1 − 1 − ρ0 

kα


 0,

Hence,

if θ1 < 1 −



1 − ρ0 
0
τ

π1 (θ1 ), if θ1 ≤ θ1 = 1 −

kα
π 0 (θ1 ) =
,

π 0 (θ1 ), if θ1 ≥ θτ = 1 − 1 − ρ0 

2
1
kα

where

1
π10 (θ1 ) = q(1 + β)α − q(1 + β)αθ1 ,
2
1
1
π20 (θ1 ) = q(1 + β)α − q(1 + β)αθ1 − q(1 + β)(1 − α)αk.
2
8
Notice that π(θ1 ) is continuous but not differentiable at θ1τ . Hence, π10 (θ1 ) and π20 (θ1 )

represent the left and right derivative of π1 (θ1 ), respectively. Then, it is straightforward
to see that π 0 (θ1 ) is strictly decreasing in θ1 , and thus the profit function π(θ1 ) is unimodal
on [0, 1]. Then, the optimal solution can be found by investigating the following three
cases.
(1) If π10 (θ1τ ) ≤ 0, then π20 (θ1 ) < 0 for θ1 ∈ [θ1τ , 1], and thus the optimal solution is the
first-order condition π10 (θ1∗ ) = 0, which gives θ1∗ = 1/2 if k ≥ kn = 2(1 − ρ0 )/α.
(2) If π20 (θ1τ ) ≥ 0, then π10 (θ1 ) > 0 for θ1 ∈ [0, θ1τ ], and thus the optimal solution is the
first-order condition π20 (θ1∗ ) = 0, which gives θ1∗ = (4 − k + kα)/8 if (1 − ρ0 )/α < k ≤ km
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and km > 0 is uniquely derived from kα[4 − k(1 − α)] = 8(kα − 1 + ρ0 ). Here, it is
straightforward to verify km > (1 − ρ0 )/α.
(3) If π10 (θ1τ ) > 0 > π20 (θ1τ ), then the optimal solution is θ1∗ = θ1τ . Taken together case
(1)-(3), the optimal solution θ1∗ can be summarized as follows:


4 − k + kα
1 − ρ0



, if
< k < km 




8
α




kα − 1 + ρ0
∗
θ1 =
,
, if km ≤ k < kn


kα








1,

if k ≥ kn
2
where kn = 2(1 − ρ0 )/α and km > 0 is uniquely derived from kα[4 − k(1 − α)] =
8(kα − 1 + ρ0 ).
Finally, taken together case (i) and (ii), and adding the non-negativity constraint, we
have the following optimal solution:


(4 − k + kα)+



, if 0 ≤ k < km 




8




+
(kα
−
1
+
ρ
)
∗
0
θ1 =
, if km ≤ k < kn  .

kα








1,

if k ≥ kn
2
We complete the proof.

(C.1)



Proof of Lemma 9:
First, due to financial constraints, it’s not feasible to set the funding target T less than
the fixed setup cost z. Second, any funding target higher than the fixed setup cost is
suboptimal, as it only decreases the success probability of the crowdfunding project. 
Proof of Lemma 10:
Let θl < θl0 be the two roots of the quadratic equation αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z. Then,
θl < 1/2 < θl0 , and they generate the same expected profit in period 1, i.e., π(θl ) = π(θl0 ).
However, for the profit in period 2, π2∗ (θl ) > π2∗ (θl0 ) due to a higher product awareness
under strategy θl . Equivalently, we can show π2∗ (θ1 ) = q(1 + β)(1 − α)A(θ1 )/8 is a
decreasing function of θ1 . Hence, θl is Pareto dominating θl0 , which gives the Pareto set
[θl , 1/2]. Since θl is the smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1 + β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z,
hence increases in z by the property of quadratic function.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.2:
Let βm = 1 − F −1 = 1 −

4z
.
αq

Two auxiliary functions as we defined are

Hr (β) = π r (θ1u ∨ θl ∧ θh ), β ∈ [0, 1];

Hs (β) = π s (θ1u ∨ θh ), β ∈ [0, βm ].

Essentially, they represent the optimal profit under risky and safe pricing, respectively,
as a function of β. Note that the startup’s problem in the retail stage is not affected by
the financial constraint, hence is always θ2∗ = 1/2.
(i) Under low investment feasibility, we have F =

αq
4z

< 1 by definition. Hence,

βm = 1 − F −1 < 0. If β < −βm , then
1 + β < 1 − βm =

4z
= Im (1/2),
αq

hence P(1/2) = 0 and the project is not feasible. If β ≥ −βm , then the project is risky
within the feasible pricing strategy regime, i.e., P(θ1 ) = 1/2 for θ1 ∈ [θl , 1/2]. Since the
optimal solution to the unconstrained problem is θ1u as given in Proposition 3.4.1, we
know the optimal solution to the constrained problem is simply θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θl due to the
unimodality of the profit function.
(ii) Under high investment feasibility, we have F =

αq
4z

≥ 1 by definition. Hence,

βm = 1 − F −1 ≥ 0. In this case, both risky pricing with θ1 ∈ [θl , θh ) and safe pricing with
θ1 ∈ [θh , 1/2] are feasible. The startup’s problem becomes:


r
s
max π(θ1 ) = max
max π (θ1 ), max π (θ1 )
θ1 ∈[θl ,1/2]
θ1 ∈[θl ,θh )
θ1 ∈[θh ,1/2]


?
r
s
= max
max π (θ1 ), max π (θ1 ) ,
θ1 ∈[θl ,θh ]

θ1 ∈[θh ,1/2]

where the equality ? comes from the following Claim 1. Essentially, the startup needs to
compare the optimal profit in each region and choose the pricing strategy with the higher
profit. When the two pricing schemes generate the same expected profit, we assume the
safe pricing is preferred. A first observation is that both safe and risky pricing scheme
could be optimal, but safe (risky) pricing is more likely to be adopted when the market
uncertainty is relatively low (high). As illustrated in Figure C.1, the left one has a profit
maximizer in the safe pricing regime, while the right one prefers the risky pricing scheme.
Then, for a given β, we have
Hr (β) = max π r (θ1 ),
θ1 ∈[θl ,θh ]

Hs (β) =
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max

θ1 ∈[θh ,1/2]

π s (θ1 ).
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Figure C.1.: Illustration of Profit Functions for Safe and Risky Pricing Schemes

Claim 1: π r (θh ) < π s (θh ).
Proof of Claim 1: By definition, θh satisfies αq(1 − β)θh (1 − θh ) = z. Then,
z
q
π r (θh ) = (1 + β)[4αθh (1 − θh ) + (1 − α)A(θh )] − ,
8
2
q
π s (θh ) = [4αθh (1 − θh ) + (1 − α)A(θh )] − z,
4
1
q
π s (θh ) − π r (θh ) = (1 − β)(1 − α)A(θh ) + [q(1 − β)αθh (1 − θh ) − z] .
8
2

(C.2)
(C.3)
(C.4)

The second part in the last equality is zero by definition of θh , hence π s (θh ) > π r (θh ).Q.E.D.
For the two auxiliary functions Hr (β) and Hs (β), we can show the following properties.
Claim 2: Given other model parameters, Hr (β) is strictly increasing in β on [0, 1];
while Hs (β) is weakly decreasing in β on [0, βm ].
Proof of Claim 2: Since θl is the smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1 +
β)θ1 (1 − θ1 ) = z, θl decreases in β. Similarly, θh increases in β. The unconstrained
optimal solution θ1u is independent of β, and thus θ1u ∨ θl ∧ θh becomes less constrained
as β increases. Moreover, π r (θ1 ) = 8q (1 + β)[4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] −

z
2

is strictly

increasing β for a given θ1 . Therefore, we can conclude that Hr (β) = π r (θ1u ∨θl ) is strictly
increasing in β on [0, 1]. As θh increases in β, θ1u ∨ θh becomes more constrained as β
increases on [0, βm ]. (Note if β > βm , then θh does not exist, and safe pricing is not
feasible.) Moreover, π s (θ1 ) = 4q [4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − z is independent of β for
a given θ1 . Therefore, Hs (β) = π s (θ1u ∨ θh ) is weakly decreasing in β on [0, βm ].Q.E.D.
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When β = 0, θh = θl , and thus Hs (0) = 2Hr (0) > Hr (0), if Hr (0) > 0. If
Hs (βm ) < Hr (βm ), then there exists a unique solution to Hr (β) = Hs (β), denoted
as βτ . If Hs (βm ) ≥ Hr (βm ), then let βτ = βm . Finally, we can conclude that under
high investment feasibility, if β ≤ βτ , it is optimal to adopt the safe pricing scheme with
θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θh , θ2∗ = 1/2; otherwise, it is optimal to adopt the risky pricing scheme.



Proof of Proposition 3.4.3:
(i) Under low investment feasibility, crowdfunding is infeasible on [0, −βm ), which is directly from Proposition 3.4.2. When β ∈ [−βm , 1], the optimal crowdfunding price is
p∗1 = qθ1∗ = q(θ1u ∨ θl ), where θ1u is independent of β and θl decreases in β. Hence, the optimal crowdfunding price decreases on [−βm , 1]. Based on Claim 2 in proof of Proposition
3.4.2, Hr (β) is strictly increasing in β, and thus the optimal profit increases on [−βm , 1].
Note that the special case is when the WoM intensity is strong k ≥ kn , and the
optimal crowdfunding price is always q/2, with the awareness function A(1/2) = 1. The
optimal profit becomes
q
q
z
π r∗ = π r (1/2) = (1 + β)[α + (1 − α)A(1/2)] − z = (1 + β) − ,
8
8
2
which is linearly increasing in β. Figure C.2 provides an illustration of the price pattern.
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Figure C.2.: The Impact of Market Uncertainty on Optimal Crowdfunding Price
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(ii) Under high investment feasibility, it is optimal to adopt the safe pricing scheme
with θ1∗ = θ1u ∨ θh when β ≤ βτ . Based on the discussion in proof of Proposition 3.4.2,
we know the optimal crowdfunding price increases and the optimal profit decreases on
[0, βτ ]. Similarly, we can obtain the results for the case with β ∈ (βτ , 1].
Similarly, for the special case with strong WoM intensity k ≥ kn , and the optimal
crowdfunding price is always q/2, and the optimal profit under risky pricing is the same
as in part (1), and the optimal profit under safe pricing is given as
q
q
π s∗ = π s (1/2) = [α + (1 − α)A(1/2)] − z = − z,
4
4
which is a constant. See the dashed line in the shadowed blue region in Figure 3.3.



Proof of Proposition 3.4.4:
(i) First, we want to show the startup’s optimal profit always increases in he WoM
intensity. From Proposition 3.4.2, we know the optimal crowdfunding price strategy θ1∗
under safe pricing scheme is


4 − k + kα



∨ θh , if 0 ≤ k < km 




8




kα
−
1
+
ρ
∗
0
θ1 =
∨ θh , if km ≤ k < kn .


kα






1


 ,

if k ≥ kn
2
Since

4−k+kα
8

decreases in k,

kα−1+ρ0
kα

increases in k, and θh is independent of k, we can

conclude that the optimal crowdfunding price p∗1 = θ1∗ q decreases on [0, km ], then increases
on [km , kn ], and remains fixed on [kn , +∞). The profit function under safe pricing scheme
is π s (θ1 ) = 4q [4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − z, where A(θ1 ) = [ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 )] ∧ 1. Note
that ∂A(θ1 )/∂k ≥ 0 for ∀θ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Applying the Envelope Theorem, we have
dπ s∗
∂π s (θ1∗ )
q(1 − α) ∂A(θ1∗ )
=
=
≥ 0.
dk
∂k
4
∂k
Consider the case where risky pricing is adopted, i.e., Proposition 3.4.1 and Proposition 3.4.2 (1). The profit function under risky pricing scheme is π r (θ1 ) = 8q (1+β)[4αθ1 (1−
θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − z/2, and the optimal pricing scheme can be summarized as:


4 − k + kα



∨
θ
,
if
0
≤
k
<
k
l
m 




8




kα − 1 + ρ0
∗
(C.5)
θ1 =
∨ θl , if km ≤ k < kn .


kα








1,

if k ≥ kn
2
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Then, similar argument as in the safe pricing case gives the result under risky pricing. It
is important to notice that as k changes, the optimal pricing strategy may switch between
risky and safe pricing in some special case. But the increasing pattern of optimal profit
is always guaranteed by the nature of the startup’s problem, i.e., max{π s∗ , π r∗ }.
(ii) Next, we prove the startup’s optimal profit always increases in the crowdfunding
market share. Consider the case where the crowdfunding market share is relatively small,
α<

4z
q(1−β)

and hence the project investment feasibility is medium and the risky pricing

scheme is adopted. The effective profit function in this case is π r (θ1 ) = 4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) +
(1 − α)A(θ1 ), where we ignore the coefficient term 8q (1 + β) and constant term z/2 for
notational convenience. The optimal pricing scheme is given in equation (C.5). It is
straightforward to see θ1∗ could have four different forms: 1/2, θl ,

4−k+kα
8

and

kα−1+ρ0
.
kα

Then, it suffices to show π r (θ1∗ ) increases in α in each case. A further observation is that
we can put those four cases into two group based on whether A(θ1∗ ) is equal to 1. When
θ1∗ = θl ,

4−k+kα
,
8

then A(θ1∗ ) = ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1∗ ) ≤ 1. When θ1∗ = 1/2,

kα−1+ρ0
,
kα

then

A(θ1∗ ) = 1. (To be precise, for the special case when θl = 1/2, we regard it as the case
θ1∗ = θl , not the case θ1∗ = 1/2.)
Case 1: θ1∗ = θl , where θl is the smaller root of the quadratic equation αq(1+β)θl (1−
θl ) = z. Then, π r∗ = π r (θl ) = 4αθl (1 − θl ) + (1 − α)A(θl ), where A(θl ) = ρ0 + kα(1 − θl ).
Taking derivative with respect to α gives,
dπ r∗
dθl
dA(θl )
= 4θl (1 − θl ) + 4α(1 − 2θl )
− A(θl ) + (1 − α)
dα
dα
 dα

dθl
dθl
= 4θl (1 − θl ) + 4α(1 − 2θl )
− A(θl ) + (1 − α) k(1 − θl ) − kα
dα
dα
dθl
= α[4 − 8θl − k(1 − α)]
+ (1 − θl )[4θl + k(1 − α)] − A(θl ).
dα
From αq(1 + β)θl (1 − θl ) = z, we have
θl (1 − θl ) + α(1 − 2θl )

dθl
= 0,
dα

dθl
θl (1 − θl )
=−
.
dα
α(1 − 2θl )

Thus,
dπ r∗
θl (1 − θl )
= −[4 − 8θl − k(1 − α)]
+ (1 − θl )[4θl + k(1 − α)] − A(θl )
dα
1 − 2θl


θl k(1 − α)
= (1 − θl ) −4θl +
+ 4θl + k(1 − α) − A(θl )
1 − 2θl
(1 − θl )2
= k(1 − α)
− A(θl ).
1 − 2θl
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When θ1∗ = θl , from Proposition 3.4.1 we know θl ≥

4−k+kα
,
8

i.e., k(1 − α) ≥ 4 − 8θl .

Together with the fact that A(θl ) ≤ 1 and θl ≤ 1/2, we have
dπ r∗
(1 − θl )2
≥ (4 − 8θl )
− A(θl ) = 4(1 − θl )2 − A(θl ) ≥ 1 − A(θl ) ≥ 0.
dα
1 − 2θl
Case 2: θ1∗ =

4−k+kα
.
8

As A(θ1∗ ) = ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1∗ ), similar calculation as in case 1

gives
dπ r∗
dθ∗
= α[4 − 8θ1∗ − k(1 − α)] 1 + (1 − θ1∗ )[4θ1∗ + k(1 − α)] − A(θ1∗ ).
dα
dα
Since θ1∗ =

4−k+kα
,
8

the term in the above equation is zero. Since A(θ1∗ ) ≤ 1, it is sufficient

to show (1 − θ1∗ )[4θ1∗ + k(1 − α)] ≥ 1. Equivalently,


4 + k(1 − α) 4 − k + kα
+ k(1 − α) ≥ 1,
8
2

[4 + k(1 − α)]2 ≥ 16,
dπ r∗
dα

which is satisfied since k(1 − α) ≥ 0. Therefore, we have shown

≥ 0.

Case 3: θ1∗ = 1/2. Since A(θ1∗ ) = 1 in this case, we have π r∗ = α + 1 − α = 1, and
thus

dπ r∗
dα

= 0.

Case 4: θ1∗ =
π r∗

Since θ1∗ = 1 −

kα−1+ρ0
.
kα

Since A(θ1∗ ) = 1 in this case, we have




kα − 1 + ρ0
1 − ρ0 1 − ρ0
r
=π
=4 1−
+ (1 − α),
kα
kα
k

2
dπ r∗
1 − ρ0
− 1.
=4
dα
kα

1−ρ0
kα

≤ 1/2, we know

1−ρ0
kα

≥ 1/2, which gives

dπ r∗
dα

≥ 0 in the equation

above.
Combining Case 1-4, we can conclude that

dπ r∗
dα

≥ 0. Next, consider the case where

the crowdfunding market share is relatively large, α ≥

4z
q(1−β)

and hence the project

investment feasibility is high and the safe pricing scheme is adopted. Applying similar
arguments, we can show

dπ s∗
dα

≥ 0.

Finally, the global increasing pattern is guaranteed by the nature of the startup’s
problem as max{π s∗ , π r∗ }.



Proof of Lemma 11:
The bank prices the interest rate for the startup’s loan according to the competitive credit
pricing equation (3.12), zδ(Cs ) = EI [min{qρ0 θb (1 − θb )I, z(1 + rs )}].
(1) High Financing Risk: zδ(Cs ) > q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ). In this case, it is straightforward to see EI [min{qρ0 θb (1 − θb )I, z(1 + rs )}] < q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ), and thus the
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competitive credit pricing equation (3.12) can not be satisfied for any choice of rs . Hence,
the bank can not break even by issuing loan to the startup, and thus directly rejects the
loan request.
(2) Medium Financing Risk: q(1 − β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) < zδ(Cs ) ≤ q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ). In
this case, the bank can break even by charging an interest rate of rs . With probability
1/2, the market interest takes out to be high, the startup can fully repay bank’s loan
z(1 + rs ). With probability 1/2, the startup claims bankruptcy due to the low market
realization and the bank can only get back qρ0 θb (1 − θb )(1 − β). From the competitive
credit pricing equation (3.12), we have
1
1
z(1 + rs ) + qρ0 θb (1 − θb )(1 − β) = zδ(Cs ),
2
2
q
rs = 2δ(Cs ) − ρ0 θb (1 − θb )(1 − β) − 1.
z
(3) Low Financing Risk: zδ(Cs ) ≤ q(1 − β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ). In this case, there is no
bankruptcy risk for the startup, as the bank’s loan can be fully repaid even when the
market interest turns out to be low. Then, the competitive credit pricing equation (3.12)
can be met by charging the interest rate rs such that min{qρ0 θb (1 − θb )I, z(1 + rs )} =
z(1 + rs ), and thus zδ(Cs ) = z(1 + rs ), which gives rs = δ(Cs ) − 1.



Lemma 22 The expected profit functions under both low and medium financing risk share
the same form as follows: π(θb ) = qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs ).
Proof of Lemma 22:
Under medium financing risk, the startup goes bankrupt (zero profit) with probability
1/2, and makes positive profit with probability 1/2. Hence,

1
q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − z(1 + rs )
2
1
1
= q(1 + β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) + q(1 − β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs )
2
2

π(θb ) =

= qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs ).
Similarly, under low financing risk we know there is no bankruptcy risk for the startup,
and thus the expected profit is the profit over the mean market interest which is one, and
the bank’s interest rate is rs = δ(Cs ) − 1. Hence, the expected profit becomes
π(θb ) = qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − z(1 + rs ) = qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs ).
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Therefore, the expected profit functions have the same form for low and medium financing
risk.



Proof of Proposition 3.5.1:
The startup’s problem under bank financing can be summarized as follows:
max π(θb ) = max qρ0 θb (1 − θb ) − zδ(Cs ).

θb ∈[0,1]

θb ∈[0,1]

Hence, the optimal pricing strategy is θb∗ = 1/2, under which the optimal profit is πb∗ =
1
qρ0
4

− zδ(Cs ).

We further characterize the condition under which bank financing is feasible. From
Lemma 11, we know the bank directly rejects the loan request when zδ(Cs ) > q(1 +
β)ρ0 θb (1 − θb ) = q(1 + β)ρ0 /4. By definition Cl (β) satisfies 4zδ(Cl ) = qρ0 (1 + β), the
condition is equivalent to Cs < Cl (β) due to the fact that δ(·) is a decreasing function.
Similarly, the bank’s interest rate decision is a direct result from Lemma 11 with the
optimal pricing strategy θb∗ = 1/2.



Proof of Proposition 3.6.1:
From Proposition 3.5.1, the optimal profit under bank financing is πb∗ = qρ0 /4 − zδ(Cs ),
which is independent of the market uncertainty β.
(i) Under low investment feasibility, crowdfunding is not feasible when β ∈ [0, −βm )
and in this case bank yields strictly higher profit. If 0 < πb∗ < Hr (−βm ), crowdfunding
yields strictly higher profit than bank financing when β ∈ [−βm , 1], since Hr (β) is strictly
increasing in β, based on Claim 2 in the proof of Proposition 3.4.2. If Hr (−βm ) ≤ πb∗ ,
we first need to show there always exists a βrb , such that Hr (βrb ) = πb∗ . Then, it suffices
to show Hr (1) ≥ πb∗ . Note that Hr (β) = maxθ1 ∈[θl ,θh ] π r (θ1 ), and thus
q
z
Hr (1) ≥ π r (θl ) = [4αθl (1 − θl ) + (1 − α)A(θl )] − .
4
2
Since θl satisfies 2αqθl (1 − θl ) = z when β = 1, z > αq/4 under low investment feasibility,
and ρ0 ≤ A(θl ) ≤ 1, we further have
q
q
qρ0
Hr (1) ≥ π r (θl ) = (1 − α)A(θl ) ≥ (ρ0 − α) >
− z > qρ0 /4 − zδ(Cs ) = πb∗ .
4
4
4
Therefore, there always exists a βrb , such that Hr (βrb ) = πb∗ , and crowdfunding yields
strictly higher profit than bank financing when β ∈ (βrb , 1].
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(ii) Under high investment feasibility, we first want to show Hs (βm ) > πb∗ always hold.
By definition of βm , we know Hs (βm ) = π s (1/2). Then, we have
Hs (βm ) = π s (1/2) =

q
qρ0
[α + (1 − α)A(1/2)] − z >
− z > qρ0 /4 − zδ(Cs ) = πb∗ .
4
4

Therefore, bank financing could be preferred only when Hr (βm ) < πb∗ < Hs (βm ). In
such case, crowdfunding achieves lowest profit (the limit of its lowest profit) when β →
+
βm
based on preceding result. Then, part (a) follows immediately. Part (b) is also

straightforward by know the monotonicity of Hr (β) and Hs (β) obtained in Claim 2 in
the proof of Proposition 3.4.2. Note that βrb is derived from Hr (β) = πb∗ .



Proof of Corollary 2:
When ρ0 → 1 and δ(Cs ) → 1, the optimal profit under bank financing becomes πb∗ =
q/4 − z according to Proposition 3.5.1. Then, we want to show there always exists a βrb ,
such that Hr (βrb ) = πb∗ , and crowdfunding yields strictly higher profit than bank financing
when β ∈ (βrb , 1]. This result follows by similar argument as in the proof of Proposition
3.6.1 , and thus details are omitted here.



Proof of Proposition 3.6.2:
(1−β)αq
,
4
(1−β)αq
<z
4

First, notice when the initial investment is low, i.e., z ≤

the project is safe under

crowdfunding. When initial investment is high, i.e.,

≤

(1+β)αq
,
4

the project is

risky under crowdfunding. When ρ0 → 1, the optimal pricing strategy in crowdfunding
is always θ1∗ = θ2∗ = 1/2, and the optimal profits for risky and safe projects are
q
z
π r (1/2) = (1 + β) − ,
8
2

π s (1/2) =

q
− z.
4

The optimal profit under bank financing is πb∗ = qρ0 /4−zδ(Cs ) = q/4−zδ(Cs ), as ρ0 → 1.
(i) When z ≤

(1−β)αq
,
4

the project is safe under crowdfunding. Since δ(Cs ) > 1, we

know πb∗ < π s (1/2), hence crowdfunding is always preferred.
(ii) When

(1−β)αq
4

<z≤

(1+β)αq
,
4

the project is risky under crowdfunding. Let Cτ be

the threshold of startup’s credit rating Cs such that π r (1/2) = πb∗ at z =

(1−β)αq
.
4

That

gives,
q
(1 − β)αq
q
(1 − β)αq
(1 + β) −
= − δ(Cs )
,
8
8
4
4
which can be simplified as α(1 − β)(2δ(Cs ) − 1) = 2ρ0 − 1 − β. Note that the credit
rating threshold Cτ is unique because the function δ(Cs ) is decreasing in Cs . Further, if
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(1−β)αq
and it is
4
≤ (1+β)αq
. Thus,
4

Cs < Cτ , π r (1/2) > πb∗ at z =
always holds for

(1−β)αq
4

<z

straightforward to see that π r (1/2) > πb∗
crowdfunding is always preferred in this

case. If Cs ≥ Cτ , as both profits π r (1/2) and πb∗ are line function of z with different
(1+β)αq 
slop, we can conclude that there exists a threshold zb ∈ (1−β)αq
, such that bank
,
4
4

financing is preferred when z ∈ (1−β)αq
, zb .

4
Proof of Proposition 3.8.1:
Ignoring some constant terms, the consumer surplus for risky and safe projects can be
written as C(θ1∗ ) = 4α(1 − θ1∗ )2 + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ ).
(i) We want to show: As the WoM intensity increases, for risky projects, the consumer
surplus and social welfare first increase on [0, kl ∨km ], decrease on [kl ∨km , kn ], and remain
stable on [kn , +∞), where kl =

1−ρ0
.
α(1−θl )

Then, similar argument gives the results for safe

project.
First, consider the case kl ∨ km = km , i.e., kl ≤ km . For risky projects, the optimal
pricing scheme is summarized in in equation (C.5). When 0 ≤ k < km , we have A(θ1∗ ) =
ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 ) < 1, and
dA(θ1∗ )
dC(θ1∗ )
dθ∗
= −8α(1 − θ1∗ ) 1 + (1 − α)
dk
dk
dk
1
= α(1 − α)(1 − θ1∗ ) + k(1 − θ1∗ )(1 − α)2 > 0.
8
When km < k < kn , we have A(θ1∗ ) = 1, and
8
dC(θ1∗ )
dθ∗
= −8α(1 − θ1∗ ) 1 = − 2 (1 − θ1∗ )(1 − ρ0 ) < 0.
dk
dk
k
When k > kn , we have A(θ1∗ ) = 1 and θ1∗ = 1/2, and thus C(θ1∗ ) remains fixed.
Second, consider the case kl ∨ km = kl , i.e., kl ≥ km . Then, by preceding results, it
suffices to show C(θ1∗ ) increases in k when θ1∗ = θl . Note that θl is independent of k and
in this case A(θ1∗ ) = ρ0 + kα(1 − θ1 ) < 1. Hence, we have
dC(θl )
dA(θl )
1
= (1 − α)
= k(1 − θl )(1 − α)2 > 0,
dk
dk
8
which completes the proof. Figure C.3 provides an illustration of the impact of WoM
intensity and market uncertainty on consumer surplus.
(ii) Due to similar structures between C r (θ1∗ ) (C s (θ1∗ )) and π r (θ1 ) (π s (θ1 )), the results
in the proposition is straightforward to obtain by analogy. Hence, details omitted here.
Proof of Proposition 3.8.2:
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Figure C.3.: The Impact of WoM Intensity and Market Uncertainty on Consumer Surplus

The social welfare S r (θ1∗ ) for risky projects under optimal pricing strategy θ1∗ can be
derived as
S r (θ1∗ ) = π r (θ1∗ ) + C r (θ1∗ )


1
= q(1 + β) 4α(1 − θ1∗ )2 + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ )
16
1
z
+ q(1 + β)[4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] −
8
2
1
z
3
= q(1 + β)(1 − α)A(θ1∗ ) + q(1 + β)α(1 − θ1∗2 ) − .
16
4
2
The three thresholds βrb , βcb and βsb are derived respectively from the following three
equations
1
z
1
π r (θ1∗ ) = q(1 + βrb )[4αθ1∗ (1 − θ1∗ ) + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ )] − = πb∗ = qρ0 − zδ(Cs ),
8
2
4


1
1
C r (θ1∗ ) = q(1 + βcb ) 4α(1 − θ1∗ )2 + (1 − α)A(θ1∗ ) = Cb = qρ0 ,
16
8
1
z
3
3
S r (θ1∗ ) = q(1 + βsb )(1 − α)A(θ1∗ ) + q(1 + βsb )α(1 − θ1∗2 ) − = Sb = qρ0 − zδ(Cs ).
16
4
2
8
Since C r (θ1∗ ) is increasing in β, we know bank financing is preferred when β ∈ (|βm |, βcb )
from the perspective of consumer surplus. Similarly, for the social welfare, bank financing
is preferred when β ∈ (|βm |, βsb ). Figure C.4 depicts an example of the above relationship,
where the highlighted yellow region represents the range [βrb , βcb ], and βsb lies somewhere
in between.
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Figure C.4.: Preference between Crowdfunding and Bank Financing

Appendix C: Complementary Results
In this appendix, we provide complementary results to show that our main results
continue to hold when several assumptions are relaxed, and to present additional results
of our model.

1. Positive Marginal Cost
Suppose the startup needs to incur a fixed cost z and a marginal cost 0 < c < q. Then,
given the retail price p2 , consumers in the retail market with θ ≥ θ2 = p2 /q will purchase,
which gives the expected revenue in retail stage π2 (θ2 ; θ1 ) = (qθ2 − c)(1 − α)A(θ1 )(1 − θ2 ).
The optimal pricing strategy becomes
θ2∗ =

q+c
.
2q

Back to the crowdfunding stage, the firm’s expected revenue is π1 (θ1 ) = (qθ1 −c)α(1−θ1 ).
The expected total profit for safe (P = 1) and risky (P = 1/2) projects can be written
as
π s (θ1 ) = π1 (θ1 ) + π2 (θ2∗ ; θ1 ) − z
= (qθ1 − c)α(1 − θ1 ) +
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(q − c)2
(1 − α)A(θ1 ) − z;
4q

z
1+β
[π1 (θ1 ) + π2 (θ2∗ ; θ1 )] −
2 
2

1+β
(q − c)2
z
=
(qθ1 − c)α(1 − θ1 ) +
(1 − α)A(θ1 ) − .
2
4q
2

π r (θ1 ) =

The unimodality of the above two profit functions can be easily verified. Because
of positive marginal cost, the funding target T should cover both the fixed cost and
associated variable production cost. For risky project with profit function π r (θ1 ), the
feasible pricing strategy θ1 should satisfy θ1 ∈ [θl , q+c
], where θl be the smaller root of the
2q
quadratic equation (1 + β)α(θ1 q − c)(1 − θ1 ) = z. Similarly, for safe project with profit
function π s (θ1 ), the feasible pricing strategy is θ1 ∈ [θh , q+c
], where θh be the smaller root
2q
of the quadratic equation (1 − β)α(θ1 q − c)(1 − θ1 ) = z.
Similarly, we define the investment feasibility F with slightly different formula as
follows,
F=

α(q − c)2
.
4qz

Then, we can categorize projects into low (1/2 ≤ F < 1) and high (F ≥ 1) investment
feasibility, and analyze the profit maximization problem under each case. All the analysis
of crowdfunding can carry through here, and similar results can be obtained with different
thresholds for k and β as in Propositions 3.4.1-3.4.3. Similar arguments also hold for the
case of bank financing.

2. Quality Uncertainty
Suppose the value of q is unknown in the crowdfunding stage, but will be realized in
the retail stage. The consumers’ prior belief of the quality q follows the same distribution
G, with mean denoted as µq . For any quality realization, the optimal retail price is
p∗2 = q/2, inducing the same purchase threshold θ2∗ = 1/2. Hence, the optimal expected
revenue in the retail stage becomes
Z
A(θ1 )
µq
∗
E[π2 (θ2 ; θ1 )] = x(1 − α)
dG(x) = (1 − α)A(θ1 ).
4
4
Back to the crowdfunding stage, consumer’s purchase decision will be based on the expected value of quality q, i.e., µq , and thus the revenue is π1 (θ1 ) = µq θ1 α(1 − θ1 ). Therefore, the expected total profit over the two periods becomes
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π(θ1 ) = π1 (θ1 ) + E[π2 (θ2∗ ; θ1 )] − z
µq
=
[4αθ1 (1 − θ1 ) + (1 − α)A(θ1 )] − z,
4
which is essentially the same as the one derived in the main paper, simply by replacing
q with µq . As such, all the results remain unchanged.
However, it is important to further point out that even facing quality uncertainty,
consumers in the crowdfunding stage have no incentive to delay their purchase decision
to the retail stage, i.e., no strategic waiting behavior. Note that θ1∗ ≤ 1/2, and consumers
appearing in the crowdfunding stage can be divided into two groups: θ ∈ [1/2, 1] and
θ ∈ [θ1 , 1/2]. For the first group with θ ∈ [1/2, 1], they always purchase in the retail stage
if they choose to wait since θ2∗ = 1/2. Hence, their expected net utility from purchasing
in two stages are θµq − p∗1 = (θ − θ1∗ )µq and θµq − p∗2 = (θ − θ2∗ )µq , respectively. They have
no incentive to wait just because θ1∗ ≤ θ2∗ . For the second group with θ ∈ [θ1 , 1/2], they
won’t purchase in the retail stage for any quality realization since θ2∗ = 1/2, which gives
zero net utility from waiting. However, if they choose to purchase in the crowdfunding
market, their expected net utility is nonnegative. Therefore, the second group has no
incentive to wait as well.

3. WoM Communication in Bank Financing
Our model of bank financing differs from crowdfunding in product awareness, and
WoM communication only happens in crowdfunding. Hence, crowdfunding has a competitive advantage, as all consumers in crowdfunding market are informed about the product,
and crowdfunding sales can further generate awareness expansion in the retail market.
Essentially, more consumers are informed about the product in crowdfunding. But, our
model can be easily extended to the case where WoM communication also happens in
bank financing. One way to incorporate this feature is to change the initial awareness
base under bank financing from A(0) to A(x), with additional parameter x > 0 reflecting
the integrated WoM interaction in the single selling period under bank financing. Such
a modification will not affect any of our main results and insights qualitatively.
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4. Crowdfunding-Bank Hybrid Financing
The firm may consider combining multiple financing options to better secure funds
for its project. As a first step, our paper aims to provide thorough understandings on
the pros and cons of those distinct choices by a comprehensive analysis and comparison
of the available funding options. If one option, for sure, dominates the other in certain
circumstance, then it could be reasonable to adopt that specific option, rather than
combining them and incurring additional administrative and operational complexities.
One case would likely happen in practice is that after a crowdfunding failure, the firm
may use the demand information collected in crowdfunding to support further bank
financing. Note in this case, there is no risk in bank financing as demand is perfectly
learned via crowdfunding sales. Hence, the problem will become trivial and easy to solve.

5. Free-Sample Seeding Strategy (Special Case Discussion)
In certain situations, crowdfunding shall work as a device of “informative advertising”
and the firm may be willing to offer the product for free to increase awareness. This pricing strategy is often referred to as free-sample seeding strategy, which could be optimal
when the benefit from WoM communication completely dominates the revenue loss in the
crowdfunding stage due to free sample offering. Such a pricing strategy is not uncommon on crowdfunding platforms (Kickstarter, Indiegogo) at the early stage of projects
(although such a strategy is not applied for the entire campaign duration, the rationale is
quite similar). The highlighted yellow region in Figure C.5(b) represents the case where
the free-sample seeding strategy is adopted and the following corollary characterizes the
adoption conditions for this strategy.
Corollary 3 If z = 0 and 4/(1 − α) ≤ k ≤ (1 − ρ0 )/α, then p∗1 = 0.
The premise of such strategy is that by initially targeting on the crowdfunding market
(small), giving them free samples of the product, the firm can trigger a cascade of influence
by which friends will recommend the product to other friends, and many individuals
will ultimately know it and try it in the retail market (large).This strategy is optimal
because the benefit from WoM communication completely dominates the revenue loss
in the crowdfunding stage due to free sample offering. The conditions for the adoption
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Figure C.5.: Optimal Crowdfunding Price p∗1 without Financial Constraint

of this free-sample seeding strategy are: the firm does not rely on crowdfunding for
capital raising (otherwise funding is the first priority); the initial awareness base of the
crowdfunding product is low (otherwise the potential benefit of awareness expanding is
limited); the crowdfunding consumer segment is small (otherwise too much revenue loss);
and the WoM intensity is medium (otherwise the optimal crowdfunding rewards are low).
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